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Introduction: Political Conflict and the Third Century 
Making and Breaking Emperors 
If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world, during which the condition 
of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that 
which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus.1 
The reign of the Emperor Commodus, the son of Marcus Aurelius, ends the period of 
enlightened despotism and also begins a new period of bloodshed and misery, in which the 
main feature is the power possessed by the army to settle at will the destiny of the state. The 
army, once the servant of the empire, became its master, and acted through rulers whom it 
raised up and pulled down according to its own caprice and for no obvious reason.2 
Throughout the early tradition of historical scholarship on the Roman empire, the end of the second 
century marked an important moment of transition. Gibbon’s ‘happy and prosperous’ age of the 
Antonines came to an end. Their successors oversaw a descent into corruption, violence and civil 
war. Commodus was murdered through court intrigue in 192; his senatorial replacement, Pertinax, 
was executed by the unruly Praetorian Guard, in favour of the dissolute Didius Julianus; Septimius 
Severus was proclaimed emperor after an invasion of Italy in 193, and two civil wars soon after to 
secure power. After Severus, things only got worse. Theodor Mommsen could apparently announce 
that the emperors between his death and the accession of Domitian in 284 were nothing more than 
the lowest dregs of Roman society.3 When Mikhail Rostovtzeff introduced the ‘Ordeal of the Roman 
Empire’ in the striking rhetorical terms quoted above, he was building on solid foundations. The era 
                                                             
1 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1 (London, 1776), 78 (= Womersley 1994 I: 
103). 
2 Rostovtzeff 1926-27 II: 305. 
3 Demandt and Demandt 1992: 377. This recent edition is a reconstruction of the unpublished fourth of five 
intended volumes of T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte (four vols, Berlin, 1854-86), made from lecture notes 
taken by two of Mommsen’s students. See Demandt and Demandt 1992: 27-50 for an overview, and a claim that 
it represents a reliable indication of Mommsen’s words.   
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of philosophical, benevolent rule descended into a world in which soldiers took control of politics. 
The Severans maintained their power through the troops; the end of their dynasty then marked the 
beginning of five decades often labelled the “Military Anarchy”.4 
Jumping forward from Rostovtzeff to the present day, the third century appears a very different 
place. The rhetoric of sharp decline which characterised these early reconstructions has been 
replaced with a narrative of transition and transformation. This is shown in part by a growing variety 
in the chronological boundaries of studies which include the third century. For Brian Campbell’s The 
Emperor and the Roman Army: 31 BC-AD 235 and Ramsey MacMullen’s Roman Government’s Response to 
Crisis: AD 235-337, the reign of Maximinus Thrax provides a sharp boundary between the traditional 
imperial and late-antique periods.5 Though a small number of more recent investigations use the 
accession of Maximinus as a chronological limit,6 this is now rarely the case. As seen recently in 
Clifford Ando’s synoptic history, several studies bracket the third century as its own period, often 
spanning a well-defined interval from the aftermath of Commodus’ assassination to the accession of 
Diocletian,7 or the death of Constantine.8 But there are exceptions to this approach. David Potter’s 
The Roman Empire at Bay, first published in 2004 and updated in a second edition a decade letter, 
concludes at the end of the fourth century.9 Olivier Hekster has recently extended the chronology in 
the opposite direction, including the third century in his Emperors and Ancestors, which covers the 
Julio-Claudians through to the Tetrarchy.10 Michael Kulikowski’s Imperial Triumph similarly begins 
                                                             
4 See Cook et al. 1939 for an extensive overview of contemporary thinking. 
5 MacMullen 1976; Campbell 1984. 
6 Most notably Johne et al. 2008. 
7 Ando 2012; see also Hekster 2008; Mennen 2011; Manders 2012. 
8 e.g. Christol 1997; Carrié and Rousselle 1999; Southern 2001; Bowman et al. 2005; Quet 2006 (beginning with 
Marcus Aurelius). 
9 Potter 2014. 





with Hadrian, recasting the third century as part of a narrative of development from the Antonines 
to Constantine.11 
This chronological reframing has coincided with a reassessment of the third century in relation to a 
range of themes, beyond the political or economic. Given the good number of works by Christian 
theologians surviving from this period, it is unsurprising that the place of the third century in the 
religious developments of the empire has long been of interest.12 Christianity is increasingly not alone 
in this regard. There is growing interest in the literary culture of the third century, particularly in 
respect to the wider phenomenon of the Second Sophistic.13 Hekster’s most recent volume is only one 
example of an increasing investigation into the development of an imperial ideology, and its 
promulgation throughout the provinces.14 The work of jurists, alongside Caracalla’s universal 
citizenship edict of 212, has also seen considerable reassessment as part of the development of Roman 
law.15 In the variety and complexity of studies, modern scholarship can seem a world away from its 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century foundations. 
Yet for all the change in attitudes towards the Severans and the third century, in one regard things 
look very much the same. In its basic character, this period is still defined by the political involvement 
of the army. The soldiers are the driving force of political change, acting to the detriment of the 
Senate. This view is exemplified by the same recent anglophone histories which have otherwise 
reframed the period. Clifford Ando’s The Critical Century includes a chapter on the legal changes 
caused by the citizenship law. It is contained within a more familiar narrative, which includes familiar 
comments on the importance of the Severans in the build-up to the turmoil of the later third century. 
In an explicit nod to Gibbon, Ando proposes that Septimius Severus played a pivotal role. Though not 
                                                             
11 Kulikowski 2016. 
12 For broad overviews, see e.g. Carrié and Rousselle 1999; Clarke 2005; Fowden 2005; various papers in Quet 
2006; Ando 2012: 122-45; Potter 2014: 297-325. 
13 The body of scholarship is extensive. Recent volumes include Goldhill 2001; Whitmarsh 2001; König 2009; 
Madsen and Rees 2014; Richter and Johnson 2017. 
14 See also Ando 2000, 2016a: 172-75; Weisweiler 2016; 2017: 52-61. 
15 Ando 2016b, on the Constitutio Antoniniana; Babusiaux and Kolb 2014. 
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a morally corrupt ruler, he describes Severus making it clear that the army was the true source of 
power, and thereby putting an end to any pretence of respect for the Senate’s traditional role. As he 
summarises: 
Severus revealed the working of power relations among interest groups within the state 
more nakedly than ever before; he more openly mocked or discounted the discursive and 
institutional structure by which those relations had been channelled, controlled and 
disguised.16 
The main interest groups in question are the army, the Senate, the equestrian order, the imperial 
household, and the masses. After Severus ‘substantially weakened the conventional [i.e. senatorial] 
structures of legitimation…no alternative method for the construction of a social consensus 
emerged.’17 In this reading, the decision by Severus to favour the army at the expense of the Senate 
set a pattern which led to the collapse of imperial legitimacy. The same argument is put forward by 
David Potter. As he concludes, earlier emperors balanced different interests; ‘[Severus] deliberately 
created insecurity and fear as a substitute for Marcus’ balancing act. Caracalla learned this much from 
his father, but he went too far, alienating officials from the notion that the emperor could balance 
interests other than those that were immediately obvious.’18 In turn, the events of 238 reveal the full 
extent of the divisions, and the army’s success in dominating politics.19 
An overview of the military and political history of the early third century quickly demonstrates how 
the centrality of the army was formed and justified. The stability of five peaceful imperial successions 
following Nerva’s death was exceptional.20 In little over forty-five years, from New Year’s Eve 192 to 
238, fourteen recognised Augusti died. All but Septimius Severus did so violently. This figure becomes 
                                                             
16 Ando 2012: 46. 
17 Ando 2012: 224. 
18 Potter 2014: 562-63. 
19 Potter 2014: 167-71.  
20 Indeed, this is true for the entirety of Rome’s history while it was united under the control of a single ruler; 





even starker when it is observed that just two emperors account for two-thirds of that time.21 After 
the unrest which preceded his reign, Severus fought two civil wars before securing power, against 
Pescennius Niger in Asia Minor (193-194) and then Clodius Albinus, who had briefly been appointed 
his Caesar, in Gaul (196-197). His death in 211 was followed by a period of instability. Caracalla killed 
his brother and co-emperor Geta in 212, before himself being assassinated in 217. Macrinus, the first 
equestrian emperor, reigned for only a year before he too was executed after defeat in civil war. The 
notorious priest-emperor Elagabalus reigned for four years before being killed by the Praetorian 
Guard in 222, in favour of his younger cousin Severus Alexander. 
It would take another thirteen years before violence led to another imperial assassination, though 
that time was not peaceful. A resurgent Persia, under the leadership of Shapur I, became an active 
threat in the 230s. After a failed invasion in 233, Severus Alexander then travelled to the Rhine 
frontier. In 235 he was killed, and replaced by Maximinus Thrax. He suffered the same violent fate 
three years later, after a reign in which he never visited Rome. First, a rebellion broke out in North 
Africa, led by the governor Gordian. He was recognised as emperor alongside his son and namesake. 
Their uprising was quickly quelled; the younger Gordian was killed in battle, and his father 
committed suicide. The response in Rome was not however to accept defeat. Two senators were 
appointed co-emperors, Pupienus and Balbinus, in opposition to Maximinus, with the great-nephew 
of Gordian as their Caesar. Maximinus in turn invaded Italy, where he was held up besieging the city 
of Aquileia on the northern tip of the Adriatic Sea. He was killed by his troops during the siege. A few 
weeks later, Pupienus and Balbinus were also killed, at the hands of the Praetorian Guard. Over the 
course of a few months, five Augusti were killed.22 The thirteen-year-old Gordian III was left as sole 
ruler of the empire. The succeeding decades would see civil war as almost the default, culminating in 
                                                             
21 Septimius Severus (193-211) and Severus Alexander (222-235). 
22 The precise chronology of 238 is very difficult to determine. Strasser 2016 provides the most recent attempt; 
cf. Peachin 1990: 26-29. 
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the splintering of Roman power into three separate units in the 260s,23 in an apparent collapse of 
central imperial authority. 
 Purely in terms of imperial successions, the violence of the army appears as a common factor in the 
disruption. These five decades saw four emperors killed by the Praetorian Guard during this time, 
and a fifth at the instruction of the Praetorian Prefect;24 two more were killed by mutinous soldiers.25 
Alongside Severus’ opponents, a further four lost civil wars.26 The court intrigues that led to the 
murders of Commodus and Geta seem relatively peaceful in comparison. But the rapid turnover of 
emperors is only the most visible aspect of this scenario of political chaos. Alongside the ‘making and 
breaking’ of emperors,27 the position of the military was altered through a series of reforms. Severus 
is said to have increased the soldiers’ status, and instigated the rapid six- to eightfold increase of 
military pay.28 This coincided with a growing reliance on equestrians within the imperial 
bureaucracy. As a result, the Senate lost out in two ways. Financially, it was the elite whose wealth 
                                                             
23 The Gallic Empire broke away under Postumus in 260, and at its height stretched from Spain to Britain. The 
Palmyrene Empire controlled territory from Asia Minor to Egypt, under the governor Odaenathus, originally 
remaining in alliance with the emperor Gallienus; it broke away from Rome openly under his son Vaballathus, 
and the famed Empress Zenobia in 267. Both splinter empires were conquered by Aurelian in the 270s. 
24 Pertinax, Elagabalus, Pupienus and Balbinus; Caracalla is the fifth. 
25 Severus Alexander and Maximinus. 
26 Didius Julianus, Macrinus, and Gordians I and II. 
27 Nicols 2007. The pattern of violent removal of emperors, either through defeat in civil war or murder by 
soldiers, continued until the accession of Diocletian. Including Gordian III, twenty-one Augusti were recognised 
in Rome from the end of 238 to 284, of whom four probably died of natural causes: Claudius Gothicus (268-270) 
and Tacitus (275-276) both succumbed to plague; Hostilian (250, alongside Trebonianus Gallus) and Carus (282-
283) may have died of disease, or may have been murdered. For an introduction, see Kienast et al 2017: 187-254; 
Meijer 2004: 83-108; Drinkwater 2005. 
28 Severus is credited with the first of three rises in 197, followed by Caracalla (212) and Maximinus Thrax (235). 
The precise details of the pay increase are disputed, but it is accepted to have been significant; see Speidel 1992, 






was targeted to pay the troops. And politically, their opportunities for power were reduced. The 
Severan dynasty has thus been interpreted as transformative in its militarisation of Roman political 
life.29 For both Gibbon and Ando alike, Severus was ‘the principal author of the decline and fall of the 
Roman empire.’30  
The ongoing importance of the army as a cause for political turmoil, and the absence of any concerted 
challenge against it, is evident in perhaps the largest modern debate about the period. The question 
of the Crisis of the Third Century has dominated large swathes of its historical discussion. The Crisis 
model was articulated most comprehensively by Géza Alföldy, as a breakdown in the social and 
political institutions of the empire in the decades between the Severans and the rise of Diocletian 
fifty years later. Instability in politics was worsened by the aggression of Rome’s neighbours, 
exacerbated by longstanding plague. For Alföldy, this was a time of economic collapse, which created 
a sense of despair among the empire’s inhabitants. Though political unrest was therefore only one 
aspect of the empire’s struggle for survival, its form followed a familiar line of argument. Once again, 
the soldiers were given too many new privileges by Septimius Severus and Caracalla, and so realised 
the full extent of their influence, and made ever greater demands in return for loyalty. The Senate 
was ignored, as a body whose displeasure was much less threatening. The events of 238 sharpened 
the appearance of a political conflict which had long been brewing, and which the soldiers ultimately 
won; the dominance of the army would define the decades which followed.31 
Alföldy’s view of the third century has been highly influential, but it was not accepted universally. 
Two routes of attack were advanced in the 1990s. The first concerned Alföldy’s argument that ancient 
writers were aware of the crisis they were living through.32 Karl Strobel was especially forceful in 
questioning whether such awareness could even be possible, and several scholars followed in 
                                                             
29 Syme 1971: 181 
30 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1 (London, 1776), 129 (= Womersley 1994 I: 
148); Ando 2012: 19-47. 
31 The Crisis is the subject of the papers collected in Alföldy 1989. 
32 See esp. Alföldy 1989: 319-42, = 1974a. 
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challenging Alföldy’s engagement with specific authors.33 The second stressed economic factors. 
Christian Witschel used archaeological evidence to demonstrate that many regions of the empire 
flourished in the third century, leading to the rejection of their being any crisis at all.34 There have 
been several responses, not least from Alföldy himself.35 Broadly speaking, it has been accepted that 
a universal crisis is an exaggeration. At the same time, the convergence of several short-term 
difficulties has been offered as a defence for Crisis as a term which remains useful.36 
It is not my intention to contribute to this debate here, but to use it to demonstrate a point. Several 
aspects of the Crisis model have been challenged and defended over the past thirty years. One has 
not. At no stage in the discussion surrounding Crisis has the characterisation of the role of the 
military been questioned. Instead, it remains a central block in the defence of using the term to 
describe the third century. Lukas de Blois has recently reframed the third century, splitting it into 
two: a period of genuine Crisis after 235, and its ‘onset’ under the Severans.37 The early decades of the 
century were not, in his view, a period of crisis, but they defined its key terms: 
Emperors were progressively becoming more dependent on their armies, which they could 
not discipline any more. So large parts of the population in war-zones, their hinterlands and 
along military transit routes were plundered by Roman military and exhausted by 
extraordinary requisitions, for which they did not receive indemnities. This must have 
undermined their confidence in imperial power… Under a surface of continuity appointment 
                                                             
33 Strobel 1993; on Herodian, Sidebottom 1998: 2792-823; Zimmermann 1999a; on Cyprian, Schuler 1999; cf. 
Christol 2006. 
34 Witschel 1999; see also Whittaker 1976; Rathbone 1996; Ruffing 2006, 2008. 
35 See esp. Alföldy 2011: 254-72. 
36 Recent overviews of the discussion are found in Gerhardt 2006; Liebeschuetz 2007; Johne and Hartmann 2008: 
1031-53; Ziolkowski 2011; Sommer 2014. All five support the use of the term crisis, with an emphasis on the role 
of the army. 





policies were changing in consequence of military, fiscal and administrative needs, which 
must have estranged members of the traditional higher orders.38 
The basic narrative is a familiar one. The army becomes unruly due to the generosity of emperors, 
leading to widespread social and political disruption. And as a direct result, the senatorial elite ‘must 
have’ been alienated. 
It is now nearly one hundred years since Rostovtzeff defined the third century around a conflict 
between the Senate and the army, and nearly 250 since Gibbon despaired of the corruption which 
followed the death of Marcus Aurelius. It is clear that reconstructions of the period have advanced 
considerably in the intervening decades. One image has proven remarkably resilient. The politicised 
army dominates even the most recent attempts to understand the disruption of the third century. 
Their role is ultimately defined in moralising terms, in a period still viewed as the age of the greedy 
soldiery. The Senate continues to be the victim of this process, ostracised by emperors who were 
reliant on military support. This thesis aims to change that. 
Writing ‘The Age of Iron and Rust’ 
The core interest of this study is the ancient evidence which supports the reconstruction of a 
militarised Rome in the third century. The consistent basis for the picture of political conflict 
between the army and the Senate is historiography. Three extended narratives survive from the 
ancient world. Moreover, two present themselves, and are treated by modern historians, as 
contemporary witnesses to events. Both Cassius Dio and Herodian wrote accounts of this period in 
Greek. Dio’s eighty-book Roman History was originally an extended description of the entirety of 
Rome’s past, though much now been lost.39 Beginning with the mythical origins of the city, it reaches 
                                                             
38 de Blois 2006: 33.  
39 Citations of the Roman History are complex. Due to the Roman History’s preservation in epitomised and 
fragmentary form (see below, 48-54), a dispute arose over the later book divisions. The epitomised narrative 
was organised by reign, with no indication of book divisions. A first scheme was set out in the 1592 and 1606 
editions of Leunclavius, and was accepted as standard for some 300 years: it continued to be used in Dindorf 
1863-65. The divisions were disputed at the end of the nineteenth century by Alfred von Gutschmidt, who 
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Dio’s own lifetime, and concludes with his retirement from public life, covering some thousand years 
in total. Herodian’s History of the Roman Empire after Marcus Aurelius – hereafter simply the History – is 
much smaller in scope. In eight books, its fully extant text covers the fifty-eight years from the death 
of Marcus in 180 through to the accession of Gordian III in 238. Herodian claims to have lived through 
all of its events.40  
Before going into detail on Dio and Herodian, though, a word on the third narrative. The absence of 
the Historia Augusta, or indeed consideration of evidence in the fourth-century breviaria, is not 
arbitrary. There are two connected points which mark Dio and Herodian out from these other 
accounts. The first is the HA’s notoriously problematic dating. Dio and Herodian are both explicitly 
favoured as sources because of their immediacy to the events they describe. From this point of view, 
it does not matter whether the HA is placed as the work of a single author in the late fourth century,41 
or accepted as a collection of early fourth-century biographies from different authors.42 More 
importantly, the later dating reinforces concerns about the highly dubious reliability of the HA’s 
claims, meaning that its modern historiographical role is very different. It is Dio and Herodian whose 
narratives lay the foundations for the social conflict outlined above. In reconstructions of the early 
                                                             
argued that the final twenty books had been divided incorrectly (1889-94 V: 549-62, with his divisions set out 
at 561-62). His reappraisal then influenced Boissevain 1895-1901, which has become the standard text of the 
Roman History. As a result, two schemes of book divisions exist, both of which are used, often without indication. 
Thus Cary 1914-27 follows Boissevain’s division in his text, but Dindorf’s in his introduction (I: ix-xxvi).  It has 
therefore become customary to cite both. For example, 74[73].12.2 refers to Boissevain’s book 74, and Dindorf’s 
73. References to fragments of the earlier books are preceded by their book number. 
40 See below, 122 for the problem of the precise dating. 
41 See recently Rohrbacher 2016: 4-15; Cameron 2011: 743-82. 
42 See most recently Baker 2014. As will be made clear in the analysis of Dio’s fragmentary tradition (below, 55-
68), I do not believe that it is possible to use the HA to reconstruct the lost imperial biographies of Marius 





third century, the HA is primarily deployed as an occasional source of supplemental detail.43 Its use 
for the later decades depends on corroboration from external sources.44 
In contrast to the occasional use of the HA or other later writers, Dio and Herodian are inescapable in 
discussions of the Severan period. Dio in particular dominates its early stages. A crude metric of his 
importance can be found in the widespread quotation of two phrases which have come to encapsulate 
modern perceptions of Commodus and the Severans, and the unpleasantness of senatorial life during 
their reigns. The first provides the title for this section. The death of Marcus Aurelius, and the 
accession of his son, saw the empire transformed ‘from a kingdom of gold into one of iron and rust’.45 
Dio is also the source of Septimius Severus’ famous words to his two sons, shortly before his death in 
211: ‘Be harmonious; enrich the soldiers; ignore everyone else.’46 Both are ubiquitous in scholarship, 
to the point of becoming cliché.47 Herodian’s central role is delayed to his later books. The History 
includes the only closely contemporary narrative of Maximinus Thrax, whose reign is so important 
in demonstrating the fullest extent of the army’s political role. He records the uprising of the 
disgruntled soldiers on the frontier, and their selection of the general Maximinus as a replacement 
for Severus Alexander.48 Herodian’s account of 238 then seems to confirm Dio’s model of political 
conflict, in its presentation of two separate senatorial rebellions against a militaristic ruler. The result 
                                                             
43 See Barnes 1978: 87-89 for a collection of examples of the HA providing detail not found elsewhere. 
44 Hekster 2008: 8 is typical: ‘On the whole, anything that can be found solely in the Historia Augusta should be 
used only with extreme caution. Where there is literary or archaeological backup, the Historia Augusta can be 
used to supply interesting details.’ 
45 ἀπὸ χρυσῆς τε βασιλείας ἐς σιδηρᾶν καὶ κατιωμένην, 72[71].36.4. The image is a common one, as recently 
explored in Evans 2008.  
46 ‘ὁμονοεῖτε, τοὺς στρατιώτας πλουτίζετε, τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καταφρονεῖτε,’ 77[76].15.2.  
47 It is worth noting the irony that Severus’ “famous last words” are not the last thing he said even according 
to Dio, who records a final death-bed exhortation to continue with any administrative tasks: ‘Come, give it to 
me, if there’s anything for us to do,’ 77[76].17.4. It should go without saying that neither line bears any weight 
as a reflection of what Severus actually said. 
48 Hdn. 6.8-9. See Speidel 2016 for a recent analysis of the scene. 
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is something decidedly rare for ancient historians of any period: two contemporary accounts which 
actually agree with each other. 
Despite the similar importance of the two narratives in reconstructing key moments in the early third 
century, modern responses to the two historians have been very different. Thanks to a successful 
public career, Dio has been received favourably. He was a senator from the reign of Commodus 
onwards, and reached the office of consul on two separate occasions, the second time with the 
particular honour of having the emperor Severus Alexander as a colleague in the ordinary consulship 
of 229.49 Dio was directly involved in the political narrative he relates, as is reflected in the frequent 
appearance of first-person authorial comments in the contemporary books.50 His proximity to 
imperial politics has led to a reputation as a reliable eyewitness. Clifford Ando’s comments are 
representative of current historiographical attitudes, when he describes Dio as ‘a remarkably well-
placed observer’ and ‘a diligent researcher’, who proves himself to be ‘an exceptionally clear-headed 
and percipient observer of imperial government’.51 The introduction to Andrew Scott’s commentary 
on books 79-80 (published in May 2018) is the most recent reaffirmation of this approach: ‘As a 
senator and political figure… [Dio’s] position as a contemporary historian has been rightly valued.’52 
The Roman History forms the backbone of most modern reconstructions of the late second and early 
third centuries. The logic is simple: Dio was there, so he knew what was going on.53 
That is not to say that Dio’s account is universally accepted in all of its detail. Various episodes have 
been challenged, from specific criticism for what has been perceived as excessive praise for Septimius 
                                                             
49 Dio (802.5.1) tells us himself. It has been confirmed epigraphically: Roxan 1985: no. 133, first published in 
Kellner 1985 = AE (1985) 821; Toupatsoglou 1970: 280-85 = AE (1971) 430. 
50 On Dio’s narratorial persona, see Hidber 2004a. This distinctive, highly personal style is the starting point for 
Kemezis’s discussion of the Roman History (2014: 90-91). 
51 Ando 2012: 19. 
52 Scott 2018a: 1. 
53 See also e.g. Bering-Staschewski 1981: 3-4; Alföldy 1989: 181, 209; Gowing 1992: 25; Moscovich 2004; Hose 2007: 





Severus after his accession in 193,54 to a more general rejection of his portrayal of Elagabalus.55 But a 
common manoeuvre reiterates Dio’s reliability even when his factual accuracy has been questioned. 
Scott again typifies current thinking. He emphasises the distinction between the Roman History’s 
contemporary books and the narratives produced by the Severan regime. Dio was driven by ‘his 
desire to create a narrative that was reflective of a senator’s experience, in opposition to the 
projected image of the Severan rulers under whom he lived.’ His ‘stance as a conduit of senatorial 
experience’ is the foundation for his eyewitness record.56 The same views proliferate in recent 
discussions of the Severans. Potter has labelled the Roman History ‘a memoir of the governing class’,57 
and Dio’s account of Septimius Severus has even been called, ‘a form of senatorial resistance against 
Severus and his policy’.58 There has been little change in the fifty years since Fergus Millar described 
Dio’s second consulship as a moment of pro-senatorial rule, since ‘no one could have been more 
acceptable to the senatorial oligarchy than the elderly Dio’.59 Dio’s position is then framed in terms 
of an ongoing social conflict. In the struggle against the rise of military figures, he represents the 
discomfort of the senatorial order.60 
                                                             
54 75[74].1.3-5; see below, 97-98 for detail. 
55 Book 80[79]; Arrizabalaga y Prado 2010: 30-36; Icks 2011: 94-103; Kemezis 2016a: 353-60; Osgood 2016. Scott 
2018a: 102-110 provides an overview of Dio’s approach to Elagabalus, and several aspects of the scholarship 
pertaining to the young emperor’s reign. 
56 Scott 2018a: xi, 9; see 3-9 for a full discussion of Dio as a contemporary historian. 
57 Potter 2014: 331. 
58 Rantala 2016: 161. 
59 Millar 1964: 26. For recent reassertions of Severus Alexander as pro-senatorial in his appointment of consuls, 
see Potter 2014: 162-62; Kulikowski 2016: 109; cf. Davenport 2011. 
60 By way of brief example, see also Espinosa Ruiz 1982: esp. 407-26; Talbert 1984: 73; Rich 1989: 87-88; 
Edmondson 1992: 24; Hekster 2002: 4-5; Hose 2007: 461; Ando 2012: 19; Davenport 2012a: 196; Langford 2013: 84-
96; Mallan 2013a: 741 (following Eisman 1977: 670-71); Letta 2014; Schöpe 2014: 125-33; Madsen 2016: 137-43; 
Tuori 2016: 274-81. 
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Herodian’s reception among modern historians is, on the whole much, less flattering. While Cassius 
Dio is held up as a trustworthy eyewitness of events in Rome, it would take some time to chronicle 
the attacks against Herodian’s historical abilities in full. Ernst Hohl, using an epithet which sums up 
modern scholarship before him, called Herodian ‘the Levantine wind-bag’.61A few more recent 
comments show the ongoing prevalence of this view. Herodian has been called ‘a mediocre recorder’ 
who was ‘exceedingly general and flaccid in his manner of expression’;62 ‘he is a rhetorician, 
pompous, repetitive, and derivative’,63 or ‘careless, ignorant and deceitful’;64 his historical analysis in 
turn has been described as ‘superficial and banal’;65 and his narrative as a whole unreliable, due to his 
‘eternal preference for rhetoric over content.’66 Even one of his defenders can manage little more 
than a condemnation through the faintest of praise: ‘Herodian’s understanding of history is neither 
profound nor original…but at least it is coherent.’67 Indeed, there have been several scholars willing 
to conclude that Herodian was less a historian than a writer of historical fiction.68  
Despite the extensive criticism of Herodian, the History continues to be central to reconstructions of 
social conflict in the third century. The earlier books are used similarly to the Historia Augusta. Specific 
details are brought in from the History to support Dio’s narrative, providing extra detail or correcting 
perceived excesses.69 Even here, Herodian’s contributions are already of great sigificance. Herodian 
                                                             
61 ‘Der windige Levantiner’, Hohl 1954: 5. 
62 Šašel Kos 1986: 282, 362. 
63 Echols 1961: 6. 
64 Birley 1988: 204-205. 
65 Kemezis 2014: 24. 
66 Kulikowski 2016: 108. 
67 Sidebottom 1998: 2812.  
68 Sidebottom 1998: 2820-22 attempts to bridge that anachronistic divide. The most extensive summary of 
recent responses to Herodian is found in Hidber 2006: 45-71; see also Zimmermann 1999b: 1-9. Piper 1975 is an 
interesting exception, arguing in general defence of Herodian’s rhetorical approach. 
69 Ando 2012: 1-75; Potter 2014: 85-172; Kulikowksi 2016: 56-109. Bowersock 1975 attempted to rehabilitate 





is the source for many of the developments which have reinforced the militaristic character of the 
Severan dynasty. The History is the only account which includes a full scheme of three pay increases 
for the troops.70 So too it is Herodian who writes that Septimius Severus allowed soldiers to marry for 
the first time, and to wear the gold ring which signified equestrian rank.71 Regardless of the attacks 
against the History for its rhetoric and moralising, it is used as a convenient source for corroborative 
information which explains the rising political involvement of the army, and which is otherwise 
lacking in Dio’s account.72 
This tendency comes to its fullest fruition in the use of Herodian’s final three books. The Roman History 
ends under Severus Alexander, shortly after Dio’s second consulship. Thereafter, Herodian is the 
main source for the 230s. A cynical reader might note the convenience,73 but it is in this final part of 
his History that Herodian is generally considered to be at his most accurate and reliable.74 Even where 
Herodian is not explicitly credited, his narrative dominates all modern reconstructions of events 235-
238. In their recent synopses, Ando, Potter, and Kulikowski all follow Herodian’s account of the 
soldiers assassinating Severus Alexander, and appointing Maximinus in his stead; Potter goes as far 
as quoting the jibes supposedly aimed at the emperor by the disaffected troops.75 The same is true of 
                                                             
70 See above, n. 28. Only Herodian mentions all three, and he is the source for their relative sizes: an unquantified 
amount by Septimius Severus in 193 (Hdn. 3.8.4; HA Sev. 12.2); a fifty percent increase by Caracalla in 212 (Hdn. 
4.4.7; Dio 79[78].36.2-3); and a doubling of pay by Maximinus Thrax in 235 (Hdn. 6.8.8).  
71 Hdn. 3.8.5; for a discussion of the evidence for the marriage ban, see Phang 2001: 13-133; see also Campbell 
1978. Though there is much broader evidence for the ban not being in place later under the Severans, Herodian 
is vital to dating its repeal to 197. 
72 Or, as Sidebottom 1998: 2776, ‘it has been reduced to a mere quarry for historical data, and an unsatisfactory 
one at that.’ 
73 As Börm 2008: 74-75. 
74 Potter 2011: 238. In a rapid passage on Herodian, his accounts of Elagabalus and 238 are praised; otherwise, 
‘his narratives are vastly more eccentric’. See also Rostovtzeff 1957: 433 (for whom book 7 provides ‘a splendid 
picture’ of events); Dietz 1980: 35-36; Haegemans 2010: 15-16. 
75 Hdn. 6.8-9. Ando 2012: 74-75; Potter 2014: 166-67; Kulikowski 2016: 111-12. 
16 
 
238. The narrative of an uprising in North Africa sparked by a tax collector, leading to the 
proclamation of the Gordians as senators; the violence in Rome which followed their defeat, with 
open conflict between the Senate and the Praetorian Guard; Maximinus’ invasion, and his defeat at 
Aquileia; the assassination of Pupienus and Balbinus by the Praetorians. All these scenes of conflict 
have been interpreted as natural developments from the policies of the Severan dynasty. All of them 
come directly from Herodian.76 
As individual accounts, both Dio’s Roman History and Herodian’s History have therefore played 
important roles in establishing the basic events in the political developments of the early third 
century. When brought together, they have supported a broader reconstruction of a political 
atmosphere and environment, driven by conflict between the core groups of Roman politics. The two 
histories are seen as corroborating accounts of a political change which is driven by conflict among 
the core groups of Roman politics. Dio, the insider, provides its foundation. He describes a political 
environment in which the Senate was under attack from emperors and their corrupt favourites.77 
From there, Herodian’s description of events under Maximinus Thrax seem to suggest a natural 
progression. After Septimius Severus or Caracalla favoured equestrians or soldiers instead of the 
Senate, the accession of a military leader at the instigation of the army follows easily. Dio’s ‘age of 
iron and rust’ sets the political tone for scholars; Herodian’s depiction of the violent reign of the 
Thracian soldier Maximinus is used to confirm it.  
Complicating the Narrative I: Alternative Sources 
It would of course be misleading to suggest that interest in the Severans is exclusively concerned 
with the political developments of the early third century, or with the written accounts which 
describe it. The use of epigraphic and numismatic evidence has long been a common feature of 
biographies of individual emperors,78 which continue to form a sizable proportion of scholarship on 
                                                             
76 Hdn. 7.4-8.8.  
77 Ranging from the authority of Plautianus, Praetorian Prefect under Septimius Severus (Dio 76[75].14-77[76].6) 
to Caracalla’s excessive generosity to the army at the Senate’s expense (e.g. 78[77].9.1, 78[77].10.1, 78[77].17).  





the period.79 As the twentieth century progressed, non-literary evidence was increasingly regarded 
as a useful source in its own terms. Its later decades saw a number of prosopographical studies, which 
consistently identified a change in the political roles of senators and equestrians during the late 
second and early third centuries. At the same time, however, it became clear that the presentations 
of violent outbursts from emperors towards the Senate, prevalent in the written accounts, were 
greatly exaggerated.80 For example, both Dio and Herodian claim that Caracalla massacred Geta’s 
supporters after killing his brother; Herodian says that much the same happened to those of Severus 
Alexander when Maximinus came to power.81 Prosopographical studies have shown the continuity in 
senatorial careers across these supposedly drastic breaking points.82 Such conclusions are now 
commonplace, and raise an important point: the ancient accounts can be deeply misleading in their 
depictions of political life, and the extent of the challenges faced by senators. 
More recently, analysis has moved away from the emperors and their interaction with the political 
elite. The last decade has seen a large number of investigations into the representation of imperial 
regimes, especially in visual terms, which have greatly added to the understanding of the Severan 
emperors. The difference in approach is perhaps best demonstrated by Achim Lichtenberger’s study 
of Septimius Severus. Although he concentrates on one specific emperor, his analysis is not a 
traditional biography, but instead explores the presentation of imperial power and its connection to 
the divine in the media which celebrated the emperor’s regime. Dio and Herodian are mentioned in 
                                                             
79 Unsurprisingly, the transgressive images of Elagabalus have led to numerous discussions of his reign. See 
recently Arrizabalaga y Prado, 2010, 2017; Icks 2011, which also covers Elagabalus’ reception at length. Others 
to receive recent discussion include Julia Domna (Levick 2007; Langford 2013; Mallan 2013a; Scott 2017); 
Commodus (Hekster 2002); Septimius Severus (Birley 1988; Daguet-Gagey 2000).  
80 Particularly important are Dietz 1980; Christol 1986; Leunissen 1989. 
81 Dio describes twenty thousand people being killed by Caracalla (78[77].4.1), and Herodian writes that every 
rich or respected member of the Senate was executed (4.6.2-3); Herodian then has all of Alexander’s amici killed 
or exiled (7.1.3-4).  
82 See recently Christol 1999; Sillar 2001; Mennen 2007, 2011. 
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passing in a two-page summary of ‘literary sources’.83 Otherwise, the argument stems from other 
evidence. Lichtenberger concludes that Severus’ portrayal reflected a continuity with earlier 
imperial models, with specific elements unique to his reign.84  
These conclusions are reflected elsewhere, in a series of actions by the Severans which have clear 
precedents from earlier emperors. Their monumentalisation of Rome and Septimius Severus’ 
celebrations in the city looked back to Augustan models.85 The detail of imperial statuary, relief 
carving and coin types remains highly traditional; throughout these media, the Senate is closely 
associated with legitimate rule.86 It must be acknowledged that not all changes to the city of Rome 
were traditional. The increase in the number of soldiers in Rome and its immediate vicinity should 
not go ignored.87 Even so, Severan Rome seems very different when looked at, rather than read. The 
ancient writers might claim that the Severans were changing the interaction between the emperor 
and the Senate, but this was not on show in public displays.88 
                                                             
83 Lichtenberger 2011: 12-13. 
84 Lichtenberger 2011: 379-86 f.  
85 e.g. Lusnia 2006, 2014 on Severan architecture; several papers are also gathered in Swain et al 2007; Faust and 
Leitmeir 2011; Sojc et al 2013; de Sena 2013. On the ludi saeculares, see most recently Rantala 2017, with de Blois 
2017 on the decennalia of 202. More generally on Severus’ attempts to represent himself as Augustan, see also 
Cooley 2007; Barnes 2008. 
86 On the visual aspects of imperial representation, see e.g. Rollé Ditzler 2011; Leitmeir 2011; Eich 2013; Nadolny 
2016. Manders 2012 and Rowan 2012 provide recent and extensive surveys on imagery on coinage. 
87 Severus increased the number of soldiers in the city itself, as well as stationing the newly-founded Legio II 
Parthica at Alba Longa, just south of Rome; see Coulston 2000: 81 for detail of the numbers of troops; see also 
Busch 2013 on military funerary inscriptions from the city. Handy 2009: 20-33 follows Dio and Herodian to 
reconstruct reactions to the change. 
88 Cf. Ando 2012: 46-47 for the use of an imperial edict to argue that Septimius Severus showed less respect to 
the Senate in the issue of public declarations, and that imperial power was understood to be entirely in the 
hands of one man. Ando’s qualification that Severus should be assessed ‘without placing too much emphasis on 





Even as the level of engagement with non-literary evidence has unquestionably added nuance to 
reconstructions of the Severan period, the contemporary historiography continues to play an 
important role. Tightly focused studies may conflict with the image of Rome presented by Dio and 
Herodian, but their narratives are central to create the wider context in which the investigations can 
be framed. The imperial court is a good example. The last few years have seen attempts to look 
beyond prosopography, and to think about the court environment in which political careers played 
out. Aloys Winterling’s important investigations have ended with the reign of Commodus,89 but their 
methodologies have been extended into the Severan era. For Peter Eich, thinking largely in terms of 
the emperor’s role, the Severans represent a period of continuity. The relationship between 
emperors and senators stayed much the same; any change in the court was primarily due to the 
emperor’s frequent absence from Rome.90  
When the perspective is shifted to the experience of the Senate, Dio again comes to the fore. Björn 
Schöpe’s study of the individuals within the Severan court is built on prosopography, with extensive 
use of epigraphic evidence. His explanations of their careers are dependent on Dio. Thus, he observes 
a continuation of senatorial careers under Caracalla and Macrinus, using Dio’s reports of the former’s 
antipathy towards the Senate to elaborate an experience of political life at this time.91 The same 
approach is taken by Carlo Letta for the court of Septimius Severus. Prosopography may be the focus 
of his analysis of the emperor’s attitude towards the Senate, but Dio is vital in supplying the senatorial 
reaction to his reign.92 Simultaneously, views of the Severan court have therefore stressed the 
appearance of continuity, but also the experience of change, in how the emperor and the Senate 
                                                             
89 See esp. Winterling 1999, 2011. 
90 Eich 2005, 2013. Even this change was an acceleration of a process begun under the Antonines; Eich 2013: 98-
100.  
91 Schöpe 2013: 124-26, 2014: 111-33 on Caracalla. Dio’s report of life at Nicomedia in the winter of 214/215 
(78[77].17) is central to this interpretation, in which the events described are taken as separate from Dio’s over-
arching antipathy towards the emperor. 
92 Letta 2014; Dio’s importance is seen at 128-39. For prosopographical studies of the court under Severus 
specifically, see also Alföldy 1968; Jacques 1992; Okoń 2012, 2016. 
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interacted. The historiographical presentation of imperial intention has been reconsidered; its 
depiction of senatorial response less so. 
As with the institutional development of the imperial court, Dio and Herodian remain important in 
the reconstruction of specific events. For example, two recent studies have combined numismatic 
and epigraphic evidence to reassess the murder of the Praetorian Prefect Plautianus at the start of 
205.93 The years 200-202 had seen a notable increase in public celebrations of Geta, which has been 
used to suggest a pro-Geta faction in Rome. This has led to suggestions that Plautianus was not killed 
because of his own desire for power (Hdn. 3.11-12) or Caracalla’s pettiness (Dio 77[76].3-4), but as a 
result of factional intrigue stemming from either on-going sibling rivalry or elite disaffection. As a 
result, it has been suggested that Plautianus was a leading figure in a plot to replace Septimius 
Severus with Geta. Outside the immediate question of Plautianus and Geta, the justification for these 
interpretations remains closely bound to the literary frame. Both the disputes between the brothers 
and the animosity of the Senate stem directly from Dio and Herodian.94 The same pattern is repeated. 
Non-literary evidence challenges the reliability of the contemporary historiography, but any 
conclusions are simultaneously framed within the context of those same narratives. 
The examples here are a long way from exhaustive. Nonetheless, they are indicative of how the 
ancient narratives remain of central importance to modern reconstructions. Investigations of non-
literary evidence have made it clear that Dio and Herodian are far from comprehensive in their 
depictions of the political atmosphere in Rome. In two respects they continue to be vital to modern 
historiography. Their accuracy may be challenged, but this is generally aimed at specific moments. 
                                                             
93 Kemmers 2011; Bingham and Imrie 2015. 
94 Kemmers 2011: 282-87 contextualises the plot against later disputes between the brothers, including the 
acceptance of the claim that Severus took his sons to Britain as a means of trying to diffuse their tension (283, 
following Dio 77[76].11 and Hdn. 3.14). Given Commodus’ presence on the German frontier in 180, taking two 
adult heirs on campaign may simply be standard practice. Bingham and Imrie 2015: 89 offers the uncritical 
explanation of ‘the disaffected senators’ animosity towards Severus, owing to his Antonine pretensions and his 
persecution of Albinus’ supporters’ (Dio 76[75].7.4-8.4; Hdn. 3.8.6-8). See also Scott 2018b: 450-54 for an analysis 





Wider context is still derived from written accounts. So too the ancient narratives are used as 
indicative of the reception of events. In interpretations of both the court and visual representations 
of the Severans, they dictate the terms for interpreting evidence, even as they are shown to be too 
simplistic. 
Complicating the Narrative II: Historiography 
The disconnect between the historiographical depictions of Roman politics and its presentation in 
other media has therefore largely been restricted to specific events or aspects of the Severan dynasty. 
A more fundamental basis for the appraisal of Dio and Herodian can be found in the growing body of 
scholarship which looks at both narratives as literary undertakings. Traditionally, investigations of 
the authors were mainly directed towards their use as sources of historical data: the biographies of 
the historians themselves, and the reliability of their factual content.95 The kind of analysis directed 
towards Thucydides or Tacitus in the late twentieth century took longer to be applied to writers from 
the third century. That is, thankfully, no longer the case. The cultural and literary history of the early 
third century has benefitted greatly from studies of the Second Sophistic, which has included specific 
investigation of Severan Rome.96 It is now not unusual to find both Dio and Herodian in synoptic 
collections of studies on classical literature,97 or surveys of historiography more specifically.98 It 
would be an exaggeration to say that either historian is now part of a literary mainstream, but they 
have both benefitted from the integration of authors outside the traditional canon. 
                                                             
95 Introduced in more detail for each author below, at 41-45 (Dio) and 121-24 (Herodian intro). 
96 See above, 3 n. 13. On the Severans, see papers in Swain et al. 2007, including Sidebottom 2007 on 
historiography. Asirvatham 2017 provides a summary of Second Sophistic historiography more broadly. 
97 Both are included in most volumes in the Brill series Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative: Hidber 2004a, 2004b 
(narrators and narratees); Hidber 2007 (time in Herodian); Pitcher 2012a, 2012b (space); Pitcher 2018a, 2018b 
(characterisation in Dio and Herodian). See also Arbo 2017 and Coltelloni-Trannoy 2017 on the miraculous. 
98 Both historians are discussed at various points in Marincola 1997; see also Hose 2007 (Dio); Pitcher 2009: 39-
44 (Herodian); Potter 2011. They are studied in more detail in smaller selections of authors in Hose 1994: 356-
451 (Dio); Kuhn-Chen 2002: 131-247 (Dio), 249-313 (Herodian); Kemezis 2014: 90-149 (Dio), 227-72 (Herodian). 
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 This situation has coincided with a growing interest in the two authors individually, in Dio’s case, 
dramatically so. For several decades following its publication in 1964, Fergus Millar’s discussion of 
the Roman History was the standard reference on Dio’s narrative.99 In the late 1980s, work began on a 
series of English historical commentaries,100 followed by the ongoing publication of several Budé 
editions with translation and commentaries in French. These volumes tend to concentrate on the late 
republican and early imperial narratives.101 More recently, there has been an explosion in literary 
scholarship on Dio. Although there has not been a monograph equivalent to Millar’s, two separate 
projects have collated a range of studies, which now address the full extent of his narrative. Valérie 
Fromentin led the editing of a two-volume collection of primarily French papers, resulting from the 
four-year Dioneia project, published at the end of 2016. Its forty-six studies cover a variety of subjects, 
from the state of the text itself, through to Dio’s engagement with wider literature, and overviews of 
previous thinking about Dio’s place in elite Roman life. Simultaneously at the end of 2016, Brill 
published the first volume in the new series Historiography of Rome and its Empire, edited by Karsten 
Lange and Jesper Madsen, containing an additional sixteen discussions directed more explicitly to 
Dio’s political narrative.102 The gathering which resulted in the edited volume has also led to a series 
of international conferences, between 2016 and 2018, and at time of writing a further six volumes are 
envisaged.103  
The result is a much more nuanced picture of the Roman History. This decade has seen a number of 
analyses which have explored the structural complexity of the narrative. A good example is the work 
                                                             
99 Millar 1964. 
100 Covering books 49-67 the rise of Octavian to Nero, with some crossover: Reinhold 1988; Rich 1990; Edmondson 
1992; Murison 1999; Swan 2004. 
101 There are now Budé editions with translation and commentaries for books 36-53, excluding 43-44 and 52, 
covering the late Republic through to Augustus.  
102 Fromentin et al 2016a; Lange and Madsen 2016a. The former calls itself the first synthesis of Dio since Millar 
(Fromentin et al. 2016b: 12); the latter is set out explicitly as a rejection of Millar’s view of an apolitical Dio 
(Lange and Madsen 2016b: 2). 





which has been done on Dio’s speeches. Rather than commonplace rhetorical exercises,104 a range of 
studies has shown how Dio uses speeches as a means of exploring political questions. This has been 
especially effective in his presentation of the Republic. It is here that Dio’s political theory has been 
illuminated. While Christopher Burden-Strevens has made the point most broadly,105 more specific 
studies on individuals like Caesar and Cicero or on individual themes have contributed to a consistent 
picture of the late Republic in the Roman History. Through speeches, Dio demonstrates the internal, 
structural weaknesses of republican government, in which individuals can only ever compete for 
power for their own personal gain.106 More generally, Adam Kemezis’s recent volume, which also 
discusses Herodian and Philostratus, has rightly been highly influential in its emphasis on the unity 
of the Roman History.107 For the earlier narrative in particular, it is no longer enough to treat individual 
scenes or characters as discrete entities. 
Like his narrative, Dio himself is being reconsidered in his position as a historian. Much greater 
attention is now being paid to the Dio’s place as a literary figure in his own right. Most studies were 
traditionally directed towards reconstructing his career, and in particular the precise dating of his 
first consulship.108 Lately, investigations have greatly expanded approaches to Dio’s authorial 
persona. There is a long tradition of seeing Thucydidean aspects in the Roman History, which goes 
back to the nineteenth century.109 This has now extended into the much broader historiographical 
tradition, including Latin writers.110 There has also been particular interest in his position as a Greek 
                                                             
104 Pace Millar 1964: 78-83; van Stekelenburg 1971: 14-16; see also Saylor Rodgers 2008: 313-18. 
105 See esp. Burden-Strevens 2015a; id. 2016 offers a specific exploration of envy, φθόνος, in the Republic. 
106 Rees 2011: 143-80, 2012; Montecalvo 2014; Fomin 2016; Kemezis 2016b; Mallan 2016. 
107 Kemezis 2014: 94-149. See also Pelling 1997; papers in Fromentin et al 2016a: 269-414, ‘Les formes de la 
narration historique’. 
108 Generally dated to around 205/206, or the early 220s. For full detail, see below, 41-42. 
109 e.g. Litsch 1893; Kyhnitszch 1894; Meyer 1899. See Rees 2011: 62-86 for more recent comments. 
110 As collected in Fromentin et al. 2016a: 113-268. Though there remains an element of Quellenforschung, papers 
such as Fromentin 2016a (on Dionysius of Halicarnassus) and de Franchis 2016 (on Livy) look at how Dio 
interacted with previous narratives, beyond simply working out where Dio got his information. 
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in a Roman world, and his place within the wider Second Sophistic.111 Dio himself is beginning to look 
more complex. 
These concerns have started to filter through to the contemporary books. As noted above, Andrew 
Scott, who has been especially active in his contributions to studies of Severan historiography, has 
now published a historical commentary on Dio’s final three books, from Macrinus to Severus 
Alexander.112 This is the first volume dedicated exclusively to the contemporary history since 
Rosemarie Bering-Staschewski’s German volume on the entirety of Dio’s lifetime, itself nearly forty 
years old.113 In his preface, Scott is explicit about the need to move away from reading the 
contemporary history as an accurate record, and that to do so ‘would be to overstate and miss the 
point.’ Instead, Dio’s account should be thought of as a corrective response to the self-presentation 
of the Severan regime.114  
This kind of stance is far from universal,115 but it is built on the solid foundation of recent 
interpretations of the contemporary books. In the same vein, Martin Hose has demonstrated the 
interaction between Septimius Severus’ public links to Augustus and his portrayal in the Roman 
History. In Dio, Severus does have clear imperial precedents, but any comparisons are entirely 
negative: not Augustus, but Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero. Moreover, Hose rejects the more traditional 
assumption that Dio was writing a Severan present into the past. Dio did not describe earlier rulers 
through the actions of emperors in his own lifetime, but instead used their well-known vices to 
                                                             
111 Ameling 1984, 1997; Aalders 1986; Swain 1996: 401-408; de Blois 1998-99; Lachenaud 2003, 2008; Moscovich 
2004; Hose 2007; Jones 2016. Burden-Strevens 2015b is a valuable exception in its suggestion that Dio was deeply 
opposed to sophists. 
112 Scott 2018a. 
113 Bering-Staschewski 1981. 
114 Scott 2018a: x. 
115 Cf. recently Hose 2007: 461-62; Rantala 2016: 170-72; Urso 2016: 13-16 for treatments of Septimius Severus’ 





redefine the actions of the Severans.116 Hose is explicit in stressing that this does not make the 
contemporary narrative historically “truthful”; it is rather a dismissal of an imperial claim, replacing 
it with something more critical.117 Elsewhere, the Roman History has been called ‘oppositional history’, 
and a ‘counter-narrative’ to the Severan emperors’ presentation of their dynastic legitimacy. Dio’s 
Severans have become a ‘disappointment’, far from the Augustan and Antonine models they 
asserted.118 In these approaches, his contemporary account is not looked at strictly in terms of its 
accuracy, but rather as a negative conclusion to a larger historiographical project. 
The explanations for Dio’s rejection of Severan claims start to reveal a methodological tension which 
is familiar from the previous section. The most important explanatory factor in modern readings of 
the contemporary books is Dio’s experience as a senator. Detailed assessments of the reliability of 
Dio’s claims as a senator are rare. The most developed recent challenge has come from Caillan 
Davenport, who focused on Caracalla’s stay in Nicomedia over the winter of 214-215. Dio reports that 
Caracalla humiliated the Senate, refusing to engage in any public business while spending all his time 
feasting his soldiers (78[77].17). Davenport argued that Dio’s very negative portrayal of senatorial 
experiences was not an accurate account of the emperor’s actions, but the embittered attacks of a 
senator who had been ostracised from Caracalla’s court.119 It was met with a concerted rebuttal from 
Scott, who emphasised in turn the consistency of Dio’s portrayal of senatorial life. The disregard 
shown by Caracalla is wholly in keeping with other episodes from his reign, and indeed the 
contemporary books as a whole. For Scott, this serves as confirmation that the Nicomedia scene is a 
reliable indication of senatorial experience.120 As with the arguments about Severan imagery, the key 
                                                             
116 Cf. Gowing 1997: esp. 2587-88 for the claim that Dio’s presentation of a theatrical Nero is informed by his 
experiences under deceptive emperors. At Hose 2011: 115-19, the direction of comparison is reversed. The 
tradition of Nero as an actor was well established; Dio used his traits as one model for a tyrannical Commodus. 
117 Hose 2011: esp. 119-24. 
118 Kemezis 2014: 146-49; Madsen 2016: 154-58. Both points come as conclusions to assessments of the Roman 
History as a whole. 
119 Davenport 2012b; his paper is an expansion on Meckler 1999.  
120 Scott 2015. 
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to understanding the episode is the broader context of the early third century, in which the rejection 
of the Senate is assumed to be securely known. In this example, that means an additional level of 
irony. Dio’s narrative is very literally being contextualised against itself. 
This extends to how the contemporary history as a whole is read. Scott views Dio’s account as an 
attempt to excuse his political role under a series of corrupt rulers. For Scott, Dio is ultimately 
helpless as a senator; he had no choice but to submit to the whims of the emperor.121 There is a clear 
disjunction here. This reasoning depends on an assumption that the Severans were anti-senatorial; 
though widespread in modern historiography, it is only supported by its ancient models, as explored 
above. The same methodological disconnection informs Scott’s view of the contemporary history in 
his recent commentary. Almost immediately after emphasising that Dio did not simply record what 
happened, he concludes: 
These final three books of Dio’s history reveal a senator and a historian confronted with 
challenges to the Roman social order and a directive to write as far as Fortune would allow. 
The result is a compelling combination of political history and social commentary. 
Again, the contemporary narrative is framed against a modern reconstruction of the Severan period. 
The atmosphere of social conflict is taken as a historical fact external to Dio’s report. But it is 
ultimately dependent on the Roman History as its primary source. The failure to acknowledge that link 
has resulted in an approach to the contemporary history which is ultimately oxymoronic. Even in 
claiming to reject the historicity of Dio’s narrative, Scott relies on its underlying accuracy to create 
his interpretative context. 
Compared to Dio, Herodian has received rather less recent interest. That is not to say that there has 
been a complete dearth of scholarship. As with Dio, a volume from the 1960s set the tone for much of 
what followed. Werner Widmer’s 1967 overview of the History may be brief,122 but it laid out some of 
the fundamental thematic concerns in Herodian’s narrative. It is now a commonplace to say that 
                                                             
121 Argued in full in Scott 2018c; see also Scott 2018a: 8. 





Herodian is primarily interested in emperors, and that Marcus Aurelius acts as an introductory model 
of ideal rule. Both ideas are crystallised in Widmer’s analysis, explicitly set up as a divergence from 
earlier concerns with Herodian’s accuracy.123 For several decades after Widmer, studies of Herodian 
were dominated by two areas: Quellenforschung,124 and his connection to the third-century Crisis;125 
again reflecting Dio, this was supported by a number of translations, often with brief historical 
commentary.126  
Two later German volumes stand out in their contribution to developing Widmer’s suggestions, from 
Martin Zimmermann and Thomas Hidber. Both scholars advanced the concept of Herodian’s imperial 
portraits in two ways. Firstly, they identified the extent of comparisons between emperors outside 
the idealised Marcus. And secondly, these comparisons were connected to the wider structure of the 
History. For example, the tyranny of Elagabalus and good rule of Severus Alexander can both be read 
alongside Marcus, but they also directly contrast with each other. This in turn contributes to a 
narrative structured around reigns, in which transfers of power play a central role in assessing the 
empire.127 
                                                             
123 Widmer 1967: esp. 9-10 on Herodian’s aims, 16-34 on imperial virtues in the History.  
124 Frank Kolb forcefully argued that Herodian was nothing more than a novelist, whose account was simply a 
poorly written version of Dio’s; summarised at Kolb 1972: 160-61. Responses ranged from total agreement to 
total rejection. The debate around the so-called Hauptquelle theory are summarised in Sidebottom 1998: 2780-
92; Hidber 2006: 49-56. The reasonable conclusion seems to be that Herodian had indeed read Dio, but that does 
not mean that the Roman History was his main source. 
125 For the argument that the History is a pessimistic response to the Crisis of the Third Century, see esp. Alföldy 
1971a (=1989: 273-94); de Blois 1998a: 3415-23; Marasco 1998; Schettino 2008. This view is explored in several 
papers in Galimberti 2017a.  
126 Especially notable are Cassola 1967 (Italian); Whittaker 1969-70 (English); Torres Esbarranch 1985 (Spanish); 
Roques 1990 (French); Müller 1996 (German). 
127 Zimmermann 1999b: 151-284; Hidber 2006: 152-87. 
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The move towards assessing how the History functions in structural terms has been fruitful. 
Comparisons between the characters of emperors continue to be made,128 but an array of other 
aspects have been identified. Adam Kemezis has argued that Herodian includes speeches that are 
almost universally ironic.129 Hidber has analysed the narrative’s inconsistent chronology, 
demonstrating how sudden movements between individual episodes create a constant sense of 
unrest.130 Elsewhere, a common theme of repetition has been identified. The History is peppered with 
recurrent motifs. Some are straightforward, such as repeated scene types.131 More complex is 
Herodian’s use of movement. Several studies have investigated how Herodian portrays the 
relationship between Rome as an imperial centre and the peripheral provinces, depicting 
geographical transitions which are easily comparable. Septimius Severus and Maximinus Thrax both 
invade Italy, to vastly differing effect; so too Elagabalus’ shift from the eastern provinces to Rome is 
mirrored by Severus Alexander’s failed Persian campaign.132 These are manipulations of the narrative 
which go considerably beyond the specific character traits of emperors. As Luke Pitcher has recently 
put it, Herodian is a writer who does not say, but shows what an emperor was really like.133 
The shift in approach to thinking about the construction of Herodian’s narrative is epitomised in a 
change to how his authorial persona has been received. For a long time, one of the main questions 
about Herodian was the practical reconstruction of his identity: very straightforwardly, who he was, 
and from what social background he was writing. Herodian differs drastically from Dio in this respect. 
Dio’s narrative is replete with first-person observations which link the Roman History to political life; 
Herodian, by contrast, is almost undetectable outside the textual world of the History. What 
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130 Hidber 1999, 2007. 
131 e.g. Sidebottom 1998: 2815-16 on traps; Scott 2018b on assassinations involving Praetorian Prefects. 
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information he does give is vague at best. He claims to have served in the imperial and public 
bureaucracy (1.2.5), but supplies no detail for what that actually means. That is the full extent of what 
we are told. Nevertheless, several suggestions have been offered, ranging from senator to slave.134 An 
alternative approach is now in favour. Instead of trying to resolve the question of Herodian’s identity, 
it accepts, to quote Kemezis, that ‘it is his anonymity above all which defines his authorial persona.’135 
This has led to the absence of an easily identifiable narrator being considered a deliberate technique 
for establishing historical authority, allowing for an omniscience which would be less plausible in a 
known individual.136 
The complexities of the History are undoubtedly beginning to be elucidated. Even so, looking from 
the perspective of political narrative, it is striking to see a limitation on these literary engagements 
with Herodian. The main focus of recent scholarship has continued to be centred on Herodian’s 
depictions of emperors. In part, that is inevitable. The History is so evidently structured around 
imperial reigns that emperors are impossible to avoid. But that does not mean that Rome’s rulers 
have to be the only material for analysis. Kemezis’s investigation of speeches looks exclusively at 
those given by emperors, even though there are a small number delivered by other figures.137 
Likewise, Andrew Scott’s discussion of assassination plots involving Praetorian Prefects concerns 
only those which targeted the emperor, and leaves aside the murder of the Prefect Vitalianus in 
238.138  
                                                             
134 The most common solution follows Cassola 1957, which argued that Herodian was in all likelihood a 
freedman, or a freedman’s son, from Asia Minor; Hidber 2006: 1-16 offers a good overview of earlier scholarship. 
See below, 121 for more detail. 
135 Kemezis 2014: 308. 
136 Hidber 2004b: 206-207, 2006: 15-16; Kemezis 2014: 307-308.  
137 Kemezis 2014: 252-60. This includes his identification of the speech by Crispinus, a consular opponent of 
Maximinus, at Aquileia in 238 (8.3.4-6) the only fully truthful and accurately predictive speech. It goes 
unmentioned thereafter. 
138 Scott 2018b; the Vitalianus episode occurs at Hdn. 7.6.4-9. 
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The strict emphasis on Herodian’s characterisation of emperors seems to reflect a wider trend in how 
the History is approached. Perhaps because emperors are so overt in the structure of Herodian’s 
narrative, it can often seem that their individual portrayals are the only rhetorical aspect of any 
importance. According to such arguments, this can be overcome through a careful historical 
contextualisation.139 The recent synoptic histories can all question the idea of Maximinus Thrax as a 
barbarian, for example, and explain his aggressive collection of taxes through a real need to pay his 
troops.140 But the source for imperial rapacity is also Herodian,141 while the acceptance of Maximinus’ 
dependence on the army is part of the narrative of social conflict which also derives from the 
contemporary historiography. As with Dio, Herodian is placed within a historical context which is 
assumed to be secure, when in fact it also derives from the History. 
Putting Herodian back alongside Dio, it is apparent that there is a certain disconnect within 
scholarship on the early third century. Literary studies of the two authors have very quickly 
demonstrated that their respective narratives are far from straightforward. Many aspects of their 
analysis have relied on an assumption that the two accounts can be contextualised within a firm 
historical context. Dio’s view remains consistent with a senatorial experience of life under the 
Severans; Herodian’s interest in emperors can be framed against a general movement towards a 
political world dominated by the army. There is a methodological irony here. As suggested earlier in 
this introduction, the current historical reconstruction derives extensively from the two narratives 
themselves. Dio is the source for a senatorial experience, Herodian the source for modern view of the 
230s as a whole. The result is that they are effectively being contextualised against themselves. Even 
as literary analyses give reason to question the reliability of the ancient accounts, there is a reliance 
on their general presentations of Rome. In this regard, Alföldy’s concept of Krisenbewußtsein is not 
only problematic, but also symptomatic of a wider trend. Dio and Herodian are taken as confirming 
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witnesses of a crisis, for which they are in fact the main evidence. It is hardly surprising that they 
agree with their own narratives.142 
Reading the Histories 
Over the course of this overview of scholarship on the early third century, a consistent approach to 
the ancient historiography is apparent. It is clear that the reliability of both Dio and Herodian can be 
challenged, but investigations have done so on relatively narrow terms. The literary studies of the 
two authors have identified individual episodes in which rhetorical interests clearly override any 
desire to present an accurate account, while investigations of epigraphic evidence and imperial 
representation have analysed particular aspects of Severan power. The concentration on particular 
aspects of political activity has meant that the broader political context has not seen the same degree 
of interrogation. The atmosphere of militarised politics which derives from contemporary narratives 
of the period, of conflict between the traditional role of the Senate and the new authority of soldiers, 
has provided a universal framework. 
My goal in reassessing the historical role of ancient narrative is to offer a balance to this situation. In 
considering the reliability of Dio and Herodian, I do not take a traditional route of trying to ascertain 
the accuracy of the detail of their accounts. My primary concern takes a much broader perspective. 
This thesis investigates how the ancient narratives create the sense of social conflict which underpins 
modern views. In this respect, I follow Adam Kemezis in thinking about contemporary historiography 
in terms of its construction of narrative worlds.143 Instead of reading Dio and Herodian as descriptions 
of the political environment in the early third century, their accounts will be treated as reactions to 
it, which are creative in their decisions about how to represent character and events. Both authors 
present politics in terms of homogenous group action. Within these schemes, the Senate and the 
army are easily identifiable, and consistently presented as antithetical. The modern view of the shape 
of third-century politics stems from the apparent agreement between the two historians, but the 
function of this scheme in their respective accounts operates at a level beyond the presentation of 
                                                             
142 More scathingly, ‘that is mere tautology’; Whittaker 1976: 144. 
143 See esp. Kemezis 2014: 8-16, 274-80. 
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politics. As will be seen, the structuring of political activity in the two narratives is directly connected 
to their authors’ thematic aims.  
This investigation requires separate analyses of Dio and Herodian, which form the main body of my 
thesis. In the main, the two historians are therefore not compared directly. Independent studies 
convey one important benefit. They allow for a more detailed engagement with the thematic 
frameworks which underpin the respective histories. In this context, the prima facie similarities 
between the two accounts quickly break down. These two authors have fundamentally different 
purposes in their presentation of any political activity. For Dio, the Senate is everything, its 
relationship with the emperor serving as the ultimate guarantor of effective rulership. The Roman 
History is detailed in its references to political institutions, and open in its concern about a very 
Roman social order. Herodian is very different. His main interest is the emperor himself. Put bluntly, 
both the Senate and the army exist as political actors only in their capacity to further elaborate the 
emperor’s character. Though different in their goals, Dio and Herodian therefore share one thing: 
their portrayal of political conflict between the Senate and army is far from objective or incidental 
in its creation. 
i. Cassius Dio 
As outlined above, Dio’s Roman History is the main foundation for our understanding of much of the 
Severan period. The reassessment of his narrative involves a two-step process. The first stage is to 
establish a narrative context for Dio’s contemporary books. This is less straightforward than it may 
sound. Engagement with the contemporary history faces an immediate challenge. For the vast 
majority of his lifetime – indeed, for the majority of the Roman History as a whole – we do not have 
Dio’s full narrative. We are instead reliant primarily on the eleventh-century Epitome of the monk 
John Xiphilinus, which begins with the Mithridatic Wars of the first century BCE, and retains on 
average perhaps a fifth to a quarter of Dio’s text.144 This is supplemented by a number of fragments, 
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mainly preserved in the tenth-century Excerpta Constantiniana.145 Due to the nature of these later 
engagements with Dio, produced through the direct extraction of material from the Roman History, 
there has been an emphasis on the reliability of textual transmission.146 But, as several recent studies 
have now demonstrated, preserving text is not the same as maintaining a narrative.147 Dio’s 
contemporary books may resemble a coherent narrative, but they have been reshaped by Byzantine 
interests which do not always coincide with Dio’s own. 
Dio’s contemporary history therefore requires a more careful approach. His presentation of politics 
cannot be gleaned directly from the contemporary books themselves, due to a lack of secure context. 
This difficulty can be resolved, however. This involves a reframing of one of the most famous scenes 
in the Roman History, the debate in book 52 between Agrippa and Maecenas about what Augustus 
should do after victory over Mark Antony. The scene has often been seen as a direct commentary on 
the Severan period,148 but this is not the only possible reading. The debate also functions as an 
effective end to the Republic, and a transition into the Principate.149 Crucially, this does not just 
happen in terms of the political structures in Rome. There are direct thematic links between the 
Republic and book 52, which reinforce the impression of republican weaknesses being resolved with 
the beginning of sole rule. Moreover, the same themes continue into the imperial books. In this 
reading, the debate becomes a model for the presentation of imperial rule within the Roman History’s 
                                                             
145 The standard overview of the Excerpta is Lemerle 1986: 309-46, 523-32; alongside Toynbee 1973: 575-605. See 
more recently Németh 2013. 
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147 See esp. papers in Horster and Reitz 2010. In a Byzantine setting, see e.g. Flusin 2002 on excerpts from 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus; Roberto 2009 on the transmission Kestoi of Julius Africanus; Bernard 2014. This 
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narrative world, establishing its ideal form. This provides a means for engaging with the 
contemporary books along similar lines. The conventional reading can be reversed. Rather than a 
commentary on the Severans, book 52 becomes a valuable device for contextualising the extant 
contemporary history, in its largely fragmentary form. 
The second chapter on the Roman History turns to a reassessment of Dio’s place in modern 
historiography, focusing on the contemporary history more directly. The main reason for the faith 
in Dio’s contemporary narrative among modern historians is his position as an eyewitness senator. 
Yet for the most part, the only source for Dio’s life is himself. The picture of Dio at the heart of the 
Senate, interacting with the emperor and the political elite, is a product of his own self-portrayal. 
Modern engagement with other writers from the ancient world shows the value of interrogating such 
authorial claims. In general terms, John Marincola’s wide-ranging survey of ancient historiography 
has identified a wide array of techniques used by writers to generate authority,150 and several more 
specific examples quickly come to mind. Thucydides has perhaps the greatest tradition of discussion 
surrounding his status as an eyewitness,151 but the same can be said for Ammianus Marcellinus,152 and, 
perhaps closest to Dio in his consular career, Pliny the Younger.153 It can no longer be assumed that 
Pliny’s correspondence with Trajan in Epistles 10 straightforwardly reflect the interaction of a 
provincial governor with the emperor.154 The same approach has only been applied to Dio in limited 
circumstances, as seen in the previous section, which accept a world of political conflict. There hasn’t 
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been the equivalent of investigations of Pliny which have stressed the connection between self-
presentation and narrative structure. 
The presentation of the Senate, and Dio’s role within it, is directly relevant to historical investigations 
of the late second century and the Severans. The creation of a unified Senate leads to a clear political 
division in Dio’s narrative. The Senate represents legitimacy. As an institution, its only engagement 
with corruption is as its victim. In turn, non-senatorial figures in positions of authority are 
intrinsically unacceptable. There can be no effective interaction between the two in the public, 
political realm. Note, however, that ‘senatorial’ is not defined exclusively by social status. Military 
equestrians are accepted into the Senate by Dio, much as men with a traditional cursus honorum can 
be rejected from it. Using the Roman History is therefore more complex than identifying and 
accounting for senatorial bias. Dio’s self-proclaimed affiliation with a senatorial norm makes the 
contemporary history an attempt to define what that bias should be in the first place. It is not merely 
the detail of his account which can be questioned, but his entire model of political life.  
 ii. Herodian 
In its structure, my analysis of the Herodian follows a similar pattern as that of Dio. The first stage 
involves establishing a means for discussion, before a more detailed investigation of where Herodian 
is most relied upon as a historical source. In one way the first step is considerably easier: unlike Dio, 
Herodian’s text actually survives.155 Yet Herodian’s treatment in historical studies is rather ironic. In 
the absence of Dio’s full narrative, historians have nonetheless assumed that his contemporary books 
represent a coherent account; Herodian’s fully extant text, meanwhile, has often been approached as 
though it were made up of individual fragments. The History is clearly divided into separate scenes, 
which are themselves easily comprehensible as self-contained episodes. It seems that this has 
facilitated a tendency to lift individual moments out of their narrative context.156 In many respects, 
the first Herodian chapter therefore takes the very opposite approach to that for Dio. Where the 
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fragmentation of Dio’s seemingly coherent account is emphasised, this chapter demonstrates the 
unity of a narrative seemingly made up of independent scenes. Its purpose however remains very 
much the same. The aim is to demonstrate how political activity functions in the History’s narrative 
world. 
Herodian’s construction of the empire is clearly demarcated. At the top is the emperor, his main 
interest. Below him, Rome is divided into the three distinct groups of the political (and usually 
senatorial) elite, the army, and the people. These groups have been identified before, most commonly 
in discussions of Herodian’s own background and social attitudes.157 I take a different approach, 
building on recent scholarship on the structure of the History. The centrality of emperors for 
Herodian is well known; I show that their evaluation within the narrative extends to the construction 
of society as well. The depiction of group activity may be simplistic in political terms, but it creates 
an extremely effective method of comparing different reigns. The three groups appear in a range of 
repeated scene types, but their individual roles change across contrasting episodes. Herodian is not 
limited to describing imperial character through an emperor’s actions. The nature of their rule plays 
out in almost cinematic terms through the depiction of immediately recognisable groups, and their 
interactions with one another. The consequences for interpreting Herodian’s political narrative are 
profound. His project is fundamentally uninterested in representing a nuanced picture of third-
century politics. Indeed, in thematic terms, he benefits from being simplistic. 
The second chapter picks up the general point about Herodian’s construction of Roman politics, and 
applies it to the books which are considered most valuable in current historical scholarship. It is built 
around the depiction of Maximinus Thrax. Herodian affords nearly two books to his reign, the vast 
majority of which is dedicated to the events of 238.158 As a character in his own right, Maximinus 
appears quite crudely developed. Every aspect of his behaviour is informed his portrayal as a 
barbarian, expressed through is constant resort to expressions of violence, and the maintenance of 
his rule by fear. This is played out in his interaction with the three social groups. Such is the extent 
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of Maximinus’ tyranny that he can alienate not only the Senate and the people, but even the army. 
And at all times, his character is reinforced by tropes of barbarian aggression against the Roman state.  
The bulk of the chapter’s focus, however, is on those parts of the narrative from which Maximinus 
appears to be absent. Herodian narrates at some length the two “senatorial” rebellions of 238, which 
account for the vast majority of book 7. Each uprising includes the depiction of extended unrest in 
Rome, which is based around the three groups acting with increasing violence towards each other, 
and culminating in the destruction and looting of much of the city. Maximinus’ characterisation 
becomes much more complex in these scenes. His barbaric nature percolates through to the rest of 
the Roman society, as greed and self-interest act as the only incentives for any public activity. 
Moreover, Herodian’s account takes full advantage of a structure which is built around familiar 
vignettes repeatedly to confound the reader’s expectations. Having a barbarian emperor leads to the 
subversion of all standard tropes. The Senate and the people become the violent groups, attacking 
the defenceless soldiers, as the empire is put under siege by its own ruler. Rome is turned upside 
down by the accession of Maximinus, and with it, so too is the structure of the narrative. This is the 
narrative which is followed in all recent reconstructions of the third century, as a focal point in the 
conflict between senators and soldiers for control of political life. Herodian’s interests seem wholly 
different to those of modern scholars. His account of 238 may well be more detailed than other parts 
of the History¸ but character remains central to his historical explanations. 
Reframing Historiography 
It is clear that the early third century saw a change in political life in Rome. The political and 
administrative roles of equestrians in particular can be seen changing, both in the number of 
adlections to high senatorial rank and the increasing status of equestrian officials themselves.159 In 
Dio and Herodian, it may seem that we have two contemporary accounts of how that political change 
played out. They agree on a basic narrative of military figures gaining influence and wealth at the 
expense of senators, in models which emphasise the hostility between the two groups. The two main 
discussions in this thesis show the dangers of accepting such a model. Both historians gain in their 
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separation of the interests of each group, and the creation of a clear distinction between their 
respective members and actions. The agreement between Dio and Herodian is not the result of a 
shared underlying reliability, but of drastically differing concerns, which are both constructed 
around the same definitions of social order. I believe that a more effective understanding of the 
period is only possible when the currently dominant political models from the literary narratives are 
placed to one side. 
Rejecting the model of social conflict suggested by contemporary third-century historiography can 
only be part of the process of reassessing the nature of political change. The extended conclusion is 
therefore more than a summation of my core argument. If the strong divisions between the Senate 
and military equestrians are a result of narratives which construct a simplified version of Roman 
politics, it presents an opportunity to sketch out some new approaches to thinking about the nature 
of social and political change during the third century. Through a comparison of the emperors 
Pertinax and Maximinus Thrax, I argue that that we can understand the third century as much more 
collaborative than has previously been assumed. A thesis of this length does not grant sufficient room 
to allow for a full reconstruction of the period, but there is space to offer an outline of potential routes 
towards a new interpretation. The two men are extreme opposites in the ancient narratives: Pertinax 
is described as an experienced and respected senator, Maximinus a barbarian soldier. But their 
careers are strikingly comparable. Both came to prominence as equestrian generals, involved in 
imperial campaigns on the Rhine/Danube frontier. Pertinax may have been a senator, but he was a 
military man too. I suggest that Maximinus can be thought of as straddling that supposed divide in 
much the same way. They may be portrayed differently, but it is possible that both men were 
similarly integrated in a network of political life, which extended far beyond the limits of the curia. 
Importantly, reconsidering Maximinus’ potential relationships with senators in 235 does not equate 
to ignoring the contemporary narratives. It remains possible to explain the starkly differing 
portrayals of these two emperors, even as their actual careers seem more alike. Dio and Herodian can 
be reframed as part of a broader Roman discourse of imperial power. The Severan dynasty and its 
successors engaged in a variety of different and often contradictory methods of asserting the 





imperial claims, in their idolisation of Pertinax and vilification of Maximinus. The two ancient writers 
therefore remain relevant to reconstructions of the third century, but cast in a different role. It is not 
simply a case of looking past rhetorical flourishes in their accounts to reconstruct what was 
happening in the empire. The creation of a political landscape is just as large a part of each narrative’s 
thematic scheme as the characterisation of emperors. It is inevitable that any rejection of the ancient 
narratives will require a more conjectural approach to Roman politics. I would argue that this is 
wholly preferable to acceptance of such evidently simplistic accounts. It may now be something of a 
commonplace to find ancient historians acknowledging that literary evidence is not completely 









It is one of the great ironies of the life of Lucius, or perhaps Claudius, Cassius Dio that, among the 
significant quantity of detail that can be reconstructed, we are not entirely certain of his name.1 Dio’s 
political career is well attested in a series of explicit autobiographical observations from across the 
Roman History, which are unsurprisingly concentrated in the contemporary books. He calls himself a 
native of Bithynia (8025.2), and tells us that his father was a senator (73[72].7.2). Dio was put forward 
for the praetorship in 193 on the recommendation of Pertinax (74[73].12.2), an office he probably 
held in 195.2 He was curator of Smyrna and Pergamum in 217/218 under Macrinus (80[79].7.4), before 
holding a number of posts in the reign of Severus Alexander, when he was proconsul of Africa, and 
governor of Dalmatia and then Pannonia Superior (49.36.4; 802.1.2-3). In 229, Dio was afforded the 
honour of the ordinary consulship. It was his second time in office (no reference to the first survives), 
and came with a clear demonstration of imperial favour: Alexander himself was his consular 
colleague.3 
Even in this brief overview of Dio’s career, a methodological tendency in scholarship on the Roman 
History comes to the fore. With the exception of Dio’s second consulship in 229, every aspect of the 
reconstruction of his progress through this cursus honorum is entirely dependent on the narrative he 
himself provides. As is clear, the record of Dio’s offices is not complete. The response has been telling. 
Rather than accepting uncertainties, scholars have looked for clues elsewhere in the text to suggest 
a likely career path. Dio’s first consulship illustrates the process. There is no explicit indication in the 
                                                             
1 The name L CASSIO DIONE is found in a military diploma, probably from Turkey (Roxan 1985: no. 133, first 
published in Kellner 1985, = AE [1985] no. 821); ΚΛ’ ΚΑΣΣΙΩ ΔΙΩΝΙ on an inscription from Macedonia 
(Toupatsoglou 1970: 280-85, = AE [1971] no. 430). Rich 1990: 1 n. 1 suggests that Lucius is more likely; Molin 2016a 
suggests the full name Lucius Claudius Cassius Dio. The traditionally ascribed cognomen Cocceianus is spurious, 
based on an assumption that he must be related to Dio Chrysostom; see Gowing 1990. 
2 Barnes 1984: 242; Molin 2016a: 438-39. 
3 Dio (802.5.1); the two inscriptions in n. 1 both refer to his consulship. For an overview of Dio’s full career, see 
Rich 1990: 1-5; Christol 2016: 451-57; Molin 2016a. 
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Roman History of when he held the office for the first time. It has been argued that Dio was alienated 
from the courts of Septimius Severus and Caracalla, due to the lack of references to personal 
engagement with the two emperors; as such his first consulship must have come in the 220s.4 
Conversely, the lack of explicit indication that he was side-lined from government positions has been 
taken to mean that his career progressed as would be expected, with a consulship in 205/206.5 Both 
sides are argued from the same position of evidential silence.  
My intention in highlighting this debate is not to solve this problem. The lack of evidence makes 
either explanation plausible; without external confirmation, it is impossible to say with any 
confidence. Instead, I offer this example as a demonstration of how Dio’s autobiographical claims 
have been met. The basis for all the discussion is the assumption that the surviving information Dio 
provides is completely accurate. It is this that makes it even possible to reconstruct the missing 
details. In turn, this approach requires that Dio’s narrative coincides closely with a historical reality. 
As suggested in the introduction to this thesis, such an argument quickly becomes circular. Dio’s 
contemporary history is key to reconstructions of the political situation under the Severans, 
especially in respect to their interaction with the Senate. The reliability of Dio’s narrative is founded 
on his senatorial career.6 That historical reconstruction is then central to discussions of his career 
itself. Attempts to date the first consulship take the Roman History as a solid historical foundation for 
more speculative suggestions. 
Even within the world of classical scholarship, a number of comparisons spring to mind to cast doubt 
on the ease of this equation between historiographical claim and historical fact. Dio was not the first 
consul to promise a history of his own lifetime, even if Tacitus ultimately failed to produce one. His 
opening to the Histories nonetheless demonstrates the problems which can be caused by taking a 
                                                             
4 Vrind 1927: 165-67; Gabba 1955: 289-93; Bowersock 1965: 473-74; Letta 1979: 135-37, 2014: 132. 
5 Millar 1964: 204-207; Barnes 1984: 243; Gowing 1992: 20, 2016: 117; Schmidt 1997: 2636 n. 168; Murison 1999: 6 
n. 16; Kuhn-Chen 2002: 131; Swan 2004: 2 n. 8; Potter 2011: 330; Ando 2012: 19; Madsen 2016: 136; Markov 2016: 
57-58. Molin 2016a: 440 suggests 207. 





historian at his word too readily. The engagement with his own highly successful political career 
under the Flavians is only one aspect of a deliberately problematic introduction, in which even the 
apparent praise of Nerva and Trajan cannot be read straightforwardly.7 Tacitus’ contemporary Pliny 
the Younger makes similar claims to Dio’s regarding his proximity to imperial activity through his 
correspondence with Trajan in Epistles 10.8 Finally, given Dio’s engagement with a Thucydidean 
model, it would be worth mentioning the reassessment in modern scholarship of Thucydides’ claims 
for accuracy based on a self-defined role as a reliable eyewitness of the Peloponnesian War.9 I see no 
reason why the same thinking should not apply to Dio as well.  
The key to the reassessment of the Roman History offered here will be its consideration as a narrative 
in its own right. Rather than thinking of Dio’s autobiographical claims as a means of reconstructing 
his actual career, I will ask instead what difference they make to the narrative. A quick example shows 
the distinction. An array of options has been put forward for the dating of the Roman History’s 
production, which are this time based on Dio’s account of his literary career. After relating the 
assassination of the emperor Commodus on New Year’s Eve 192, Dio embarks on a brief excursus 
about his decision to write a full history of the Roman empire (73[72].23.1-5). He concludes by 
announcing that he spent ten years researching the Roman History, before an additional twelve 
writing it up. Conventionally, the reaction from scholars has been to suggest possible dates to 
correspond to this time period. Fergus Millar’s monograph on Dio took this twenty-two-year period 
as being 197-219, complete with breakdowns of when particular books were being written.10 The 
succeeding years have seen numerous suggestions, but no definitive consensus. The majority of 
scholars tend towards the period of research beginning in the first few years of the third century, 
and therefore completed between 220 and 225, with revisions and additional detail from the reign of 
                                                             
7 See recently Sailor 2008: 6-50; Pelling 2010; Strunk 2017: 7-37 on the tension between Tacitus’ public life and 
his authorial voice.  
8 On Pliny’s self-fashioning in relation to Trajan, see below, 113. n. 64. 
9 Marincola 2001: 61-104; see Harloe and Morley 2012 for Thucydides’ reception outside classical scholarship. 
10 Millar 1964: 28-32; generally following Schwartz 1899; Gabba 1955: 295-301. For a rapidly appearing sceptical 
reaction to the year-by-year guide, see Bowersock 1965; Deman 1966; Pleket 1966. 
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Alexander Severus added later.11 A number of scholars meanwhile have attempted to date the Roman 
History slightly later, with the assumption that Dio finished his twelve years of writing in the late 
220s/early 230s, and died shortly thereafter.12  
The arguments are lengthy, and far from conclusive.13 It seems reasonable to argue that the final 
version did not take form before 230, given the inclusion of events in 229; beyond that, more detail is 
impossible.14 Much clearer is the effect of Dio’s description of his literary endeavours on the narrative. 
The twenty-two-year period appears almost universally in introductions to the Roman History, and 
has contributed to Dio’s reputation as a conscientious historian. He has been labelled ‘a diligent 
researcher’, who ‘utilized available historiography to the greatest extent possible.’15 There are clear 
problems in establishing the accuracy of Dio’s assertion. Moreover, there are reasons to be suspicious 
of potential motives for exaggerating his commitment to the writing process. By drawing attention 
to the amount of time he committed to the Roman History, Dio engages in an assertion of authority 
with a long tradition. John Marincola’s assessment of the role of a historian’s character in establishing 
legitimacy brings out the importance of literary effort, especially in Roman histories. He notes that 
Greek models go back as far as Isocrates, and the ten years spent on the production of his Panegyricus: 
‘this is most likely the ultimate model for Diodorus, Dionysius, and Dio, a guarantee to the audience 
                                                             
11 e.g. Bering-Staschewski 1981: 58; Zawadski 1983: 277; Rich 1990: 1-4; Edmondson 1992: 27-28; Hose 1994: 424; 
Swan 1997: 2549-56; Murison 1999: 8-12; Schettino 2001: 554-58; Potter 2011: 331. Note Schmidt 1997: 2618-25 
and Sordi 2000 for recent efforts to put the start of writing even earlier, into the 190s. 
12 Letta 1979: esp. 155-63; Reinhold 1988: 180-82; Barnes, 1984: 245-52; Bowersock 1985: 712; Molin 2016a: 445-
46. Scott 2018a: 10-14 argues that the contemporary history must have been written after Dio’s retirement from 
political life in 229. 
13 Kemezis 2014: 282-93 provides a comprehensive summary. 
14 As Eisman 1977: 658-59; Kuhn-Chen 2002: 132; Gleason 2011: 37, esp. n. 12.  
15 Ando 2012: 19; Hose 2007: 464 respectively. See also Reinhold 1986: 213. An indication of the universality of 
twenty-two years being accepted can be taken from the discussion of the dating of the Roman History. In all 





that, like the master, they had put great effort and care into the making of their history.’16 Dio’s 
twenty-two years of work are therefore not merely biographical. Nor do they have to be understood 
in reference to a literary career external to narrative. Within an ancient literary context, they are a 
loaded claim of authority.17  
As a starting point, this kind of explicit autobiographical claim is an effective demonstration of how 
Dio’s first-person comments can be reframed. But it is only the beginning. This investigation will 
expand considerably on its basic principles, to explore Dio’s self-portrayal in the contemporary 
history as a means of establishing his authority as a commentator on Severan Rome. Fundamental to 
my approach is the divorcing of the Roman History from any assumed historical context. This is instead 
an analysis of how Dio creates the image of Rome which dominates modern reconstructions. 
Whatever the nature of Dio’s interaction with emperors, he alone was in control of its original 
presentation. The narrative world of the contemporary books is therefore not only based on the 
experiences of one individual senator, but also derives from his decisions about how best to portray 
his self-defined senatorial life.  
Before this methodology can be applied to Dio’s self-fashioning, an additional difficulty must be 
addressed. For the most part, Dio’s extant contemporary narrative is not actually his Roman History. 
Large parts of the Roman History survive only in Byzantine excerpts or epitomes, meaning that much 
of Dio’s original narrative has been lost. As explored in my first chapter on Cassius Dio – ‘A 
Fragmentary History’ – the effect of the epitomisation is considerable. What survives as the 
contemporary books is largely a misleading semblance of Dio’s account, which offers only a stilted 
picture of his original narrative. A comparison between Xiphilinus and the surviving manuscripts of 
the Roman History provides an example of how much the epitomisation has altered the thematic focus 
of Dio’s narrative. It is particularly striking how often Dio’s account is reshaped into a universally 
applicable moralising discussion, shorn of the specifically Roman aspects which are seemingly of no 
                                                             
16 Marincola 1997: esp. 151-58; quotation from 152. 
17 Cf. Scott 2018a: 10. ‘The question of when Dio wrote up his history is crucial for how one views the 
contemporary portion.’ In relation to the question of authorial presentation, I disagree. 
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concern to Xiphilinus’ Byzantine readership. Beyond the limits of the later manuscript, there is no 
way of knowing how much material has been omitted, or how the narrative has been reworked in its 
new context. In short, Dio’s contemporary history is not really Dio’s at all. When the goal is to 
interrogate the construction of a narrative world, it is not possible to do so exclusively within the 
bounds of the contemporary books themselves. 
But that does not render an investigation of the extant text futile. While it may be impossible to know 
what is missing from Dio’s later books, the passages which remain can be placed in the much wider 
thematic context of the Roman History as a whole. This chapter’s second half will focus on the well-
known debate in book 52 between Agrippa and Maecenas. They had been asked by the soon-to-be 
Augustus for advice on what he should do with his power after victory at Actium. Agrippa says that 
he should abandon that power, and return Rome to a ‘democratic’ Republic (52.4-13). Maecenas’ 
speech contains a detailed outline of an ideal form of monarchy, which has often been seen as a 
commentary on Dio’s experiences under the Severans.18 I turn this approach on its head. Instead of 
looking for a historical context for the debate, I use it to form a narrative context for the 
contemporary history. Recent scholarship has begun to recognise the importance of book 52 as a 
narrative transition from the Republic into the Principate, but has largely emphasised the differences 
between their portrayals.19 I build on this work to show that there are in fact clear continuities in the 
thematic framework which underpins Dio’s entire narrative. Crucially, they remain evident in the 
epitomised books. The foregrounding of the thematic links between the contemporary books and the 
earlier, extant Roman History is therefore not an end in itself. It is a crucial step in moving away from 
a reliance on the historicity of Dio’s report. Though the reconstruction of the original contemporary 
books remains unfeasible, episodes from the surviving books can be contextualised more securely 
than when they are treated separately. 
In my second chapter on Cassius Dio – ‘The Eyewitness Historian’ – the focus shifts more directly to 
the contemporary history itself. Its chief aim is to investigate Dio’s self-portrayal as a reliable guide 
                                                             
18 See below, 66-67 for a more detailed overview, with bibliography. 





to Severan politics. Two main strands underpin his authorial persona: his ability as a historian and 
his status as a senator. It will not go unremarked that these self-appointed qualities are the same 
reasons why Dio has been praised in modern reconstructions of the period. It is not just in his hard 
work that Dio presents himself as a good historian. As with the thematic unity of the Roman History, 
it is structured consistently around a traditional Thucydidean distinction between λόγοι, what is said, 
and ἔργα, what actually happens. The pairing recurs throughout Dio’s narrative, and comes to define 
the early imperial books. By the contemporary history, Dio is able to work through that problem. He 
presents himself as a direct participant in events, who is therefore able to reveal both the pretence 
and the reality of political life. This role is inextricably tied to Dio’s political career, as the basis for 
enabling a resolution of that historiographical dichotomy. In his own methodological terms, Dio 
becomes the ideal historian. 
But it is not enough to say that Dio is a senator in the narrative world of the Roman History. Dio is not 
merely present as a member of the Senate in the contemporary books. Instead, he locates himself at 
the very centre of senatorial experience and opinion. As a historiographical technique, this approach 
confirms many of Dio’s claims to be an accurate recorder of senatorial life. As a method of narrative 
world creation, it enacts a disjunct within the narrative itself. Dio’s Senate is a homogenous entity, 
embodied in Dio as an individual. But as a collective unit it is also sometimes opposed to specific 
senators. Dio’s response is simple. They are excluded from the Senate, described as corrupt 
individuals who attack the legitimate group.  
The effect is to create a clear division between Dio and his senatorial peers, and anyone who opposed 
them, regardless of their social status. It is now something of a truism to say that the Senate holds 
the key to legitimacy in the Roman History. In the contemporary books, that legitimacy revolves 
around Dio himself. This comes to a head at the very end of the narrative. In the famous scene of Dio’s 
second consulship, the Praetorian Guard demand his arrest, leading to him spending his time in office 
outside Rome (802.4-5). For many scholars, this is a crystallisation of the historical conflict at the heart 
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of Severan politics, between the army and the Senate.20 In the context of the Roman History, however, 
the scene has an additional effect. It moves Dio beyond being merely the representative of senatorial 
experience, and makes him the singular demonstration of senatorial virtue, and by extension, 
political legitimacy. 
The description of Dio as a reliable source for the early third century is a common one, but it is an 
image which should be treated with caution. Through comparison with the thematic construction of 
his narrative, it becomes clear that Dio is meeting ideals of elite behaviour and historical accuracy 
which he himself has set up. This is not limited to his self-presentation. The construction of political 
life as a struggle between senators and their upstart opponents is beneficial to Dio’s self-appointment 
as the Senate’s champion. The insistence of unity does not always sit comfortably alongside the 
narrative itself, but these moments of tension only show the extent of authorial control over the 
historiographical creation of Severan politics. Dio is able to define the Senate, excluding any 
unacceptable elements and conjoining the resulting political bloc with his personal experience. The 
Roman History has been taken as a senatorial narrative, with Dio acting as a reliable eyewitness who 
is the forthright mouthpiece of a homogenous Senate. Within the wider framework of Dio’s account, 
it is clear that in all these respects he is very much a self-made man. 
                                                             






A Fragmentary History 
The Extant Text of the Roman History 
The defining characteristic of Dio’s narrative of the Severan period among modern historians is its 
immediacy. Dio lived through the events he describes, and as seen above, his contemporary history 
has been considered especially valuable as an eyewitness account. There is, however, a problem: for 
the vast majority of Dio’s later narrative, we don’t have Dio’s original text. Roughly two-thirds of the 
Roman History’s eighty books currently exists in a fragmentary or epitomised state. The remaining 
third is largely comprised of a central block of text between books 36 and 60 inclusive, from the 
Mithridatic Wars to the reign of Claudius. This text is complete for the most part, but even here 
sections have been lost. There are twelve manuscripts which form the basis of the central section of 
extant books.1 Of these, nine are later copies of two key texts. The first is Laurentianus 70, 8 (L), an 
eleventh-century manuscript which spans 36.18-50.6.2.2 Four missing folios from the start of book 36 
are reconstructed from a fifteenth-century copy, Vat. Gr. 144 (V). Its few other lacunae can be 
reconstructed from later copies or the second main manuscript, Marcianus 395 (M). This is another 
eleventh-century copy which contains 44.35.4-60.28.3. M is considerably more lacunose than L; more 
problematically, it is the sole source for much of books 55-60.3 It has been estimated that as a result 
only about half of the original account of Tiberius’ and Claudius’ reigns survives, while a quarter of 
Caligula’s has been lost.4 
Only one additional section from the contemporary history survives, preserved in a single, lacunose 
manuscript from the fifth or sixth century. It begins with Caracalla’s Parthian campaign of 216/217 
and covers the reign of Macrinus, and the first part of the reign of Elagabalus (79[78].2-80[79].8). This 
                                                             
1 For a full discussion of eleven, see Boissevan 1895-1901 I: lix-lxxxix. The most recent overview of the 
manuscript tradition is Bellissime and Hurlet 2018: lxxvii-lxxxvi, including a manuscript unknown to 
Boissevain. 
2 Boissevain 1895-1901 I: lxi-lxv. 
3 Covered accessibly in Edmondson 1992: 28-30; Swan 2004: 36-38. See also Boissevain 1895-1901 I: xlviii-lxxiv. 
4 Edmondson 1992: 28. 
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lacunose text survives in the fifth- or sixth-century Vat. Gr. 1288, and has seen significant corrections 
from a later editor, who is thought to have had an additional (now lost) copy to work from.5 The 
manuscript in turn is missing several folios, and is heavily damaged.6 The remainder of Dio’s record 
of his own lifetime is shaped from the eleventh-century Epitome of Cassius Dio, by the Byzantine monk 
John Xiphilinus.7 The Epitome opens with a description of the general Lucullus at the start of book 36, 
and goes through to the very end of Dio’s account.8 It consists of extended quotations from the Roman 
History, compiled into a seemingly coherent but considerably shortened narrative.9  
A variety of fragments support the Epitome, which are from a small number of different sources. The 
most important is the Excerpta Constantiniana, which was originally a vast collection of excerpts from 
various ancient historians compiled in the tenth century for the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus. There were originally fifty-three separate books, each with its own theme, but only 
four now survive: de Legationibus (Romanorum, ELr and Gentium, ELg), de Virtutibus et Vitiis (EV), de 
Insidiis (EI) and de Sententiis (ES).10 Based on the length of these books, it has been suggested that a full 
                                                             
5 Without which the codex would be ‘mendosissimum’, Boissevain 1895-1901 III: vi.  
6 Boissevain 1895-1901 III: iii-ix, summarised by Cary 1914-27 I: xxviii. 
7 As with Dio, citing Xiphilinus is not simple. Boissevain’s standard text of the Epitome is numbered based on the 
pagination of two editions: it begins with the 1865 edition of Dindorf (Xiph. Dind.), who brought his text of the 
Epitome to an end in book 60, during the reign of Claudius; the remainder follows the pagination of Stephanus’ 
sixteenth-century text (Xiph. R. St.), considered otherwise inferior to its later counterpart. Some overlap occurs 
between the two, meaning that it is necessary to specify the source of the text. Xiph. 180 Dind. concludes with 
the opening sentence of book 61[60] (61[60].29.1); the text is immediately picked up at Xiph. 142 R. St 
(Boissevain 1895-1901 III: 579). 
8 Though even by the time Xiphilinus was redacting the Roman History, book 70 and much of book 71 had already 
been lost. The reign of Antoninus Pius is reduced to two comments from Dio, and a similarly small collection 
from other sources, including the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius (70.1-2; = Xiph. 256 R. St.). On their potential 
disappearance by the sixth century, see Juntunen 2013. Schmidt 1989 attempts to reconstruct their contents. 
9 His methods are discussed in greater detail below. 
10 Again, there is an additional complication in citing the Excerpta, with some of its books referred to using 





edition would have run to over 200 modern volumes.11 The Excerpta are generally short extracts, 
collected around specific themes, and thus often divorced from a clearer context.12 It can therefore 
be very difficult to assess the original context of any individual passage. A smaller number of 
fragments are then contained in several other sources, including the seventh-century Florilegium of 
ps.-Maximus the Confessor, and the twelfth-century Chiliades of John Tzetzes.13  
Greater challenges still are posed by the earlier books. Much as the final quarter of the Roman History 
is largely reliant on Xiphilinus, the structure of books 1-21 is reconstructed from the Epitome of 
Histories of Zonaras. Zonaras was a twelfth-century Byzantine scholar and historian who produced a 
history of the world from the Christian creation story to the death of the emperor Alexis I in 1118. He 
seems to have been quite free in his interpretation of the Roman History, summarising and rewriting 
Dio’s text, and leaving only an impression of the general shape of his narrative.14 No coherent 
                                                             
by Henri de Valois. By the same process, the EL is also called the Excerpta Ursiniana (Exc. Urs.), after its 1582 
publication by Fulvio Orsini.  
11 Büttner-Wobst 1906: 97. As it is, roughly three percent of the Excerpta survives (Lemerle 1986: 324-25). 
12 Thus Németh 2013: 240: ‘The imperial excerptors tried to purify the text of any digressions and any data that 
seemed to belong somewhere else.’ 
13 For recent fuller and more detailed discussions of the transmission of the text, see Mazzuchi 1979; Bellissime 
2016a; Fromentin 2016b; see also Cary 1914-27 I: xix-xxvi; Boissevain 1895-1901 I: i-lxxxix.  
14 See Rich 2016 for a reconstruction of the structure of books 1-35. For an introduction to Zonaras and an 
outline of modern scholarship on the Epitome of Histories, see Grigoriadis 1998: 1-28; Banchich and Lane 2009: 1-
12; Treadgold 2013: 388-99; Bellissime and Berbessou-Broustet 2016. The difficulties of accepting Zonaras as a 
guide to Dio’s text are identified in Bellissime and Berbessou-Broustet 2016, esp. 100-108. As they summarise, 
‘les voix auctoriales s’entremêlent intimement’ (108) – it is difficult to identify where Zonaras is directly quoting 
Dio, and where he is inserting his own views. Millar 1964: 1-4 provides a summary of the two Byzantine 
epitomes; see 195-203 for a comparison of the content of book 54 in Dio, Xiphilinus and Zonaras.  
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narrative exists for books 22-35, though the later sources preserve several fragments – some of which 
are quite lengthy15 – from the intervening text.  
The numbers are stark. Though we are faced with what may appear to be a text of significant length, 
only a quarter of its original form survives. Of 80 books, perhaps twenty can be considered intact (36-
54, plus the contents of Vat. Gr. 1288); a further six are mostly coherent, but with significant lacunae 
(55-60); sixteen are almost entirely lost (22-35; 70-71); and the remaining thirty-eight are based on 
epitomes and fragments. To put it another way, Dio’s original narrative covered a full millennium of 
Rome’s history. We have direct access to around 120 years of it. 
If this seems a forcefully pessimistic introduction to the extant state of the Roman History, then it is 
deliberately so. The issue of the Roman History’s transmission is directly pertinent to any study of the 
contemporary books. I believe that it is decidedly more problematic than has usually been suggested. 
Despite its uncertainties, scholarly responses to the text of the contemporary history have been 
overwhelmingly positive.16 This stems from an approach to Xiphilinus’ Epitome which emphasises its 
accurate quotation of Dio. Where comparisons are possible, in book 36-60 and 79-80, the Epitome is 
often made up of verbatim extracts. The fragments from the Excerpta, traditionally seen as taking a 
mechanical approach to quoting earlier works,17 are then taken as equally indicative of Dio’s original 
account. Though we may not have access to the full text, this line of argument has stressed that we 
nonetheless have Dio’s own words to work from.18  
                                                             
15 Fr. 109 (books 30-35) on Sulla, for example, runs to some four pages in Boissevain’s edition (1895-1901 I: 350-
54). 
16 The clearest exception is Murison 1999: 1-3, on Dio’s Flavian narrative. 
17 e.g. Cary 1914-27 I: xx.  
18 Bering-Staschewski 1981: 6; Hekster 2002: 5; Molin 2006: 437-38. Where studies do note the potential difficulty 
caused by Xiphilinus, they tend to pass over it quickly: e.g. Edmonson 1992: 29; Hekster 2002: 5; Adler 2011: 141-
42; Ando 2012: 19; Mallan 2013a: 737-38; Gowing 2016: 130-32 (where Dio’s text being ‘largely intact’ is then 





Having the same words is not the same thing as having the same narrative. Even if the epitomised 
text closely follows Dio’s, the selective retention of text means that the balance of material and 
interests of the original narrative are unavoidably altered. This point is especially important for 
historians using the Roman History. Dio has been used to reconstruct elite attitudes to the emperors 
he served, but the epitomised text means that we cannot even fully reconstruct his own views. The 
absence of text makes it particularly dangerous to assume that we have Dio’s view of the general 
political atmosphere of his lifetime. It is impossible to know what it is missing. It is therefore 
impossible to know how much the specific interests of Byzantine writers have warped the force of 
Dio’s words, even if they do quote him directly. In short, those who wish to study Dio’s report of his 
lifetime must confront the inconvenient fact that, for the most part, we can neither read nor 
reconstruct it.19 
A quick example from the Excerpta Constantiniana shows the disparity between the transmission of 
text and the survival of contextual meaning. In book 42, Dio narrates the siege of Alexandria in 47 
BCE, led by the Egyptian general Achillas against Caesar and Cleopatra (42.36-38). A central section of 
the account is quoted directly in the Excerpta de Legationibus (ELr), a collection of embassies sent and 
received by the Romans. It records how Caesar sent ambassadors to Achillas to ask for peace. Achillas 
decided to kill them, and therefore forced his men into war by such an act of defilement (ELr 10 = Dio 
42.36.1). By one definition, it is an excellent reflection of the Roman History. The text itself is changed 
minimally. A now contextually incongruous δέ and τε are removed; Caesar’s embassy is made one 
man (τινα for τινας); and the soldiers are forced into a war, rather than forcing it themselves 
(κατασταθῶσιν for καταστῶσι). Otherwise, the text is Dio’s, with no omission from within the 
passage.20 Away from the detail of the text itself, however, the episode has a very different thematic 
                                                             
19 The same concerns could apply equally to the first twenty-one books of the Roman History, where Zonaras is 
the most important source for the structure of Dio’s narrative. Despite the problems caused by the nature of 
the preserved text (see n. 9), it is often argued that Zonaras gives a useful indication of Dio’s general thoughts; 
see e.g. Urso 2005: 7-14; Simons 2009: 25-32; Rich 2016. 
20 In this respect, it is typical of extracts from Dio. A list of other examples is provided in Boissevain 1895-1901 
III: 767-75, set out for easy comparison between the Excerpta and the Roman History. 
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force in its two contexts. In ELr, the message is a straightforward one: killing ambassadors is an 
unacceptable and unforgiveable act, which leads to an inevitable war. In the Roman History, things are 
more complex. The passage is connected directly to Caesar’s infatuation with Cleopatra (42.34-35). 
Dio states explicitly that the Egyptian rebellion occurred out of the fear that Caesar would give 
Cleopatra full control of Egypt, and that the rebels acted out of hatred of the idea that a woman could 
rule them (42.36.3). For Dio, the embassy is only one aspect of a much broader interaction between 
the key figures on both sides of the rebellion. In its Byzantine rendering, that one aspect becomes the 
full explanation. 
This should not be considered surprising in light of approaches to the Excerpta as a complex literary 
undertaking in its own right. Scholarship on Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ project has advanced 
greatly over recent decades, as interest in the ordering of knowledge has led to Byzantine attempts 
to construct the past attracting greater attention.21 The Excerpta has been placed into a wider scheme 
of Byzantine discourse with the earlier Roman empire, and Constantine’s position in respect to this 
Roman heritage.22 The key point is that while the Excerpta is made up of extracts from earlier authors, 
these extracts have been chosen specifically because they fit in with the Excerpta’s own goals and 
interests. In this example, the clue to the Byzantine focus is very much in the name. As mentioned 
above, the passage comes from the Excerpta de Legationibus. There is no reason to expect detail which 
does not relate directly to the embassy itself, even if it has an effect on the episode’s framing in Dio. 
Though only one example, this scene should stand as an early warning to those who look for Dio’s 
general political stance in the contemporary books. When the definition of reliable transmission is 
shifted from text to thematic or explanatory force, a very different picture of the Excerpta emerges. 
The Egyptian episode takes on a new purpose in its changed context: one element of a much larger 
political struggle is transformed into a universally applicable exemplum regarding the sanctity of 
embassies. Mechanical as the physical transmission of text may be, the process of organising material 
                                                             
21 On ordering knowledge in the ancient world (and beyond), see Formisano 2001, 2003; König and Whitmarsh 
2007; van der Eijk 2010; König and Woolf 2013. 





under specific titles re-inscribes its original function. This may seem like a lengthy digression about 
a collection of limited importance in the reconstruction of Dio’s contemporary history, but it sets 
outs clearly the effect of omitting an original context. If the Excerpta provides us with a window onto 
some of the missing passages of the Roman History, then its view is highly distorting.23 Most 
pertinently here, the distortion can affect the kind of political explanations for which Dio’s later 
books are so valued. 
Xiphilinus 
With these concerns in mind, I turn to the main source of the contemporary history’s extant text and 
narrative shape. Like the Excerpta, the Epitome of Xiphilinus has been viewed favourably by scholars. 
Where Dio’s original text remains extant for comparison, it has been shown that Xiphilinus provides 
reliable and often verbatim excerpts.24 Though he occasionally alters Dio’s word order or (more 
rarely) vocabulary to his own ends, such emendations are infrequent.25 But once again, the text is 
only one aspect of the Epitome’s relationship with the Roman History. Already in 1980, Peter Brunt used 
Xiphilinus as an example of an epitomised text demonstrating different concerns from its original, 
despite a consistently good preservation of the text itself.26 More recently, scholars have engaged 
with abbreviated texts in a way which moves beyond their interaction with their original models, 
treating them as literary exercises in their own right.27 The process of abbreviation is an inherently 
                                                             
23 For a similar conclusion on the Excerpta Constantiniana as a source for Dionysius of Halicarnassus, see Flusin 
2002; on John of Antioch, Umberto 2009: 84.  
24 Millar 1964: 2; Ziegler 1967: 2133; Bering-Staschewski 1981: 6; Gowing 1997: 2561; Murison 1999: 1-2; Davenport 
2012a: 796 n. 2; Mallan 2013a: 738. 
25 Mallan 2013b: 611-12; Bellissime and Hurlet 2018: lxxxiii-iv. Vrind 1927: 4-6 lists occasions where Xiphilinus 
appears to use terms not found elsewhere in the Roman History, e.g. τάγμα for legion, where Dio always uses 
στρατόπεδον; even these very specific differences run to only around two full pages of discussion. Before book 
60, where the text can be compared with Dio’s original, Boissevain identifies 29 comments added by Xiphilinus, 
listed at Treadgold 2013: 311 n. 12. 
26 Brunt 1980: esp. 488-92. 
27 See generally Horster and Reitz 2010. 
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creative one. Even if text is not added, the decisions made on what to retain, and indeed what to omit, 
can reshape narratives much more comprehensively than the individual excerpts investigated 
above.28 This is especially problematic for Dio’s contemporary books. Close analysis of the Epitome 
makes it clear that the specific questions of Severan politics – that is, the reasons why Dio is so highly 
valued – are often greatly distorted.  
The Epitome presents an explicit (if generalising) statement from Xiphilinus himself which can give 
some indication of how he approached the Roman History. In a first-person intrusion into Dio’s 
narrative of the reign of Augustus, Xiphilinus sets out the basic rationale for his work: 
τὸ μὲν οὖν σύμπαν οὕτω τὴν ἀρχὴν διῴκησε, λέξω δὲ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον ὅσα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι 
καὶ νῦν μάλιστα, διὰ τὸ πάμπολυ ἀπηρτῆσθαι τῶν καιρῶν ἐκείνων τὸν καθ’ ἡμᾶς βίον καὶ τὸ 
πολίτευμα μνημονεύεσθαι (Xiph. 87.2-6 Dind.).  
Everything [Augustus] did to manage the empire I will mention in turn, as much as is 
necessary, which now in particular, across the great separation from those times, brings to 
mind our way of life and government.  
The Epitome is set up here as a Roman history which is directly relevant to its own contemporary 
Byzantine audience. Rome stands as an example of what is happening καθ’ ἡμᾶς, ‘among us’. 
Importantly, in this capacity, it is exemplary to a Byzantine form of government. It is this phrasing 
which explains the otherwise very broad ὅσα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι. Dio’s account has no inherent value, 
but is worth preserving inasmuch as it applies to an eleventh-century context. The point is 
emphasised through a comparison to the Roman History. Xiphilinus’ editorial comment overwrites a 
similar statement from Dio: 
τὸ μὲν οὖν σύμπαν οὕτω τὴν ἀρχὴν διῴκησε, λέξω δὲ καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ὅσα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι 
μετὰ τῶν ὑπάτων, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐγένετο, μνημονεύεσθαι (53.22.1). 
                                                             
28 On the epitomisation of historiography in the ancient world, see esp. Chaplin 2010 (on the Livian Periochae); 





Everything [Augustus] did to manage the empire I will mention in turn, as much as is 
necessary to recall, along with the consuls under whom it took place. 
Xiphilinus maintains Dio’s structure exactly; the change in the stated purpose of the narrative is 
nonetheless significant. The Roman History is set up as an account of the succeeding emperors which 
follows a traditional annalistic style, structured around the consulship. In the Epitome, that 
specifically Roman political institution, and its related historiographical approach, is superseded by 
eleventh-century concerns. It is the similarities to Byzantine politics which matter. In making that 
editorial decision, Xiphilinus introduces a narrative which is concerned with his own πολίτευμα, not 
Dio’s.29 As will be seen, the various means by which Xiphilinus alters the text of the Roman History 
reinforce this removal from a specifically Severan focus. 
The most basic effect of the epitomisation of the Roman History is the loss of text. Two examples 
demonstrate its potential effects on the shape of Dio’s narrative, and should not offer encouragement 
to anyone wanting to use the Epitome to access the original narrative structure. The first is the debate 
between Agrippa and Maecenas, which forms the bulk of book 52 (52.1-40). In his Epitome, as Peter 
Brunt observed, Xiphilinus allows it only a few lines.30 The debate has been important to modern 
scholars concerned with the Roman imperial constitution, or Dio’s attitude towards it. Such things 
were apparently of minimal interest to the Byzantine epitomator. 
This is reflected in the second example, taken from the contemporary history itself. In the year 212, 
Caracalla instituted a law which made all free men in the empire Roman citizens. Known as the 
Constitutio Antoniniana, this law has attracted considerable attention from modern scholars.31 Ancient 
reaction was rather muted in comparison; of a small number of references, only Dio (78[77].9.5) and 
                                                             
29 See Inglebert 2010: 513-14 on the importance of temporal context for understanding epitomes. 
30 Brunt 1980: 489. Agrippa argued for what was more just, and the return of power to the people; Maecenas for 
what was more useful, and keeping control. Octavian was persuaded by Maecenas (Xiph. Dind. 80.29-81.2).   
31 Recent volumes specifically on the citizenship decree include Buraselis 2007; Pferdehirt and Scholz 2012; Ando 
2016a; Imrie 2018. Other discussions include Carrié and Rouselle 1999: 57-65; Garnsey 2004; Ando 2012: 76-99; 
Humfress 2013: 79-90; Kemezis 2014: 30-34; Potter 2014: 139-40. This list is self-evidently far from exhaustive. 
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Ulpian (Dig. 1.5.17) associate it correctly with Caracalla.32 In its extant form, Dio’s comment seems 
brief. He writes that Caracalla was interested solely in getting wealth to give to his soldiers, and 
contrived various means of being able to do so. Wealth was stolen from the elite, and the cities across 
the empire forced to supply money in direct tribute, and to pay increased taxes. He additionally made 
everyone a citizen to tax them more, by removing the exemptions offered to foreigners. Scholars 
have complained about the inaccuracy and banality of Dio’s explanation for the citizenship law.33 But 
even this brief summary is an amalgamation of different sources of the Roman History’s text. The 
majority of the information comes from the Excerpta, including the actual detail regarding the law 
itself. Xiphilinus refers to money being given to the army, and the wasteful spending forced on the 
elite, but details about Roman citizenship are not included.34 
This omission has not only caused a loss of detail for Dio’s reaction to the law. It also further 
illuminates Xiphilinus’ lack of interest in the specifically Roman administrative or constitutional 
aspects of Dio’s narrative. In keeping with his own programmatic statement, Xiphilinus seems to be 
concerned with a more universal moral description which is relevant to his own time, rather than 
with the specific details of a Severan political narrative. Indeed, the same can be said regarding the 
Excerpta. Dio’s description of the constitutio Antoniniana is preserved in the de Virtutibus et Vitiis (EV 
365-66) – that is to say, in a collection concerned with moral exempla, rather than imperial 
institutions or law.35 The EV presents a similarly universalised view of Caracalla, omitting references 
which do survive in the Epitome to the specific suffering of the Senate.36 A fundamental problem is 
                                                             
32 Neither Herodian nor the HA make any mention of the citizenship law. Alternative traditions credited the 
constitution to different Antonini – Aurelius Victor to Marcus Aurelius (Caes. 16.12), and John Chrysostom to 
Hadrian (Homil. in Acta Apostolorum 48.1). 
33 e.g. Ando 2012: 58-60, where Dio’s interest in greed ‘serves him ill’ in his assessment of the citizenship law. 
34 Xiph. 330.22-32 R. St.  
35 Names matter here. Referring to the Excerpta Valesiana (see above, n. 10) in itself masks the moralising 
function of the excerpt. 
36 Caracalla sought to ruin everyone else but the soldiers, ‘not least the senators’ (οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς συγκλητικούς, 





raised by this episode. It is clear that we do not have a complete picture of Dio’s view, even where the 
Excerpta and the Epitome coincide. Moreover, without the EV, it would seem that Dio had nothing to 
say about the constitutio Antoniniana at all. However true Xiphilinus may be to the text of the Roman 
History, the character and tone of the Epitome’s political discussion in these cases is almost 
unrecognisable from those of its source. 
The alterations to Dio’s text are not limited to the simple omission of some of its specifically Roman, 
political details. Their removal is often connected to a shift in the explanatory force of Dio’s original 
narrative. Christopher Mallan’s important recent study seeks to establish Xiphilinus’ working 
methods in the production of the Epitome.37 In a discussion which focuses primarily (though not 
exclusively) on the late republican and early imperial sections of the narrative, Mallan has 
demonstrated an occasional tendency to simplify Dio’s account. In particular, political analysis is 
often replaced with moral explanation. Caesar’s death in the Roman History, for example, comes after 
Brutus and Cassius fail to recognise the distinct constitutional advantages of monarchy (44.1.1.-2.5); 
in the Epitome, Brutus was not willing to submit to tyranny (31.3-11 R. St.). This kind of change can 
often be extremely difficult to detect, and would be impossible to reconstruct without Dio’s original.38 
In trying to see the Epitome as indicative of Dio’s original narrative, we are therefore faced with a 
threefold problem: firstly, Xiphilinus is very evidently an author with his own personality and 
concerns, which are reflected in his willingness to omit details of institutional Roman politics; 
secondly, he sometimes alters the explanatory force of the narrative to coincide with his own 
                                                             
37 Mallan 2013b. Scholarship specifically on Xiphilinus – that is, rather than on the Roman History by way of the 
Epitome – is limited. After Ziegler 1967’s brief summary, more detail is now provided by Berbessou-Broustet 
2016. Canfora 1978 investigates his role in the extant structure of book 60; Schmidt 1989 discusses Xiphilinus’ 
response to the lost book 70; Ehrhardt 1994 argues for a (potentially inadvertent) Christian influence over the 
Epitome. 
38 Mallan 2013b: 624-30. The political conflict between Pompey and Caesar follows a similar pattern. Dio’s 
description is specifically republican, including the attempts by Curio to secure an unwarranted intercalary 
month during Caesar’s consulship (40.59-62); Xiphilinus omits a large amount of detail (chapters 29-66 are 
excised), writing simply that both men desired power, and therefore came into conflict (Dind. 15.26-16.6). 
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interests; and finally, it can be extremely difficult to know when this kind of departure from Dio’s 
text is happening. 
These three difficulties can be observed in the contemporary books of the Roman History, and put real 
pressure on the idea that we can access Dio’s full account of politics in his own lifetime. As mentioned 
above, a manuscript of the original text containing much of book 79[78] and the start of book 80[79] 
still survives.39 It is therefore possible to make comparisons between Xiphilinus and Dio himself for 
at least part of his contemporary history. This includes the full account of the reign of Macrinus, 
which will serve as the key point of comparison between Dio and Xiphilinus here. Unsurprisingly, 
Xiphilinus’ Epitome narrates Macrinus’ principate in much less detail; his account (Xiph. 342-46) 
amounts to roughly three and a half pages in Boissevain’s edition, compared to some thirty-eight for 
Dio (79[78].11-41).40 Yet there is much more at stake than simply less detail in the Epitome. Xiphilinus 
shows the same tendencies in his summary of Macrinus as elsewhere in his treatment of the Roman 
History. He often ignores information about specific political developments, while including amusing 
stories. When these two factors converge, the themes of the narrative are heavily distorted. 
In the case of Macrinus, this means the loss of perhaps the defining feature of his reign. Dio’s account 
is littered with comments about an equestrian becoming emperor. Xiphilinus does not mention it.41 
In itself, that is stark confirmation that Xiphilinus has different interests from Dio, and indeed from 
the majority of his modern scholarly readership. But it also has a direct effect on the analysis of 
Macrinus’ brief principate. This can be demonstrated by the conclusion to his reign: 
οὕτω που οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ τῶν σφόδρα δοκούντων ἐρρῶσθαι βεβαίαν τὴν ἰσχὺν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ 
πάνυ εὖ πράττοντες ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς λοιποῖς αἰωροῦνται. ὁ δ’ οὖν Μακρῖνος καὶ τάχιστα καὶ 
                                                             
39 In Vat. Gr. 1288 (V); see Cary 1914-27 I: xxvi.  
40 Cf. the estimates of a quarter of Dio surviving, above n. 8. It is clear that Xiphilinus was far from consistent in 
the rate at which he chose to include or omit Dio’s text. It would appear that the reign of Macrinus was of 
especially little interest to him. 
41 There is one mention of his low birth (Xiph. R. St. 342.27, Dio 79[78].15.3); the same trait however is also 





βαρυσυμφορώτατα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπέβαλεν· ἐνιαυτῷ τε γὰρ καὶ δύο μησί, τριῶν ἡμερῶν, ὥστε 
καὶ μέχρι τῆς μάχης λογιζομένοις συμβῆναι, δέουσιν, ἦρξεν (Xiph. R. St. 346.28-33). 
And thus it is clear that nobody, even those who seem to be the strongest, is certain of his 
strength; rather, the powerful face the same danger as the rest. And so Macrinus lost power 
very quickly and disastrously. He ruled for three days less than a year and two months, 
counting up to when the battle took place. 
The words are Dio’s, corresponding almost directly with the end of book 79[78]; the only exception is 
the addition of ὁ δ’ οὖν Μακρῖνος and τὴν ἀρχὴν, which are required for clarity of meaning following 
an omission after αἰωροῦνται. That omission however drastically changes the character of the 
narrative. In the Epitome, the fall of Macrinus is a moral lesson on the transience of power. It is rather 
different from Dio’s version. We lose his explanation that Macrinus would have been praised if he 
had selected a senator to replace Caracalla. We lose the detail that he claimed power when he did not 
even have the title of senator, μηδ᾽ ὄνομα βουλευτοῦ ἔχων (79[78].41.4), which in the Roman History 
immediately precedes his rapid and calamitous downfall. Xiphilinus may use Dio’s words, but he 
alters their thematic force. The transgression of social order becomes a universally applicable tale, 
removed from its original anchoring in the depiction of political tensions in Severan Rome. 
Such de-politicisation of Dio’s account extends even into the more colourful moments of the Epitome. 
Dio reports the trial of a certain Lucius Priscillianus, who had been a favourite of Caracalla. He writes 
that he often fought wild animals in the arena, including on one occasion fighting a bear, a panther, 
a lioness and a lion all at the same time, without assistance. Yet this paled in comparison with the 
number of senators and equestrians he slew. Under Macrinus, he was tried by the Senate and exiled 
(79[89].21.3-5). Xiphilinus keeps this part of the story, but in an abridged and slightly reordered form 
(Xiph. R. St. 343.4-10). It becomes explicitly a comparison between emperors: Priscillianus is 
introduced as one of Caracalla’s favourites who was exiled under Macrinus, in a typical μέν…δέ 
construction.42 Dio’s focus is slightly different. Mention of his success under Caracalla comes at the 
end of the passage, and carries much greater detail: rather than the general ‘he was honoured’ 
                                                             
42 ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ Καρακάλου μεγάλως ἐτιμήθη, ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐς νῆσον τινα κατεκλείσθη (Xiph. 343.6-7 R. St.). 
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(ἐτιμήθη) of the Epitome, Dio reports that Priscillianus was given praetorian rank, and made governor 
of Achaea. His exile is then specifically at the hands of the Senate, with no mention of the emperor 
(79[78].21.5). Even in what might appear one of Dio’s more entertaining anecdotes, his version 
pertains directly to Roman political life. Dio’s Priscillianus contravened social precedent and was an 
active opponent of the Senate. Xiphilinus strips away this level of commentary. In the Epitome, 
Priscillianus is little more than an amusing aside.43 
Given the subject matter of Dio’s contemporary history, with its frequent wars (both internal and 
external) and plots against the various emperors, it does not seem excessively cautious to suggest 
that Xiphilinus’ evident tendency to simplify Dio’s political commentary might have some impact on 
the narrative which survives only in the Epitome. The wars of Septimius Severus demonstrate some 
of the potential concerns very effectively. As it stands, Dio’s narrative of the civil war against 
Pescennius Niger in 194 is dominated by an account of the siege of Byzantium.44 It does not seem 
unlikely that this shaping of the Roman History has been affected – perhaps effected – by the Byzantine 
scholar Xiphilinus. Elsewhere, Severus’ campaign against the Parthians in 198 also appears to have 
been altered by Xiphilinus’ interests in amusing stories. It is reduced to a skeleton narrative, in which 
Severus invades, and faces no resistance. Seleucia and Babylon are captured, Ctesiphon sacked, and 
then the Romans go home (76[75].9.1-5). In spite of this general brevity, Xiphilinus chooses to include 
the episode of the emperor coming across a huge boar, which had taken thirty men to capture 
                                                             
43 The pattern is consistent in the Epitome. Much the same can be seen at the start of Elagabalus’ reign. Elagabalus 
is introduced, and immediately goes to Rome; a summary of his reign follows. A universal good action, in the 
form of his decision to spare everyone who had insulted him during Macrinus’ reign, is balanced by a summary 
that he became wholly shameful for his three years and nine months in power (Xiph. 347.10-23 R. St.). Dio offers 
considerably greater detail in the Roman History, including letters sent to the Senate and the army while 
Elagabalus was still in Antioch (80[79].1.1-3.3). 
44 The war is covered in 75[74].6-14; of the nine chapters, the final five are exclusively about the siege and its 





(76[75].9.2). The story has been labelled ‘apparently pointless’.45 This may be so in the Epitome, but it 
is impossible to say if it that is also true of the Roman History. 
The Epitome may seem a different kind of response to the Roman History from Constantine’s project. 
Unlike the Excerpta, Xiphilinus creates a narrative structure which provides a largely coherent 
context for the material from the Roman History which he includes. But it has to be remembered that 
this context is Xiphilinus’, not Dio’s. Xiphilinus’ selection of text is based on his interests and 
concerns, and it is clear that they do not always align with Dio’s. It is therefore impossible to see a 
clear path through to Dio’s original account when we have only the Epitome to work from.46 The 
political commentary which relates specifically to a Severan context is particularly affected by this 
process, from the lack of detail regarding Dio’s career to the kind of criticism aimed at emperors and 
their subordinates. If there is an apparent inconsistency in Dio’s presentation, it is at least in part 
because of Xiphilinus. In many respects, this is therefore more problematic than the Excerpta. There 
is the appearance of a functional narrative to work from, which has led to the view that Dio was 
overwhelmingly concerned with the behaviour of the army, and its impact on political life. But this 
is a Byzantine narrative, not a Severan one. 
Re-Approaching the Contemporary History 
When faced with Dio’s contemporary history, accessing his narrative world is therefore more 
complicated than reading the extant text. The examples laid out above suggest a pattern which 
quickly problematises the use of the Epitome as a proxy for Dio’s original narrative. There are several 
moments when Xiphilinus can be seen transforming elements of the Roman History to make them 
more directly applicable to his own experience of an eleventh-century Byzantine monarchy. Details 
                                                             
45 Millar 1964: 142. 
46 Cf. Chaplin 2010: 466 on the Livian Periochae: ‘If the Periochae do not reveal anything solid about Livy’s politics 
or (anti-) Augustanism, they show rather a lot about the epitomator. We have seen that his intentional brevity 
can unintentionally distort Livy; that he has his own interests and preoccupations, which do not always dovetail 




which are particular to the Roman empire, let alone its Severan form, are made more universally 
applicable by the removal of unnecessary detail. As the summary of the reign of Macrinus shows, that 
detail can be extensive. If we still get a general sense of Dio’s point – something which is not always 
the case – that does not mean that we can confidently reconstruct his overall thematic structure, 
which has been stripped away from the surviving episodes. Even if the surviving contemporary 
narrative does represent a full quarter of the Roman History, the lost material provides a context which 
cannot be reconstructed. From the contemporary history alone, we cannot recreate Dio’s 
presentation of politics. 
That, however, does not mean that an analysis of Dio’s presentation of Severan politics is impossible. 
The remaining half of this chapter is dedicated to suggesting a way of overcoming the problems 
caused by the state of Dio’s text. In its bluntest formulation, the aim is to re-contextualise a narrative 
which should be treated as fragmentary. The standard approach to Dio is to frame the Roman History 
within a historical Severan context.47 As described in the introduction to this thesis, there is a 
methodological problem with doing so. The ancient historiography is the main basis for modern 
political reconstructions of the third century, meaning that this involves the circular process of 
contextualising Dio’s contemporary history against itself.48 I will instead think in terms of literary 
context. The similarities between the Severan emperors and the earlier narrative are evident, and I 
do not dispute them at all. But they can be reframed as part of a thematic continuity, rather than a 
historical commentary. 
In that respect, I build considerably on a recent article by Martin Hose, which explores the 
presentation of imperial madness. Hose compares the depictions of Commodus and Septimius 
                                                             
47 The following is intended only as an indication of the variety of periods which have been seen as a 
commentary on the Severans. Roddaz 1983 is set out explicitly as a discussion of the Augustan narrative in 
Severan terms; Gowing 1997 (esp. 2587-88) sees Dio’s Nero as a reaction to his experience of a series of emperors 
who ruled through performance and deception; Urso 2016 argues that Dio’s focus on Sulla in the republican 
narrative is due to Septimius Severus praising him. 





Severus with the earlier corrupt emperors Tiberius, Caligula and Nero. He observes the creation of a 
thematic paradigm of madness within these three earlier reigns, to which many actions of Dio’s 
contemporary emperors conform. His assessment of Severus is then especially noteworthy. Rather 
than seeing Severus as the model for corruption, Hose argues that we can see how his behaviour fits 
with a precedent set by Tiberius. As a commentary on the Severans, it operates on a discursive rather 
than factual level: Severus presented himself as the new Augustus, but he could only live up to the 
first emperor’s successor.49 In this instance, the earlier books provide the narrative context for a 
depiction of Severan misrule, which functions without a need for objective historical accuracy. 
A comprehensive study of the thematic links between the contemporary history and Dio’s earlier 
books is evidently not possible in this setting. This investigation is therefore intended as a case-study 
of thematic continuity. Its specific focus is the idea of παρρησία (hereafter parrhēsia), which is 
generally translated as free or frank speech.  Rather than a modern concept of general “free speech”, 
parrhēsia has a close connection to political activity in the ancient world. It expresses an ability to 
speak openly to a political superior without concern for personal safety, with a particular opposition 
to tyranny.50 In contrast to Hose’s focus on imperial comparisons, a more conceptual theme enables 
the republican narrative to be included in the exploration of Dio’s narrative framework. Christopher 
Mallan has analysed parrhēsia as a feature of the Republic, while Christopher Burden-Strevens has 
argued for its transformation under Augustus.51 In contrast to their views, I will suggest that its 
presentation is consistent into the extant imperial books, and ultimately individual fragments from 
the epitomised narrative as well. 
                                                             
49 Hose 2011: esp. 119-24 on Severus and Tiberius. Severus’ Augustan presentation is explored in Cooley 2007; 
Barnes 2008; de Blois 2017. 
50 Recent studies of parrhēsia are numerous. For its Athenian origins, see e.g. Monoson 2000: esp. 51-63; 
Saxonhouse 2006; Konstan 2012; Landauer 2012; Balot 2014 (esp. 47-73). Papers in Sluiter and Rosen 2004a track 
parrhēsia through the classical world. By Late Antiquity, it was a trait associated with philosophers (Brown 1992: 
61-70), and Christian bishops (Gaddis 2005: 260-68; Rapp 2005: 267-73; Flower 2013: 146-63). 
51 Burden-Strevens 2015a: 234-41; Mallan 2016. 
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The starting point for this discussion is the key moment in the transition from Republic into 
Principate, which also provides one of the clearest examples of the conventional approach of reading 
a Severan historical context into the earlier books. The debate between Agrippa and Maecenas has 
conventionally been treated as a standalone description of Roman imperial power, in which Dio 
presents his own idealised view of a Roman imperial system. Maecenas in particular has been viewed 
as Dio’s mouthpiece. In an account which covers a wide array of institutions and officials, Maecenas 
presents a Rome which is seen as most recognisable in Dio’s own Severan world.52 Agrippa’s speech 
has received less direct attention, having generally been seen as a rhetorical antithesis to Maecenas’ 
vision of monarchy.53 Recently however it has been suggested that both Agrippa and Maecenas offer 
arguments which are entirely in keeping with Dio’s concerns about imperial power later in his 
narrative.54 In any case, discussions overwhelmingly continue to centre on the comparison between 
                                                             
52 In the late nineteenth century, Eduard Meyer (1891) saw Maecenas as representing Dio’s rejection of the pro-
senatorial policies of Severus Alexander; see also Schwartz 1899: 1719-20.  That reading has fallen out of favour, 
but the assumed connection to Dio continues. See for example Jardé 1925: 26-33; Hammond 1932; Bleicken 1962: 
466-67; Millar 1964: 102-18; Letta 1979: 167-70; Manuwald 1979: 21-5; Zawadski 1983: 317-18; Aalders 1986: 297-
302; Reinhold 1986: 219-21; Reinhold and Swan 1990: 164-5; Fishwick 1990 (on the imperial cult); Vielberg 1996: 
42; Escribano 1999: 175-84; Handy 2009: 22-24; Corsana 2016: 557-58; France 2016 (on imperial finance). Cf. 
Gowing 1992: 289 for the idea that Dio was aware that the ideals in the speech were no longer achievable; Ando 
2016c for the view that books 52 and 53 combine for a problematisation of imperial rule from its very outset. 
53 But that is not to say there has been none. Markov 2013 looks at Agrippa’s speech for evidence of Dio’s political 
thought, while Berrigan 1968 and Fechner 1986: 86 make the case for Agrippa giving the more compelling 
arguments of the two speakers. Elsewhere, McKechnie 1981 sees Agrippa as a fully Hellenistic contrast with 
Maecenas’ more Roman monarchy; see also Kuhlmann 2010 on the intertext with Herodotus’ Persian debate 
(Hdt. 3.80), with bibliography.  
54 Adler 2012 is especially comprehensive. See also Espinosa Ruiz 1982: esp. 38-58, 91-101; Reinhold 1988: 170; 





book 52 and the contemporary narrative. When that narrative is assumed to be accurate, the 
Augustan debate becomes a commentary on a very real Severan context.55 
Yet this kind of historicising approach is not the only reading of the Agrippa/Maecenas debate. A 
number of recent studies have begun to stress the structural function of book 52, as the narrative 
shifts from the Republic to the Principate. Especially important is the analysis of Adam Kemezis. He 
has described the Roman History as divided into what he terms narrative modes, five different periods 
of Rome’s history which are described in their own slightly different terms. The debate marks a 
transition between two of these modes, as the civil wars of the Late Republic progressed into the 
Augustan Principate. Rather than introducing a new kind of political situation in Rome through an 
explicit authorial interlude, Dio uses the debate to make the shift.56 Kemezis’s view of the shape of 
the Roman History has been challenged by scholars who have stressed the coherence of the narrative 
as a whole, and the porous borders between its suggested periods.57 But the key point for this study 
remains, and indeed is supported: the scene has a function which is removed from any Severan 
context. In terms of the Roman History’s construction, it functions as a central pivot in an overall 
narrative which is able to remain coherent even as it straddles markedly different political systems.  
Seeing books 52 as an important structural device in the Roman History does not remove the clear 
links between the debate and the contemporary history. It does reframe them. If the debate 
represents an ideal, then it is one which is closely connected to Dio’s construction of imperial Rome. 
The scene provides an outline of how Rome changed after the institution of the Principate. The 
similarities in the authorial use of parrhēsia indicate that Dio’s methods of describing the city’s history 
                                                             
55 Recent examples include de Blois 1998b: 362-68; Schmidt 1999: 104-17; Schettino 2001: 547-51; Markov 2013: 
229 (Dio has Agrippa, ‘pay special attention to current problems of the Severan age’); France 2016: 781 (‘la 
critique de son époque est évidente); Madsen 2016: 138; Moatti 2016: 80-81; Molin 2016b: esp. 469-71. 
56 Narrative modes are set out at Kemezis 2014: 94-104. He lists five: early Rome; the Republic; the ‘dynasties’ 
(δυναστεία) which began with Caesar’s rise to sole power; the imperial narrative; and Dio’s contemporary 
history. See 126-35 on the Agrippa/Maecenas debate. 
57 See papers in Burden-Strevens and Lindholmer (forthcoming, 2018) on the consistent role of jealousy 
(φθόνος) across Dio’s republican books, for example. 
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do not. Where consistency can be identified, the fragmentary narrative can be recontextualised. Dio’s 
original account remains hidden, but individual surviving scenes can be explained in more detail. 
Parrhēsia and the End of the Republic 
In a treatment of parrhēsia directed mainly towards the Republic, Christopher Mallan identifies frank 
speech as a lost relic in Dio’s own age, an ideal which can no longer function in an imperial setting. It 
is a feature of republican Rome, where senators had the ability to speak their minds openly. Despite 
this generally pessimistic tone, Mallan also comments briefly on the Agrippa/Maecenas debate to 
present frank speech in much more positive terms. His summary describes the scene as, ‘in some 
ways representative of how advisors should behave towards an emperor, and how an emperor should 
behave towards his advisors.’58 It is an idea which merits closer inspection than Mallan’s single 
paragraph. In particular, the harmonious interaction in the debate stands in direct contrast to the 
kind of parrhēsia usually seen in the Republic. The beginning of the Principate marks a shift in frank 
speech occurring as a disruptive force, into something which now has the potential for being of direct 
benefit to Rome. That transition of parrhēsia is described in consistent terms across both periods. As 
a starting point, then, it can demonstrate a thematic link which traverses the divide between Republic 
and Principate. Though it has been thought of as a commentary on Severan politics, the debate 
therefore also works as a fitting end to the Republic. 
Over the course of book 52, there are at least four references to parrhēsia.  At the start of his speech, 
Agrippa promises to speak frankly (λέξω δὲ μετὰ παρρησίας, 52.3.3); the idea is closely paralleled in 
Maecenas’ advice that an emperor should allow his advisors to speak freely (52.33.4, 52.33.6).59 This 
forms part of the general scheme of effective monarchy. Maecenas acknowledges the greater power 
of the ruler, but stresses that there should be consultation between a monarch and other judges, with 
advice passing in both directions. Parrhēsia is introduced as necessary to make the most of this two-
way consultation.60 Finally, at the end of the debate, Augustus thanks his two advisors for their many 
                                                             
58 Mallan 2016: passim, 270 for the quotation.  
59 Mallan 2016: 270 refers only to the first two mentioned here. 





thoughts and suggestions, and the parrhēsia with which they have spoken.61 There is a fifth potential 
reference at the lacunose start of Agrippa’s speech.62 An unclear and possibly spurious comment 
describes parrhēsia in a democratic context as unable to persuade those who disagree (52.14.1).63 It is 
clear that one of Maecenas’ criticisms of democracy is the ability of the undeserving to say whatever 
they want (52.14.2). Frank speech may not be the sole theme of the debate by any means, but its role 
within the structure of book 52 should not be ignored. The debate begins with the promise of frank 
advice; the theme is picked up within the speeches; and it finishes with parrhēsia as the main focus of 
Augustus’ appreciation. 
The debate is therefore structured around parrhēsia. Moreover, the debate meets all of Maecenas’ 
criteria for effective frank speech. Augustus invites frankness in a discussion of matters of state which 
aims to come to the best possible conclusion, much as Maecenas suggests at 52.33.6-7. There, Dio has 
him stress that a monarch’s advisors should be granted parrhēsia whenever they want it, and that bad 
advice can be ignored (rather than punished) without any negative consequences for Augustus 
himself.64 This too comes to fruition in book 52. Despite advising Augustus to give up power, Agrippa 
becomes an eager supporter of his monarchical reforms, as though he himself had proposed a 
monarchy (52.41.2). His advice is listened to and put to one side, and all three men work together 
once a decision is made. To build on Mallan’s summary, the Agrippa/Maecenas debate can be seen as 
                                                             
61 ὁ δὲ δὴ Καῖσαρ ἀμφοτέρους μέν σφας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πολυνοίᾳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πολυλογίᾳ τῇ τε παρρησίᾳ ἰσχυρῶς 
ἐπῄνεσε (52.41.1). The two men’s thoughts and words may be important, but they build up to a climactic focus 
on their parrhēsia. 
62 A single folio is missing, to a total of 62 lines; Reinhold 1988: 179-80. 
63  …οὔτε πεῖσαί τι ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ παρρησίας τοὺς οὐχ ὁμοίους δύνανταἰ. The line is considered questionable by 
Boissevain (1895-1901II: 388) and Cary (1914-27 VI: 108), but accepted by Dindorf (1863-1865 III: 45). Even if 
accurate, its precise contextual meaning is difficult to glean. 
64 The point is connected to Maecenas’ advice on monarchy: don’t do anything to your advisors which you 
wouldn’t want someone to do to you (52.29.2). A similar formulation is found in the respect shown by Tarquinius 
Superbus to the Senate early in his career (fr. 9.1-3); this quickly stops after he comes to power. 
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much more than a representation of how an emperor should engage with the elite. It defines good 
governmental practice, built around parrhēsia, and simultaneously performs it. 
The demonstration of effective monarchy through the debate resonates strongly with the recent 
scholarship on parrhēsia in the Republic. Mallan’s investigation is highly elucidating; I therefore 
summarise his points here. The two figures most associated with frankness in the Republic are Cicero 
and Cato. They exist as opposites: Cato was genuine in his parrhēsia, and worked only towards the 
public good;65 Cicero’s parrhēsia was directed exclusively at self-promotion.66 Notably, Cato’s efforts 
achieved nothing.67 The contrast is reinforced by close textual links between the two, as sometimes 
identical claims are made by both men, only highlighting Cicero’s hypocrisy.68 His selfishness comes 
to a head in another debate scene. Cicero is given three lengthy speeches in the Roman History, of 
which the final one is of concern here.69 Dio relates a fictional debate set at the start of 43 BCE between 
Cicero and Quintus Fufius Calenus, consul in 47 and a supporter of Mark Antony. The scene is one of 
the longest in the entire Roman History, spanning two books (45.18-46.28). Ultimately, the Senate are 
persuaded to support Octavian at Antony’s expense, leading to the outbreak of open war.  
As Mallan has it, the debate ‘is crucial to Dio’s consideration of Republican parrhēsia’. The concept is 
ever-present in the speeches. Cicero speaks first, presenting himself as a good citizen, opposing 
                                                             
65 See e.g. 43.10.5, where Cato refuses to support Caesar as he is unwilling to give up freedom and parrhēsia in 
exchange for slavery; much the same idea is expressed in his opposition to Pompey at 37.22. 
66 Dio’s portrayal of Cicero as an obstructive egotist is unsurprisingly a focus of considerable scholarship, dating 
back to the nineteenth century, as Haupt 1884: 687-92; see more recently e.g. Gowing 1992: 143-61; Claassen 
1996; Lintott 1997: 2514-17; Sion-Jenkis 2002; Fromentin and Bertrand 2008: xx-xxxiii; Lachenaud 2008; Sanna 
2008; Rees 2011: 102-83; Montecalvo 2014; Burden-Strevens 2015a: 47-72. 
67 See Madsen 2016: 143-46, for the suggestion that Cato’s honest parrhēsia could only fail in a Republic which 
was destined to collapse. 
68 See Mallan 2016: 259-69 for a number of comparisons. 
69 The earlier two are Cicero’s opposition to the lex Gabinia, which granted Pompey’s extraordinary powers in 





Antony for the benefit of Rome;70 Calenus attacks him as a selfish coward in reply. On several 
occasions, Calenus echoes Cicero’s claims in his jibes. Cicero bemoans the fact that Antony’s influence 
makes it impossible to speak openly about anything or do what is needed (παρρησίαν ἄλλως εἰπεῖν τι 
καὶ πρᾶξαι τῶν δεόντων) without a bodyguard for protection (45.22.5); Calenus retorts that Cicero 
uses his ability to speak frankly so he can appear bold (ἐκ τοῦ θρασέως παρρησιάζεσθαι), rather than 
saying anything useful (τι τῶν δεόντων εἰπεῖν, 46.9.4). Cicero claims that he doesn’t fear death for 
employing parrhēsia against Antony (45.46.3-4); Calenus mocks him, since he had previously assented 
to all the powers which the Senate had bestowed. Cicero was not stripped of parrhēsia then (οὐ γάρ 
που καὶ παρρησίας ἐνδεὴς ἦσθα) – he simply used it to bark pointlessly (46.26.1-2). 
Things come to a head in the debate’s conclusion.71 In contrast to the effective parrhēsia of book 52, 
the debate between Cicero and Calenus has no productive outcome. As Dio summarises: 
τοιαῦτα τοῦ Καλήνου εἰπόντος ὁ Κικέρων οὐκ ἤνεγκεν: αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀκράτῳ καὶ 
κατακορεῖ τῇ παρρησίᾳ ἀεὶ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἐχρῆτο, παρὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἠξίου τὴν 
ὁμοίαν ἀντιλαμβάνειν. καὶ τότε οὖν ἀφεὶς τὸ τὰ δημόσια διασκοπεῖν ἐς λοιδορίας αὐτῷ 
κατέστη, ὥστε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἥκιστα μάτην κατατριβῆναι (46.29.1). 
Cicero could not endure Calenus’ words. Though he himself was always used to speaking with 
untempered and immoderate freedom to everyone regardless, he could not accept that same 
thing from other people. He therefore then abandoned the investigation of public concerns 
and turned to abusing him, so that the whole day was wasted through it. 
The phrasing here almost directly quotes Dio’s critique of Cicero earlier in the narrative. When 
explaining Cicero’s exile in 58-57 BCE, Dio describes him as excessive and immoderate in the way that 
he employs parrhēsia towards everyone (τῇ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ 
                                                             
70 His speech in the Roman History has been described as, ‘an epitome of the fourteen Philippics’ (Fomin 2016: 
232). The points of comparison are set out in Montecalvo 2014: 3790-406; see also van Stekelenburg 1971: 79-87; 
Burden-Strevens 2015a: 58-70. Kyhnitzsch 1894: 59-64 points out a number of Thucydidean references in the 
two speeches.  
71 Mallan 2016: 63-68 provides more detail. 
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χρώμενος, 38.12.5). Dio’s Cicero is far from the self-appointed champion of the people that he claims, 
and it is through his parrhēsia that this is made most evident. As Mallan has argued, the conclusion to 
the debate is more than simply a final insult aimed at Cicero before the narrative moves on. The scene 
can instead be seen as an embodiment of a political system in which frank speech can be used solely 
for self-promotion.72  
Placed alongside the excesses of Cicero and Calenus, book 52 is not just a demonstration of parrhēsia 
working effectively. It becomes a resolution of a fundamental structural weakness in republican 
government. The frankness engaged in by Cicero and Calenus is actively disruptive. His lack of 
restraint leads to Cicero descending into nothing more than abuse, and actively turning away from 
the public concerns that the debate was meant to address. Both men could talk about τὰ δέοντα, what 
is necessary, but their rivalry supplanted its discussion. The contrast with book 52 is clear. At the 
start of his speech, Agrippa asserted the need to speak frankly, οὐ τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ ἴδιον… ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν τό 
τε κοινὸν – not in his own interests, but those of Augustus and the state (52.2.2).73 Even though his 
advice was not followed, Agrippa accepted the outcome, keeping to his statement in a way which is 
alien to his republican models. 
To this extent, I come close to agreeing with Christopher Burden-Strevens, who identifies a range of 
other problematic themes from the Republic which are resolved by Augustus through other 
speeches.74 For Burden-Strevens, this is a ‘reinvention’ of parrhēsia in a new, imperial context.75 This 
is where my view differs considerably. While the impact of parrhēsia has certainly changed with the 
installation of an autocratic arbiter, the way it is used is much the same. The distinction is shown 
through the arrest of Licinius Murena, who was connected to a conspiracy against Augustus (54.3). 
                                                             
72 Mallan 2016: 268-69. See also Burden-Strevens 2015a: 240-41.  
73 See also 52.13.5, where he advises Augustus to secure his authority by doing everything which is useful to the 
state (πάντα τὰ συμφέροντα τῷ δημοσίῳ). Maecenas meanwhile says that an effective monarch should promote 
those who are πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ συμφορώτεροι, more effective for the state’s interests (52.37.8). 
74 Burden-Strevens 2015a: 241-58. 
75 Burden-Strevens 2015a: 237. See also Mallan 2016: 275 for the distinction between different types of parrhēsia 





His downfall is strikingly reminiscent of Cicero at the end of the debate. Dio attributes his assumed 
engagement in the plot – whether true or a rumour – to his unrestrained parrhēsia. The phrasing used 
to describe Cicero’s affronted response to Calenus is quoted verbatim to say that Murena used 
parrhēsia recklessly: καὶ ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ τῇ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἐχρῆτο (54.3.4). The 
benefits of the new political system are confirmed by the change in reaction to frank speech, rather 
than the frank speech itself. Murena could still engage in parrhēsia in the same way as Cicero, but he 
did not gain from it. Instead, it made people suspicious that he was involved in a plot, and led to his 
eventual execution. In contrast, Augustus got involved in events as the representative of τὸ δημόσιον; 
his resolution of matters confirmed the claim, as he did what was beneficial to public interests 
(συμφέροντα τῷ δημοσίῳ, 54.3.6).76 Speaking with parrhēsia still has the potential to be disruptive in 
Dio’s Augustan world. Augustus may reinvent the consequences of speaking in this way, but he does 
not change the speech.77 
From Cicero and Calenus through to book 52 and the Murena trial, we find the same use of parrhēsia 
to demonstrate the change in Rome’s political atmosphere. And it is clearly a positive one. The 
Augustan monarchy creates a situation in which parrhēsia can be a positive force, rather than a 
disruptive one. It allows Agrippa to speak frankly, in the interests of the state. Murena’s untempered 
frankness, meanwhile, can be consigned to a grave, instead of diverting public business. In effect, this 
is Augustus reversing the polarity of parrhēsia in the Republic, where Cicero’s excess could triumph 
in public debates and Cato’s genuine concern for the good of Rome achieved nothing. On both a 
                                                             
76 There are several examples of Augustus appreciating parrhēsia. See esp. 55.7.3, where among the many virtues 
of Maecenas listed at his death is his ability to restrain the emperor’s anger with frank speech. More generally, 
senators are allowed to speak openly (53.21.3, 55.4.1, 55.34.1); Augustus’ encouragement of parrhēsia is 
mentioned three times at the end of his reign – twice by Tiberius in his eulogy (56.40.3, 56.41.8), and in Dio’s 
summary of his reign (56.43.1). 
77 The same could be said of Helvidius Priscus, who uses parrhēsia ‘beyond what is fitting’ (οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ) to 
attack Vespasian (65[66].12). Mallan (2016: 271) sees the episode showing Dio’s distaste for ‘ostentatious, 
pointless opposition that had little value.’ I would suggest this is rather an emperor rightly punishing 
misdirected parrhēsia.  
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structural and a thematic level, book 52 forms part of a coherent shift into the Principate. In the 
content of Maecenas’ speech, Dio sets out the political shape of imperial Rome; in the construction of 
the scene, he illustrates the benefits of monarchy. 
Parrhēsia after Augustus 
Through parrhēsia, we can see how book 52 can be read as the performance of a resolution to the 
Republic’s fundamental flaws. Just as there is distinct continuity with its republican equivalent in the 
presentation of Augustan parrhēsia, the later narrative continues to associate it with the same 
collection of themes, and its performance has the same kind of consequences.78 While it may be true 
that frank speech is less common in the extant imperial books, the reign of Tiberius shows that it is 
still present. Dio’s Tiberius conforms to familiar images from Tacitus and Suetonius, concentrating 
on his deception. As Dio puts it, he was someone who suggested the very opposite of what he actually 
intended to do. It was then even more dangerous to anticipate Tiberius’ nature, and doing what he 
really wanted was liable only to raise his suspicions (57.1.4). The result is that Tiberius hated 
everyone: either people agreed with his words, and therefore what he actually disliked, or they 
challenged his pretence (57.1.6). Tiberius therefore created a world in which it was impossible to 
speak safely. The connections with book 52 are clear. From the very outset of his reign, Tiberius is 
described in terms of his reaction to elite speech. We are a long way from Maecenas’ advice that a 
monarch should do and say whatever he wants his governors to think and do.79 While Augustus is 
grateful for the frank opinions of Agrippa and Maecenas, Tiberius creates an environment in which 
such communication is impossible.80 
                                                             
78 Aside from parrhēsia as a specific theme, Jones 2016: 306-309 provides an overview of emperors being judged 
against their engagement with advisors, beginning with the fragmentary account of Romulus. 
79 Πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τοὺς ἀρχομένους καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν βούλει, καὶ λέγε καὶ ποίει (52.34.1). 
80 This trait is shared with both Domitian and Caligula. Domitian (67.4.2) had the most terrible (δεινότατον) 
quality of craving flattery, but hating everyone as a result: flatterers for their insincerity, and everyone else for 





Despite this introduction, Dio’s Tiberius is not straightforward in his opposition to effective speech. 
The structure of Dio’s narrative allows for some much more positive involvement with parrhēsia. After 
listing some of his more problematic traits, Dio emphasises that to begin with Tiberius governed the 
state in a way which was very effective (57.7-13). The scene is introduced with a general overview, in 
which Tiberius would act like Augustus (κατὰ τὸν Αὔγουστον, 57.7.2), immediately setting up an 
explicit basis for comparison. What follows is a catalogue of everyday actions, all in the imperfect 
tense, which sets out the general character of the early reign. Within the wide-ranging list, Dio 
includes specific discussion of how Tiberius allowed parrhēsia in his discussions with the Senate: 
καὶ ἔς γε τὸ μέσον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην τιθεῖς οὐχ ὅπως ἀντειπεῖν αὐτῇ παντί τῳ παρρησίαν 
ἔνεμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀναντία οἱ ἔστιν ὅτε ψηφιζομένων τινῶν ἔφερε. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ψῆφον 
πολλάκις ἐδίδου. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δροῦσος ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἄλλοις τοτὲ μὲν πρῶτος τοτὲ δὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρους 
τοῦτ᾽ ἐποίει: ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐσιώπα, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ πρῶτος ἢ καὶ μετ᾽ ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ 
καὶ τελευταῖος τὰ μὲν ἄντικρυς ἀπεφαίνετο, τὰ δὲ δὴ πλείω, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῇ τὴν παρρησίαν 
αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἔλεγεν ὅτι ‘εἰ γνώμην ἐποιούμην, τὰ καὶ τὰ ἂν ἀπεδειξάμην’ (57.7.3-4). 
When he had set out his own opinion publicly he not only allowed everyone to speak frankly 
against it, but even accepted it when people voted for the opposite; for he himself would 
often cast a vote. Drusus was equal to the rest, sometimes acting first, and sometimes after 
others. There were times when Tiberius meanwhile would keep silent, others when he spoke 
first, or after some others, or even last; sometimes he would reveal his opinion directly, but 
most of the time, so he didn’t seem to be taking away their frank speech, he would say, ‘If I 
were taking part, I would say this, or that.’ 
The links back to book 52 and the late Republic are apparent. This is parrhēsia operating in an 
administrative setting, closely connected with public business. As with the Agrippa/Maecenas 
debate, it involves members of the elite giving their frank opinion, facilitated by the presence of a 
                                                             
and delighting equally in both flatterers and those who spoke frankly (τοῖς τε θωπεύουσιν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖς 
παρρησιαζομένοις τι καὶ ἤχθετο ὁμοίως καὶ ἥδετο, 59.4.5).  
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monarch who is simultaneously controlling the excesses of the Republic and granting a degree of 
freedom.81 Augustus too put everything before the Senate (55.4.1), and spoke last to ensure that his 
advisors were not influenced by his view (55.34.1). It is not a problem that Tiberius tried to avoid 
‘seeming’ (μὴ δοκῇ) to be preventing parrhēsia. This is exactly the same focus on a public impression 
of senatorial power suggested by Maecenas five books previously.82 Finally, Tiberius himself is a 
contrasting figure to the likes of Cicero and Calenus. Rather than boasting about an interest in the 
public good, as had the two republican orators who achieve nothing more than wasting everyone’s 
time, Tiberius was restrained in even offering an opinion. 
Dio’s account of Tiberius introduces another important aspect of thematic continuity. In his reign, 
parrhēsia is found operating in a consistent fashion even when the narrative has been epitomised. 
Despite a positive beginning, Tiberius’ reign descended into tyranny after the death of Germanicus 
(57.13.6), reflected in the growing power of Sejanus. In a passage preserved only in the Epitome, lost 
to a lacuna at the start of book 58, parrhēsia takes on a role in Dio’s presentation of this corruption. A 
perverse form of frank speech proliferated: that of informers. These men were free to say whatever 
they wished, safe in the knowledge that their victims would face any punishment which came from 
it (58.1.2). Their association with parrhēsia is a direct subversion of the monarchy described by 
Maecenas in book 52. For Maecenas, the goal of speaking freely was to the benefit of the state: elite 
advisors should be able to share their honest opinions with the emperor, so that he can then make 
                                                             
81 Dio’s phrasing in the introduction also picks up on Maecenas’ speech. He stresses that Tiberius shared the 
decision-making process, offering in quick succession the verbs ἐκοίνου and ἐπεκοίνου (57.7.2). The repetition 
calls to mind Maecenas’ exhortation, τά τε γὰρ κοινὰ κοινῶς διοικεῖσθαι δεῖ (52.32.1) – shared concerns (often 
‘the state’) should be administered in a shared fashion – in his assertion that everything important should be 
brought before the Senate. 
82 Summed up at 52.31.1: καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ ἀξιόλογόν ἐστι τό τε τὴν βουλὴν πάντων κυρίαν δοκεῖν εἶναι, ‘It is both 





the best-informed decision possible.83 Under a corrupt emperor, parrhēsia continued to be effective, 
but only to destructive ends.  
Though it is highly likely that Xiphilinus abbreviated this passage, it is consistent with later events 
in Tiberius’ reign which are fully extant. The reference to informers and treason trials is repeated as 
book 58 progresses, with a similar corruption of parrhēsia. On this occasion, useful frank speech loses 
all its force. The execution of Sejanus was followed by a purge of his friends and supporters. Dio writes 
that some of those accused of showing him favour were tried, and spoke with parrhēsia; most killed 
themselves first, to avoid the extra suffering of imprisonment, and the seizure of their property, 
when defending the accusation was futile (58.15). Frank speech in a legal setting is not only made 
ineffective by tyranny, but actively causes more harm. The corruption of parrhēsia from the Epitome 
is completed by this passage. Taken together, Dio presents its harmful form coming to the fore, and 
its ideal use having no impact. This is a state which has been turned upside down. 
The reversal of effective parrhēsia coincides with a shift in thematic connections. This problematic 
form of frank speech caused by tyranny is explored using direct parallels with the disruptive parrhēsia 
seen in the Republic, and encapsulated in the figure of Cicero. Misused parrhēsia in both cases is 
closely associated with insults. The informer only has to begin with some kind of insult – ἔργον ἐστὶ 
λοιδορίας τέ τινος προκατάρχεσθαι (58.1.2) – to encourage his victim to join in; that is the risk-free 
parrhēsia he can indulge in. The connection with loidoria occurs in much the same way with Cicero in 
book 46. Within Calenus’ speech, Cicero is accused of insulting Antony (ὡς αὐτὸς λοιδορεῖ, 46.16.3), 
and then mockingly quoted on his claim to be the only one who speaks frankly in defence of the 
Republic (ἐγὼ μόνος ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας παρρησιάζομαι, 46.16.3). More starkly, Calenus accuses 
Cicero of insulting everyone all the time, out of a desire to look like he is able to speak frankly – καὶ 
λοιδορεῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντας πανταχοῦ, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ θρασέως παρρησιάζεσθαι δοκεῖν δύναμιν (46.9.4). This 
comes to a head at the conclusion of the scene, discussed above, where Dio describes Cicero falling 
                                                             
83 Esp. 52.33.6-9. As Maecenas concludes in this section, it is the emperor who has the most to gain from this 
kind of advice. 
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back to insulting Calenus (ἐς λοιδορίας αὐτῷ κατέστη, 46.29.1).84 It is a situation which reaches 
something of a climax at the start of Caligula’s reign. He is the first to insult Tiberius (αὐτὸν καὶ 
πρῶτος λοιδορήσας), encouraging the elite to speak with a rather hasty frankness (προπετεστέρᾳ 
παρρησίᾳ χρήσασθαι). He then punishes some of them for their words (59.4.2). Caligula is presented 
an emperor who became an informer himself.  
Dio’s contemporary books may seem somewhat removed from his account of the early Principate, 
due to the apparent absence of parrhēsia. It is mentioned only three times, in two scenes which both 
occur in the reign of Septimius Severus. As explored above, this apparent infrequency is not 
necessarily reflective of a different approach from Dio. It is impossible to say if other mentions were 
omitted by Xiphilinus and the other Byzantine excerptors, let alone how many. Their existence does 
not seem unlikely: of the forty-nine occurrences of parrhēsia in books 36-59, only eighteen are in the 
Epitome.85 But frequency is not the concern here. What is clear is that frank speech in the 
contemporary history is entirely consistent with the earlier narrative. Moreover, the coherence of 
Dio’s presentation of parrhēsia can enable certain scene to be more easily understood. Dio’s 
description of Severus is generally viewed as negative. His account includes several scenes of 
                                                             
84 Hadrian’s reign has a similar echo of Cicero and Calenus. Hadrian executes the architect Apollodorus, after 
he criticises the emperor’s design for a temple. Hadrian could not put up with his parrhēsia (τὴν παρρησίαν 
αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἤνεγκεν, 69.4.3), much like Cicero at the end of Calenus’ speech (46.29.1). This has wider thematic 
links. Hadrian’s hatred of Apollodorus is linked to his jealousy (φθόνος) towards those who have expert 
knowledge (69.3.3). It is a trait shared by Domitian (67.14.3) and later Caracalla (78[77].11.5); cf. book 52, where 
Agrippa stresses that tyranny leads people to hide their abilities out of fear (52.5.1-2), while Maecenas 
encourages Augustus to celebrate those abilities (52.33.9). 
85 By way of more extreme comparison, Burden-Strevens 2015a: 182 n. 143 refers to eighty-two mentions of the 
morpheme -φθον- (i.e. words associated with φθόνος, envy) between books 25 and 55 in a discussion of its 
thematic importance in Dio’s late Republic (2015a: 180-93; see also id. 2016: 207-14). Seventy-six of these are in 





duplicity and aggression against the Senate.86 Though there are some more praiseworthy moments, 
they have been seen as exceptional, to the point that several scholars have been willing to label 
Severus as one of the tyrants of the Roman History.87 This is a view which neatly represents the 
approaches to the contemporary history which I have challenged. It assumes that we still have a 
complete image of what Dio thought about Severus, which can be analysed in its own discrete terms.  
When Severus’ positive interaction with parrhēsia is framed against the wider narrative, the 
suggestions of exceptionality cease to apply. At the very end of Severus’ life, Dio presents a general 
precis of the emperor’s approach to imperial duties (77[76].17). It is immediately comparable to the 
scene under Tiberius: a collection of repeated, imperfect actions, which set out Severus’ everyday 
interaction with the senatorial elite, covering details from his behaviour in a court environment to 
his typical dining habits.88 As with Tiberius, Dio includes Severus’ attitude to parrhēsia: 
ἔπραττέ τι πάντως νυκτὸς ὑπὸ τὸν ὄρθρον, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐβάδιζε καὶ λέγων καὶ ἀκούων τὰ 
τῇ ἀρχῇ πρόσφορα: εἶτ᾽ ἐδίκαζε, χωρὶς εἰ μή τις ἑορτὴ μεγάλη εἴη. καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἄριστα αὐτὸ 
ἔπραττε: καὶ γὰρ τοῖς δικαζομένοις ὕδωρ ἱκανὸν ἐνέχει, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς συνδικάζουσιν αὐτῷ 
παρρησίαν πολλὴν ἐδίδου (77[76].17.1). 
He would always do something during the night before dawn, after which he would go for a 
walk and discuss matters regarding the empire. He would then sit in court, unless one of the 
big festivals was happening. Indeed, he did this very well: he would grant speakers sufficient 
time, and would allow those of us who were his fellow judges to speak entirely frankly. 
                                                             
86 Perhaps the most famous example being his false claim after his accession that he wouldn’t kill any senators, 
only to execute the man who had written up the edict (75[74].2.1-2). 
87 See recently Juntula 2016; Madsen 2016: 154-57. A more restrained characterisation of Severus as 
‘insufficiently heroic’ for anyone trying to praise the Severans (Kemezis 2014: 146) seems more reasonable, 
though is still difficult to justify fully. 
88 Pitcher 2018a: 223-24 outlines Dio’s tendency to characterise through praxis, the actions of characters, rather 
than explicit judgement. 
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The setting of this account of elite parrhēsia is almost identical to that of Tiberius, apart from its place 
at the end of Severus’ reign rather than the start. It occurs in the same kind of block of general 
patterns of administrative behaviour, with the same string of imperfect verbs. His engagement with 
parrhēsia is just as positive. Senators are allowed to speak freely as colleagues in a legal setting 
(συνδικάζουσιν), in a confirmation that Severus really did carry out his public duties excellently 
(ἄριστα). There is a return to the idea of beneficial public activity, too. Severus was concerned about 
τὰ τῇ ἀρχῇ πρόσφορα, the business of ruling.89  There is consistent praise, which coincides directly 
with Dio’s exploration of parrhēsia elsewhere. 
When parrhēsia features again under Severus, the same thematic continuities can be seen. The trial 
of Cassius Clemens, a senator charged with treason for supporting Pescennius Niger in the civil war, 
is framed explicitly around parrhesia (75[74].9.1-3). His response to treason charges was to speak 
frankly (ἐπαρρησιάσατο, 75[74].9.1). Clemens said that he was just trying to stay alive, and that anyone 
would have done the same thing. Severus admired his frankness (τῆς παρρησίας θαυμάσας, 75[74].9.3) 
and spared him execution; Clemens was exiled and allowed to keep half of his property. The 
exploration of parrhēsia in a legal setting is a clear continuation of a theme from earlier in the Roman 
History. Already there are links to Tiberius, and the parrhēsia of informers during trials. In comparison, 
the Clemens scene is entirely respectable. Clemens was allowed to speak frankly in a legal setting, 
and was rewarded for doing so. This occurred even though he had been involved in an open 
insurrection against Severus, the one reason acknowledged by Maecenas as an acceptable reason for 
executing a senator (52.31.10). 
The most direct parallel comes from Dio’s account of Claudius, towards the end of the fully surviving 
text. In 42 CE Claudius faced an attempted uprising led by Camillus Scribonianus. Dio briefly records 
its failure (60.15.1-4) before supplying much greater detail of its consequences (60.15.5-16.8). Amid 
the broad summary of the treason charges which follow, Dio reports two specific individuals who 
                                                             





were remembered for their frankness. The relevant case here is Galaesus, a freedman of Camillus.90 
When asked what he would have done had the uprising succeeded, he answered frankly 
(ἐπαρρησιάσατο), saying that he would have stood behind his master and kept quiet. The response 
achieved nothing. Dio’s conclusion to the trials paints a stark picture of life under Claudius: the only 
thing that Galaesus could achieve was dying well, ‘since virtue was not recognised in any way other 
than a noble death,’ ὥστ᾽ ἀρετὴν μηκέτ᾽ ἄλλο μηδὲν ἢ τὸ γενναίως ἀποθανεῖν νομίζεσθαι (60.16.7). In 
an environment of tyranny, parrhēsia once again loses its value. This is perhaps not as extreme as the 
frank speech of informers under Tiberius, but it creates a damning image of Claudius. Even admirable 
parrhēsia could only have an effect as a response to an inevitable execution. 
The links between the two trial scenes are clear. The trials of both Galaesus and Cassius Clemens took 
place in the aftermath of military uprisings, but they give very different impressions of Claudius and 
Septimius Severus. Severus tried a senator whose parrhēsia ensures that his deserved punishment is 
at least lenient.91 Claudius is quite the opposite. In the emperor’s obsession with attacking anyone 
associated with Camillus (60.16.7), parrhēsia becomes a tool which can secure a reputation, but 
nothing more. It was used not by senators, but by a freedman.92 During Claudius’ reprisals, members 
of the elite were instead tortured (60.15.6). The same idea underpins both, connecting them back to 
the positive frankness seen in book 52. A monarchical system has the potential to enable a beneficial 
form of parrhēsia, as seen under Severus. But the potential for frank speech to be ineffective or 
disruptive remained, and was activated by Claudius’ corruption.  
Dio’s Severus is a tyrannical figure for many scholars. It is a view which is based on the assumption 
that the surviving text represents Dio’s full judgement of his reign. Though it is often acknowledged 
                                                             
90 The second is the wife of Caecina Paetus, Arria. After Paetus refuses to speak in the trials, Arria is remembered 
for a bold remark as she committed suicide, urging her husband to do the same (60.14.4-6). 
91 Following Maecenas (52.31.9). 
92 An idea reinforced by the silence of the senator Paetus which precedes the trial. 
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that his portrayal is not straightforwardly negative, the attacks are seen as more prominent.93 The 
two examples fall into that pattern. It has been suggested that we should see Clemens as a 
representation of Dio’s own difficult senatorial position, stuck in a world in which senators can have 
little control over their actions.94 So too Alan Gowing has described Dio’s summary of Severus as 
typical for an emperor ‘for whom he did not particularly care’.95 And it is true that there are moments 
during his reign when Severus is tyrannical; this is someone who can be described as showing none 
of the traits of a good ruler whatsoever after the defeat of Albinus in 197 (76[75].7.4). But when these 
two passages are reframed against the portrayal of parrhēsia in the Roman History, this image becomes 
more complex. Against a backdrop of Ciceronian disruption or Augustan openness, the Clemens trial 
becomes an example of how Severus could treat the elite admirably, at least on some occasions. In 
his everyday approach to ruling, Severus was comparable to the very best emperors. Within the 
surviving narrative, such occasions may look out of place. But the Epitome cannot be assumed to have 
preserved a full picture. As far as the Roman History goes, the moments of praise are not exceptions in 
an otherwise negative portrayal of Severus, but instead very much in keeping with a consistent use 
of parrhēsia in the characterisation of imperial activity. We do not know the balance of Severus’ 
character in the original Roman History, but we can say that these examples of parrhēsia compare very 
favourably to his predecessors. 
Dio’s Contemporary History 
When scholars have approached Dio’s contemporary history, whether as a historical source or more 
recently as a conclusion to a literary undertaking, they have done so with an assumption that it can 
be trusted. This chapter has argued the very opposite. The issue of the text’s epitomised state has not 
been ignored, but the challenges it presents are widely understated. It is argued that Dio’s narrative 
                                                             
93 Leading some scholars to see Severus as one of the tyrants of the Roman History. See recently Juntula 2016; 
Madsen 2016: 154-57. A more restrained characterisation of Severus as ‘insufficiently heroic’ for anyone trying 
to praise the Severans (Kemezis 2014: 146) seems more reasonable, though is still difficult to justify fully. 
94 Kemezis 2012: 403. 





may not exist in full, but we still have a clear indication of what he thought about his own lifetime. 
Two general forms of defence exist. Either Dio’s narrative conforms to the general Severan historical 
context, or the nature of the epitomisation means that we can be confident about having Dio’s own 
words. As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the first position is hardly tenable. It is no cause 
for celebration that Dio agrees with himself.96 The second approach is just as flawed. The preservation 
of text is a very different thing from that of a narrative. 
The survival of the text through the Epitome and the Excerpta has resulted in what looks like a coherent 
narrative. This impression is highly deceptive. The process of abbreviation has eliminated parts of 
Dio’s text which cannot be reconstructed, and has altered the thematic focus of Dio’s account in ways 
which cannot be accounted for. The effect of this intervention, as seen in the reign of Macrinus, 
should not be understated. Xiphilinus produces a form of summary of the Roman History which 
marginalises Dio’s specifically Roman concerns. When something as fundamental as the emperor’s 
equestrian status is not considered important enough to preserve, it is unavoidably clear that the 
Epitome’s interests are very different from Dio’s. Put bluntly, we do not have Dio’s Severan stance on 
his lifetime, but a simplified version which is more interested in universally applicable exempla 
relevant to a Byzantine audience. Nor can it be assumed that the individual preserved scenes bore 
the same relative significance in the original narrative. Dio’s Severan narrative may now resemble a 
litany of complaints against Severus, interspersed with occasional moments of balance. But we simply 
do not know whether the quarter or so of extant text is representative of Dio’s full opinion. 
It is here that the second half of this chapter becomes important. Gaining a nuanced perspective of 
how the contemporary books portray Roman politics is not possible from reading them in isolation. 
As the case-study of parrhēsia shows, however, a greater understanding of individual moments can 
be gained through comparison with the fully extant books. Dio’s model of destructive government in 
Rome is consistent from the Republic to the Principate. The political context may change, but the 
underlying use of this theme stays much the same: when self-interest turns frank speech into a series 
of insults, it can only harm the public good. Conversely, a good emperor provides an environment 
                                                             
96 See above, 30-31. 
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which allows parrhēsia to be wholly beneficial to the state. This framework continues into the 
epitomised narrative as well. Where parrhēsia survives, its function is wholly consistent with its 
earlier deployment. In the right constitutional circumstances, when the right people behave in the 
right way, then public life functions to the advantage of public interests. In the case of parrhēsia, that 
means imperial senators giving their frank opinions to an appreciative ruler; change any one of those 
aspects, and parrhēsia contributes to both republican and imperial tyranny. 
To emphasise again, parrhēsia is only one example of a theme, but it demonstrates a thematic 
coherence which provides a useful basis for investigating Dio’s contemporary books. This does not 
make it any easier to reconstruct what Dio thought. The positive association with parrhēsia at the end 
of Severus’ reign does not indicate an overall attitude, any more than his attacks against senators. 
But it does provide a means of understanding the narrative methods used to characterise Severus at 
certain moments. The connections to the Agrippa/Maecenas debate show that this approach can be 
extended considerably. When book 52 is thought of as a transition point in the narrative, it becomes 
a central node in the network of interacting themes in Dio’s approach to historiography. The extant 
contemporary history is made up of individual fragmentary scenes, but they are firmly tethered to a 
solid context, by the web of thematic links to the earlier books. The assessment of Dio’s construction 
of a contemporary narrative world does not therefore have to rely on circular assumptions about its 





The Eyewitness Historian 
Commodus and the Ostrich 
In 192, Commodus held lavish games in Rome. They lasted for two weeks. Dio’s report consists of a 
series of displays of excess from the emperor (73[72].18-21).1 Commodus killed wild beasts using bows, 
shooting them from the safety of a gallery erected around the arena, only taking on animals from a 
closer range when they had been safely subdued. He even fought as a gladiator, holding his wooden 
sword in his left hand with great pride, and inevitably defeating his opponents; all the while, he 
claimed 250,000 denarii a day as payment for his efforts. The other gladiators were subjected to 
extremely violent combat, which went beyond even their own accustomed bloodthirstiness. Such 
was his excess, Dio writes, that the crowd genuinely believed the emperor would start shooting 
arrows at them too, impersonating Hercules and his combat with the Stymphalian birds. Indeed, his 
delight in Hercules extended to the point that he tied together people who could not walk, pretending 
that they were serpentine giants, and slew them with a club.2 
Within this account of festivities, Dio makes an emphatic confirmation that he is now present as an 
observer and protagonist in the narrative of the Roman History. Earlier in the reign of Commodus, he 
says quite briefly that he is now speaking from his own experience, as a witness of the conspiracies 
against the emperor.3 At the games, he presents a much more detailed justification of a scene which 
might otherwise be an affront to the dignity of history: he was present, and so will record everything, 
as the one who can write the best and most accurate account (73[72].18.3-4). Dio had also previously 
appeared in his own narrative as part of a first-person Senate. Again, the comment is a short one, as 
                                                             
1 The account begins rather suddenly, with what happened on the first day (καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, 
73[72].81.1). It seems likely that some kind of introduction to the games to provide context to this ‘first day’ has 
been lost. For an overview of descriptions of games in the Roman History, see Newbold 1975. 
2 A similar account of the games is found in Hdn 1.15; the HA has several instances of the emperor fighting as a 
gladiator, e.g. Comm. 15-3-16.9.  
3  ‘I say this, and the rest, not from the accounts of other people, but from personal observation.’ (λέγω δὲ ταῦτά 
τε καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλοτρίας ἔτι παραδόσεως ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ οἰκείας ἤδη τηρήσεως, 73[72].4.2.) 
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Commodus orders ‘us, our wives and our children’ (ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἡμῶν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας) 
to give him two gold pieces on his birthday every year (73[72].16.3). In part, these abbreviated 
personal notices are almost certainly due to the epitomisation of Dio’s text. It is quite likely that there 
would originally have been some longer comment on his early career, and at least his entry into the 
Senate. Whatever the cause, the effect on the narrative is striking. Dio’s clearest entry into the extant 
contemporary history is in one of its most famous and bizarre scenes. 
At the close of Dio’s depiction of the games, Commodus killed an ostrich (73[72].21.1-2). With its head 
in his left hand and a bloody sword in his right, he walked over to where ‘we’ – Dio and the other 
senators – were sitting. Gesturing at them, he moved his head in a such way that made it clear the 
Senate risked the same fate. It is here that Dio enters the scene as an individual: 
κἂν συχνοὶ παραχρῆμα ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γελάσαντες ἀπηλλάγησαν τῷ ξίφει (γέλως γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ 
λύπη ἔλαβεν), εἰ μὴ δάφνης φύλλα, ἃ ἐκ τοῦ στεφάνου εἶχον, αὐτός τε διέτραγον καὶ τοὺς 
ἄλλους τοὺς πλησίον μου καθημένους διατραγεῖν ἔπεισα, ἵν᾽ ἐν τῇ τοῦ στόματος συνεχεῖ 
κινήσει τὸν τοῦ γελᾶν ἔλεγχον ἀποκρυψώμεθα (73[72].21.2). 
And many would have been removed by the sword then and there from laughing at him – for 
laughter, not distress, overcame us – if I myself had not chewed on some laurel leaves which 
I took from my garland, and then persuaded other people sitting next to me to do the same, 
so that by continuously moving our mouths we could hide the evidence that we were 
laughing. 
The episode has often been commented on, used by scholars as an example of Commodus’ tyrannical 
excess, and the risks faced on a daily basis by senators who served him.4 Indeed, the forceful 
                                                             
4 The scene serves as an introduction to Mary Beard’s wider discussion of Roman laughter (Beard 2014: 1-8). It 
has been used to claim that Rome was entering a political crisis just as Dio entered the Senate (Espinosa Ruiz 
1982: 2-4), or to add colour to the narrative of Commodus’ reign (Goldsworthy 2009: 55; Potter 2014: 92). 
Elsewhere, it ranges from an example of the emperor’s attempts to win over the masses (Toner 2014: 29-30), or 
an aspect of Dio’s dismissal of his ridiculous performances (Hekster 2002: 55), to a more literary demonstration 





characterisation of Commodus as especially deserving of censure is evident. The threat posed by 
Commodus in the Roman History is a universal one. Dio introduces the anecdote by saying that fear of 
the emperor was common to everyone, both ‘us’ – the senators – and everyone else.5 But it would be 
a mistake to conclude that this is only about the emperor. 
The ostrich scene is an ideal place to begin a discussion of Dio’s construction of Roman politics, and 
its modern reception. Three elements from this episode are important factors in a scheme of self-
presentation which has led to Dio’s reputation as a reliable source. The first, in many ways, is obvious. 
Dio’s self-location as an eyewitness is integral to his use in scholarship, and the ostrich scene is just 
the first of many detailed examples of his direct participation in the events he narrates. But there is 
a more complex method of establishing his legitimacy as a historian at work. Just as Dio’s engagement 
in the narrative meets a thematic ideal of senatorial behaviour, so too his contemporary books 
function as an ideal response to his own historical method and understanding. Mallan has suggested 
that Dio’s resistance to the temptation to laugh is an indication of his restraint, and unwillingness to 
rush into a frank reaction.6 But this is only true of Dio the protagonist. As narrator, Dio is able to 
reveal his true reaction, even if it was hidden at the time. In doing so, he bridges a methodological 
divide which is common to Greek historiography, and a frequent feature of the Roman History: the 
difference between logoi and erga; what is said versus what is done; appearance as opposed to reality.7 
According to Dio, the great challenge of writing imperial history is the impossibility of identifying 
logoi and erga in the past, since no one is ever willing to challenge the reports propagated by the 
regime.8 Much like the Agrippa/Maecenas debate in the transition from Republic to Principate in the 
preceding chapter, Dio’s entry into the narrative resolves that tension. He becomes his own ideal 
historian. 
                                                             
5 οὗτος μὲν ὁ φόβος πᾶσι κοινὸς καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἦν (73[72].21.1). 
6 Mallan 2016: 273, 
7 The distinction is famously Thucydidean, as set out extensively in Parry 1971. See n. 11 for scholarship on 
Thucydidean aspects of the Roman History. 
8 53.19, discussed in greater detail below. 
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Dio’s historiographical persona forms the basis for his claims to legitimacy as a witness of events. The 
second point ties this into the other main cause for his appreciation by scholars, his place in the 
Senate. In the ostrich scene, Dio is not just sitting with the senators. This is more than a simple 
reflection of his social rank. He creates a sense of unity within the Senate, in which its members 
undergo the same experiences, as well as sharing the same status. Dio himself is at its heart, sharing 
in the same urge to laugh. Even so, Dio stands out from the rest of the crowd. His decision to chew on 
his laurels represents the peak of shared laughter, his own desperate effort to find anything that will 
mask his feelings. The collective response of the Senate is thus focalised through Dio as an individual. 
He defines what senatorial experience means, as his roles as both narrator and protagonist coincide 
once again. 
Narrowing the focus to Dio individually introduces the final point. Gleason has argued that Dio’s 
efforts to hide his reactions to Commodus reflect a necessary and passive endurance of tyranny.9 
Within the wider thematic context of the Roman History, however, his actions appear much more 
positive. The links with book 52 are clear. In threatening the Senate, Commodus clearly ignores that 
ideal, in a show of contempt for the men who should be acting as his advisors.10 Dio behaves quite 
differently. He is able to see the reaction of the other senators, and he responds to it in a way which 
is fundamentally concerned with protecting public interests. Agrippa warns Augustus in book 52 that 
tyranny leads to everyone following the character of the ruler, and thinking that other people’s losses 
are their own gains (52.5.2). Dio the protagonist resisted this model. He may not have confronted 
Commodus directly in the amphitheatre, but nor did he selfishly allow his senatorial peers to risk 
death. This is not therefore a simple case of Dio preventing unnecessary deaths. Dio does not only 
appear as an embodiment of senatorial experience, but also of senatorial virtue; in discussing the 
                                                             
9 Gleason 2011: 45; see also Millar 1964: 18. 
10 As per the advice of Maecenas. Commodus’ behaviour contravenes the overall scheme of treating the Senate 
with respect (52.32-34), and the summary advice that Augustus should do what he would want another emperor 





restraints on senatorial freedom imposed by Commodus, Dio presents himself as their rightful 
guardian. 
Importantly, his position is not limited to the immediate context of this one episode, or the 
contemporary history. It is clear from the ostrich scene that all three of these aspects are closely 
connected, and mutually reinforcing. Dio’s involvement in the narrative justifies his depiction of a 
senatorial experience, while the homogenous nature of that experience confirms that Dio really is 
aware of the full extent of erga behind the logoi. They also build on a series of links which bind the 
contemporary books to the remainder of the Roman History. The themes which Dio uses to present his 
own qualities are well established earlier in the narrative; so too, his methodological approach to 
historiography. Dio appears as a leading figure in the Senate, whose understanding of history allows 
him to produce a reliable guide to senatorial life under the Severans. The resulting self-formulation 
in the contemporary books coincides directly with the modern justification for trusting his narrative.  
Analysing Dio’s self-portrayal is more than an exercise in exploring characterisation. As the idealised 
protagonist in his account, Dio’s appearances in the Roman History offer considerable insight into how 
its narrative world is constructed. His self-location at the heart of the Senate has a direct impact on 
the appearance of Severan political life. The social conflict which underpins modern reconstructions 
of the period stems from a moralising and simplistic model of political action. The creation of an 
image of Dio as a senatorial champion is crude in its exclusionary tendencies. Put simply, anyone who 
disagreed with Dio cannot be senatorial, and becomes tyrannical in his account. The army is only the 
most pronounced example of a strict polarity between legitimacy and corruption. The acceptance of 
Dio’s credibility also entails the acceptance of his worldview. The depiction of Rome by a consular 
eyewitness is widely seen as indicative of senatorial reactions to emperors during Dio’s lifetime. That 
is all due to Dio’s assertions of his own importance. 
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The Ideal Historian 
The basic outline of Dio’s historiographical scheme in the Roman History has long been identified. He 
is well known for his Thucydidean approach.11 Many events are explained in terms of φύσις, human 
nature, and (as noted above) he frequently sets up comparisons through the traditional opposition 
between logoi and erga. As is particularly clear in the contemporary history, Dio shows the same 
regard for the importance of eyewitness testimony. There are several occasions when he explicitly 
confirms his presence, with a comment explaining that he saw or heard things personally. And there 
are numerous assertions of his ἀκρίβεια (akribeia hereafter), that Thucydidean ideal of historical 
exactness. This is by no means the full extent of Dio’s historiographical model. Recent scholarship 
has greatly expanded the list of possible influences on his style, making it abundantly clear that he 
was more than just an acolyte of Thucydides.12 My purpose here is not to challenge this approach. 
Instead, I will use it as a foundation to move beyond questions of how Dio wrote, and to think instead 
about how his decisions affect his appearance, as both narrator and senatorial protagonist. 
My starting point is another of the contemporary history’s stranger scenes. At the end of Caracalla’s 
reign, Dio presents an episode which crystallises his take on Thucydidean historiography. After 
relating a catalogue of omens leading up to the emperor’s death, Dio then describes the several 
insulting names which were applied to them. He concludes his record as follows: 
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκείνου, ὅπως ποτ᾽ ἂν καὶ ὀνομάσῃ τις αὐτόν, οὕτως ἔσχεν: ἐμοὶ δὲ δή, καὶ πρὶν ἐς 
τὴν μοναρχίαν καταστῆναι, προεδηλώθη τρόπον τινὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα 
γράψοιμι. ἐν γὰρ πεδίῳ μεγάλῳ τινὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων δύναμιν ἐξωπλισμένην ὁρᾶν 
τεθνηκότος αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἔδοξα, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸν Σεουῆρον ἐπί τε γηλόφου καὶ ἐπὶ βήματος 
ὑψηλοῦ καθήμενον διαλέγεσθαί τι αὐτοῖς. καί με προσστάντα ἰδὼν ὅπως τῶν λεγομένων 
                                                             
11 The identification and discussion of Thucydidean elements in the Roman History goes back to the nineteenth 
century, e.g. Litsch 1893; Kyhnitzsch 1894. For more recent discussion, see Freyburger-Galland 1997: 189-200, 
2003; Rees 2011: 62-86; Lachenaud 2016. 
12 Papers gathered in Fromentin et al. 2016: 269-414 (‘Les forms de la narration historique’) cover a wide range 





ἀκούσω, ‘δεῦρο,’ ἔφη, ‘Δίων, ἐνταῦθα πλησίον πρόσελθε, ἵνα πάντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ 
γιγνόμενα καὶ μάθῃς ἀκριβῶς καὶ συγγράψῃς.’ τοιοῦτος μὲν ὁ τοῦ Ταραύτου καὶ βίος καὶ 
ὄλεθρος ἐγένετο (79[78].10.1-3). 
Such were the events of this man’s life, whatever you may call him. But even before he had 
taken up the Principate, it was made clear to me by his father, in a way, that I would also 
write about them. After [Severus’] death, I thought I saw the whole Roman force in arms, in 
the middle of a large field, and Severus there too, sitting on a wooden platform on a mound, 
saying something to them.  When he saw me coming over to hear what he was saying, he said, 
‘Come here, Dio, come closer, so that you can learn accurately everything that is said and 
done, and write it down.’ Such was the life and death of Tarautas. 
This is Dio in full. The episode is preserved near the beginning of Vat. Gr. 1288, which opens shortly 
before Caracalla’s death; in contrast to other parts of the contemporary history, this scene can be 
located securely within its immediate narrative structure. It marks the very end of Caracalla’s reign. 
Dio briefly notes that his death was followed by those of the conspirators, and then his friends, before 
introducing Macrinus. It is a striking collection of the full range of Thucydidean historiographical 
practice. Dio is the investigator, and receives assurances that he will write a fully ἀκριβῶς account of 
everything that was both said and done. It is made even more striking by its position at the close of 
Dio’s Caracallan narrative, as a retrospective assertion of his accuracy. 
At the same time, however, this dream is distinctly un-Thucydidean. Dio’s retelling of his dream is 
impossible to verify. The result is a moment which seems to be especially revealing of his approach 
to writing contemporary history. The reader is presented with an indisputable ergon. Dio did indeed 
write a history of Caracalla, which has taken up the full span of book 78[77]. In turn, the clear 
existence of a product invites an acceptance of the explanation behind it, which can be neither 
confirmed nor disproved. If Dio’s dream is believed, he reinforces his claim to akribeia. But if not, the 
entire episode becomes nothing more than a logos. Of course, it is difficult to tell if this is a deliberate 
problematisation of historical accuracy as a concept. By this point in the narrative, there have been 
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several instances of Dio presenting himself as a reliable witness and interpreter of omens,13 which 
might suggest that it was a genuine aspect of his view of the world.14  
Regardless of the intention, this scene complicates the image of Dio as a historian. There are very few 
scholars who would accept a dream as an indication of an author’s reliability, but that is what Dio 
demands here. The same language of eyewitness testimony and historical accuracy which 
proliferates in his political narrative occurs in his engagement with the divine. When he reports a 
series of increasingly implausible uprisings in Asia Minor under Elagabalus, culminating in a wool-
worker trying to become emperor, it is his presence as the intermediary which confirms their 
accuracy.15 This ought to stand as a firm warning that we are not dealing with someone who sees the 
Severan world in anachronistically objective terms. 
However removed Dio’s engagement with dreams might be from modern attitudes, it is entirely in 
keeping with his own approach. A much better known example of a methodological statement is 
found in his account of the transition from Republic to Principate.16 An explicit moment of 
                                                             
13 Not least in the catalogue leading up to Caracalla’s death (79[78].7-8). After the first of three summary phrases 
(‘he endured such an end to his life’, τοιούτῳ μὲν τέλει ἐχρήσατο βιούς, 79[78].6.5), Dio begins the list by 
immediately focalising the narrative through the many wonderous tales which occur ‘to me’ at this point in 
the narrative (καί μοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ λόγου θαυμάσαι πάμπολλα ἐπέρχεται, 79[78].7.1). This includes an omen 
which involved Dio himself, in which Caracalla predicted his own death in an aside to the historian after a 
dinner (79[78].8.4-6). Throughout, Dio is the authority who both identifies the omens, and asserts their truth. 
14 An overview of earlier scholarship on Dio’s belief in the reality of dreams and omens can be found in Swan  
2004: 8-13; see also Langford 2013: 55-63 for their politicising aspects. 
15 80[79].7.1-3. He instructs the reader not to doubt what he has said (καὶ μηδεὶς ἀπιστήσῃ τῷ λεχθέντι); his 
presence as governor of Pergamon and Smyrna ensures that he wrote everything accurately (ἀκριβώσας 
ἔγραψα). The scene supports Osgood 2016, in which Elagabalus is viewed as a socially disruptive force at every 
turn. 
16 Kemezis 2014: 95 n. 9 lists a selection of earlier discussions of ‘probably the most commented-on 
methodological passage in Dio’. See more recently e.g. Coudry 2016: 296; Lachenaud 2016: 401-402, 412-14; 





periodisation distinguishes the process of writing the history of the two forms of government. Dio 
claims that under the Republic, people knew what was happening, and so it is easy to come by reliable 
narratives. This changes in the Principate. People are instead suspicious of everything, convinced 
that everything either said or done (καὶ γὰρ λέγεσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι πάντα, 53.19.3) is aimed at 
pleasing the person in charge. The result is a total inability to distinguish actual erga from mere logoi: 
καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ μὲν οὐ γιγνόμενα θρυλεῖται, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ πάνυ συμβαίνοντα 
ἀγνοεῖται, πάντα δὲ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄλλως πως ἢ ὡς πράττεται διαθροεῖται (53.19.4). 
Because of this, many things which don’t happen are spread about, while many things which 
definitely do occur go unknown, and virtually everything is reported differently from what 
is done. 
At this point, Dio claims to be reticent about passing any judgement on the logoi which make up the 
history of the early Principate. While Dio is willing to offer his own opinion, it is specifically to 
counter the wild rumour, τὸ θρυλούμενον, which has replaced real events in the historical record 
(53.19.5-6). The same concepts are present in his dream about Severus, but to very different effect. 
The emperor’s words provide an assurance that Dio would learn two things: everything that was said, 
and everything which happened (πάντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα, 79[78].10.2). When Dio 
reports that we told he would both learn and record everything accurately (καὶ μάθῃς ἀκριβῶς καὶ 
συγγράψῃς), it is not simply a claim for akribeia. It is an assertion that Dio is able to access both sides 
of the Thucydidean divide. The dream serves as confirmation that he has resolved what he himself 
views as the fundamental difficulty with writing imperial history. 
These two examples have been deliberately chosen from parts of the text which survive in full. They 
provide the necessary evidential base to establish the historiographical framework of the Roman 
History, and the contemporary books within it. As such, they also allow comparison with passages 
which are preserved in more fragmentary form. The most explicit statement of Dio’s engagement 
with the logoi/erga formulation occurs very shortly before the ostrich scene with which I began. It 
isn’t fully clear how much text has been omitted between the two passages by Xiphilinus, but they 
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do seem to part of the same narrative of 192.17 As seen above, Dio famously apologises to his reader 
for including an account of Commodus’ excesses, in case he seems to be sullying the dignity of 
history.18 The justification is what matters here. Dio explicitly writes that he felt obliged to describe 
everything because he was present, and saw and heard and said everything which he narrates.19 This 
is followed by a more extensive promise to write an especially detailed contemporary history, even 
in comparison to his earlier books: 
καὶ μέντοι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοῦ πραχθέντα καὶ λεπτουργήσω καὶ λεπτολογήσω 
μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερα, ὅτι τε συνεγενόμην αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὅτι μηδένα ἄλλον οἶδα τῶν τι 
δυναμένων ἐς συγγραφὴν ἀξίαν λόγου καταθέσθαι διηκριβωκότα αὐτὰ ὁμοίως ἐμοί 
(73[72].18.4). 
And indeed I will reproduce and narrate everything that happened in my lifetime in more 
detail than earlier events. I was there when they happened, and I know of no one else among 
those able to set out a fitting account who has done so as accurately as I have. 
As with the earlier passages, this could read as a fairly simple justification of writing contemporary 
history: I was there, and so I know what happened. In those terms, including all the detail is very 
much in keeping with the precision demanded by akribeia. Moreover, the reference to others who are 
able to write a history, but who have not done so in the same close detail, διηκριβωκότα, places Dio 
within a traditional scheme of competitive historiography. Dio’s narrative is simply better than 
anyone else’s. But there is more going on beneath this superficial level. 
Much as in the dream about Septimius Severus recorded after Caracalla’s death, Dio also engages with 
one of the central ideas of his own historiographical approach. In the later scene, Dio’s ability to 
reconcile logoi and erga is conferred externally. In book 73[72], he is much more direct in claiming it 
                                                             
17 73[72].18-21 relates the games held by Commodus. In present form, the ostrich scene is almost its conclusion. 
It is obviously uncertain how climactic it was in Dio’s original structure, though Xiphilinus does seem keen to 
maintain details of games and animal hunts elsewhere (as above, 60-63). 
18 κηλιδοῦν τὸν τῆς ἱστορίας ὄγκον (73[72].18.3); see above, 85 for the context. 





for himself. It is difficult to render the full effect of καὶ λεπτουργήσω καὶ λεπτολογήσω in translation; 
‘reproduce and narrate’, suggested above, is a fairly unsatisfactory attempt to maintain a contrast 
between verbs which in English carry much the same meaning. In the Greek, however, Dio builds 
explicitly on the distinction between erga and logoi. Dio’s formulation here is distinct. Both verbs used 
are rare: in total, there are fewer than twenty attestations combined which pre-date Dio.20 The two 
are not found together anywhere else. While the dream from Severus suggests control over both 
Thucydidean elements, in the account of Commodus Dio claims it directly in his own narratorial 
voice. His justification for describing scandalous episodes quickly becomes an explicit proclamation 
of his historiographical mastery.21  
Dio’s self-formulation as the ideal akribēs historian is thus closely connected to the underlying 
structure of the Roman History. It invites a reassessment of his claims about the inception of his 
historical project, discussed in the introduction to this wider investigation. After describing the 
assassination of Commodus on New Year’s Eve, 192, Dio inserts a biographical aside about his journey 
towards becoming a writer of history (73[72].23). The details of this passage can be found almost 
universally in introductions to Dio’s life and career.22 To summarise quickly here: he first wrote a 
pamphlet about the dreams and omens which led up to the accession of Septimius Severus, followed 
                                                             
20 λεπτουργέω occurs once in Plutarch’s Lives (Vit. Aem. 37.4) and once in Diodorus Siculus (17.115.1). 
λεπτολογέω never appears in earlier historiography or biography, but is found three times in Lucian (J. conf. 10; 
Bis Acc. 34; Prom. 16). The only Athenian attestation is from Aristophanes’ Clouds (320).  
21 A comparison with a passage from the very start of the Roman History suggests that this is more complex than 
a reassertion of historical accuracy. The full proem to the Roman History does not survive, but there are extant 
fragments. The longest, fr. 1.1.2, includes Dio’s defence against the charge that using highly stylised language 
will prevent him from writing the truth. He responds, ‘I strove to be equally exact, as far as I could, with both,’ 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀμφότερα, ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν, ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶσαι ἐσπούδασα. This early formulation of akribeia is not just a 
matter of describing things accurately, but also in an impressive literary manner. In this formulation, it may be 
that Dio’s competitive self-positioning as a more detailed author also suggests that he is more stylistically 
impressive as well. 
22 See above, 41. 
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by an account of the ‘wars and strife’ which followed. When this first historical work received praise, 
Dio decided to write a full history of Rome. He tells the reader that the whole project lasted twenty-
two years: ten spent collecting material, and then twelve writing it up.23 
Away from the question of reconstructing Dio’s literary career, this section is closely linked to his 
self-portrayal as a reliable historian. At the centre of this overview of Dio’s literary career is the 
transition into writing a large-scale history of the entire Roman past. Although there is no specific 
engagement with akribeia, Dio includes a series of elements which are familiar from other scenes in 
the contemporary history: 
καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκεῖνος πεμφθέντι παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐντυχὼν πολλά μοι καὶ καλὰ ἀντεπέστειλε. ταῦτ᾽ 
οὖν ἐγὼ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἤδη λαβὼν κατέδαρθον, καί μοι καθεύδοντι προσέταξε τὸ 
δαιμόνιον ἱστορίαν γράφειν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ταῦτα περὶ ὧν νῦν καθίσταμαι ἔγραψα. καὶ ἐπειδή 
γε τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Σεουήρῳ μάλιστα ἤρεσε, τότε δὴ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ τοῖς 
Ῥωμαίοις προσήκοντα συνθεῖναι ἐπεθύμησα (73[72].23.2-3). 
He read a copy I had sent him, and sent back many fine comments in reply. I got his letter 
when it was nearly night and went to bed, and while I was asleep the deity told me to write 
history. And so I wrote the narrative with which I am currently concerned. And when it met 
with favour from various people, and from Severus himself in particular, I decided to put 
together an account of everything else concerning the Romans. 
One point immediately stands out in relation to the fully extant conclusion to Dio’s account of 
Caracalla’s reign. As with the dream about Septimius Severus, and his message that Dio would write 
an accurate narrative of Caracalla (79[78].10), it was a vision in a dream which inspired the inception 






of the Roman History as a whole, this time from his patron deity Tychē.24 As John Marincola observes, 
having dreams as the motivation to write history is unique in the ancient world to Dio.25  
Dio’s autobiographical claims have largely been accepted at face value. In terms of his political career, 
the details regarding his two shorter works have been used to reconstruct a potential rise to 
prominence under Septimius Severus. It has been suggested that the account of the omens leading 
up to Severus’ accession brought him to the emperor’s attention. It has then been reasonably argued 
that the ‘wars and great strife’ refer to the events of 193, and possibly the civil wars which followed 
as Septimius Severus secured his position as emperor. Dio’s report of the favour it received from 
Severus is then used to argue that this was essentially a piece of pro-Severan propaganda, which 
secured Dio’s position as one of his favourites.26 Moreover, the confidence in Dio’s autobiographical 
statements has led to the assumption that remnants of these (allegedly) propagandistic works can 
still be found in the Roman History itself. 
The justification for the idea that Dio’s earlier pamphlet can be traced in the text of the Roman History 
demonstrates both the limitations of looking exclusively at the contemporary history, and the 
eagerness of scholars to build on what Dio himself tells us. The main evidence put forward is Dio’s 
account of Severus’ adventus into Rome in 193 (75[74].1.3-5). The scene in the Roman History is one of 
great festivity. The army proceeds in glittering order through the streets, while the people look on 
in awe, and the senators process in full order. Other writers are much less positive. Both Herodian 
and the Historia Augusta emphasise the threat of armed soldiers marching into the city.27 When 
Severus is then immediately criticised for not living up to the early promises of his reign, and killing 
senators despite saying he would not, it is seen as an attempt by Dio to correct an overly laudatory 
                                                             
24 On Dio and Tychē, see Schmidt 1999: 98-102; Kuhn-Chen 2002: 210-13. Schmidt 2000 argues that Dio’s anecdotes 
emphasise divine power. If so, it is a power which Dio is able to understand and explain with consistent 
accuracy, within the Roman History’s specific environs. 
25 Marincola 1997: 47-51. 
26 On the two works generally, Schmidt 1997: 2605-18.  
27 Hdn. 2.14.1; HA Sept. Sev. 7.1-4, where Severus and all his associates are repeatedly described as armati. 
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narrative which he no longer wishes to support. Dio’s later critical tone is the more accurate 
indication of his true thoughts.28  
In the previous chapter I have argued that we cannot think in terms of an overall view of Severus in 
the Roman History (due not only to the state of the extant text). The interpretation is unsatisfactory 
on two counts. On a straightforward level, it fails to account for the positive traits attributed to 
Severus at the end of his reign (77[76].16-17). More importantly, it is unnecessary to explain away 
positive descriptions. Few of Dio’s emperors are entirely tyrannical, or entirely praiseworthy. 
Emperors such as Claudius, Vespasian and Hadrian show a mix of traits, and display both tyrannical 
and virtuous behaviour; even Trajan has to keep his significant character flaws in check (68.7.4).29 Not 
only is the suggestion that Severus must be one extreme or the other not required, it would in fact 
run contrary to the earlier narrative.  
Moving away from a historicising interpretation of Dio’s account, it is possible to read this scene as 
part of his wider programme of self-construction. It follows a number of patterns from the Severus 
dream. Purely in terms of narrative structure, both scenes occur after the death of an emperor, and 
are closely associated with catalogues of omens.30 In its encouragement to accept Dio as a legitimate 
interpreter of the divine, the foundational story of the Roman History has much the same effect too. 
The prophetic aspect of Fortune’s message is presented in a context which proves its accuracy. More 
than seventy books into the full narrative, it seems hard to question the outcome. As in the case of 
Dio’s visitation from Severus, there is a strong invitation to then believe the explanation as much as 
the result.31 
                                                             
28 Rubin 1980: 41-84; see also Rantala 2016: 159-61; Langford 2013: 51, 55-63; Birley 1988: 103-104. 
29 Tiberius is an extreme in his transition from good rule into tyranny. Davenport 2014 explores the 
characterisation of Vitellius as a contrasting mixture of virtue and vice. 
30 Omens for Commodus’ death immediately follow the dream from Fortune (73[72].24); those for Caracalla’s 
immediately precede the one with Septimius Severus (79[78].7-8), 
31 A third example of this self-confirming, retrospective prophecy concludes the Roman History. Dio dreams that 





In the context of akribeia, there is an additional force to the more mundane reasons behind Dio’s 
decision to write history. Scholars have largely accepted Dio’s version of events, and have often 
therefore made Severus an important patron of his literary career.32 Within the confines of the 
narrative, that connection with the emperor is just as significant for Dio’s self-presentation. Severus 
was not merely an eager recipient of Dio’s earlier works, but sent back lengthy and particular praise. 
But this goes beyond finding a welcoming audience. The whole idea of writing the Roman History is 
presented as stemming from the emperor’s personal favour. It is a literary undertaking which has an 
explicit imperial sanction at its point of genesis.33 The methodological statement in the games under 
Commodus is clear in presenting Dio’s involvement in imperial actions as the justification for the 
detail he includes, and the basis for accepting his akribeia. The excursus on the origins of the Roman 
History takes this further. The very existence of his narrative is offered as proof of Dio’s proximity to 
imperial politics.  
In his self-presentation as a Thucydidean historian, Dio brings to mind recent studies of a later Roman 
writer who has often been held in similarly high regard. Gavin Kelly’s engagement with Ammianus 
Marcellinus has significantly reassessed the autobiographical claims which have underpinned 
modern faith in the accuracy of his narrative. As Kelly summarises, ‘rather than being incomparably 
revealing, they are calculated to show openly and imply metaphorically the qualities which made 
Ammianus the definitive historian of his age.’34 I would argue that the same can be said of Dio. His 
narrative is structured consistently around the methodological difficulty of knowing what really 
happened, which is made even more challenging after the establishment of a monarchy. Those issues 
are overcome when Dio enters into the narrative himself. In recounting the origins of the Roman 
History, Dio reasserts his position at the centre of political life. His interaction with the emperor is 
                                                             
32 By way of brief example, Swain 1996: 401; Murison 1999: 7; Hose 2007: 462-63; Madsen 2016: 154; Scott 2018a: 
46. 
33 Cf. 46.21, in which Calenus attacks Cicero for writing a history of the Catilinarian conspiracy, which began 
with his own consulship and went backwards to the reign of Romulus. Dio’s historiography is removed from 
such self-obsession through both its origins and its lengthy account of events before his own lifetime. 
34 Kelly 2008: 6. He notes their frequent connection with allusions to other texts; esp. 2-7; 31-35; 65-78. 
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portrayed in terms which suggest enthusiastic acquaintance between the two men. Within the 
historiographical framework of the Roman History, Dio has been the ideal historian from the day that 
he decided to undertake writing history at all. In the immediate narrative context, it suggests a 
confirmation of his earlier claim: that there really was no one who could write as effective an account 
as Dio himself. 
Dio and the Senate 
The transition from Dio’s self-formulation as a narrator to his self-portrayal as a protagonist in the 
contemporary history is a natural one. It is personal involvement in the narrative that allows Dio to 
put into practice the methodological statements about his historiographical approach. In this 
respect, his use of the first-person singular to confirm the veracity of otherwise questionable events 
performs the same function found in authors from Thucydides to Procopius.35 Dio was present for the 
unmasking of the false Sextus Quintilius Condianus, who pretended to be a senator killed by 
Commodus, only to be revealed as nothing of the sort when Pertinax tried to speak to him in Greek 
(73[72].7.1).36 So too Dio confirms an omen of silver rain falling from the sky, which he himself used 
temporarily to plate some bronze coins, only for it to rub off after three days (76[75].4.7). Autopsy 
remains an important aspect of the historian’s craft. There is often an overt connection to political 
office. Dio knows about the countless adultery charges which went unpursued by Septimius Severus 
because he could see the records while consul (77[76].16.4), and is able to provide a brief excursus on 
the history of Pannonia because he had been governor there (49.36.4). 
The greatest impact of Dio’s autopsy, especially on scholarship which emphasises the historical utility 
of his contemporary account, occurs away from his individual role. The repeated references to what 
‘we senators’ experienced underpins the modern view of the Roman History as an insightful source for 
reconstructing senatorial life under the Severans.37 There has been an emphasis on Dio’s self-
portrayal as one figure within a wider collective, who rarely stands out through individual action, 
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and who chooses instead to locate himself firmly within a corporate senatorial body.38 But it is also 
clear that the moments of united senatorial experience are connected to a more individual 
characterisation. In historiographical terms, there is a continuation of Dio’s claims to be able to 
identify both logoi and erga, presenting both the appearances forced on the Senate and the realities 
of their views. More pertinently for this thesis, Dio also shows a tendency to define the collective 
senatorial experience around his own actions. By shaping his narrative around senatorial unity, Dio 
becomes its chief representative. 
Another, closer look at the story of Commodus and the ostrich brings together the historiographical 
and senatorial aspects of Dio’s self-portrayal, highlighting his credentials as perceptive narrator and 
well-placed protagonist. The end of the passage is worth quoting again, as its specific construction is 
key to understanding Dio’s position within the scene: 
κἂν συχνοὶ παραχρῆμα ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γελάσαντες ἀπηλλάγησαν τῷ ξίφει (γέλως γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ 
λύπη ἔλαβεν), εἰ μὴ δάφνης φύλλα, ἃ ἐκ τοῦ στεφάνου εἶχον, αὐτός τε διέτραγον καὶ τοὺς 
ἄλλους τοὺς πλησίον μου καθημένους διατραγεῖν ἔπεισα, ἵν᾽ ἐν τῇ τοῦ στόματος συνεχεῖ 
κινήσει τὸν τοῦ γελᾶν ἔλεγχον ἀποκρυψώμεθα (73[72].21.2). 
And many would have been removed by the sword then and there from laughing at him – for 
laughter, not distress, overcame us – if I myself had not chewed on some laurel leaves which 
I took from my garland, and then persuaded other people sitting next to me to do the same, 
so that by continuously moving our mouths we could hide the evidence that we were 
laughing. 
Although there is no explicit linguistic engagement with the logos/ergon divide, the themes are 
evident in Dio’s report. From an external perspective, it looked as though nothing especially 
untoward was taking place. The ἔλεγχος was hidden from the emperor’s view, a term referring to 
legal evidence, and highly suggestive of the treason trials which the Senate risked had they shown 
any hints of rejecting Commodus’ authority. Dio is able to reveal both the deception and the reality 
                                                             
38 Kemezis 2012: 402-405; Scott 2018c: 240-45. 
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underpinning it. His presence in the senatorial seats, and his active participation in the laurel 
chewing, confirm the legitimacy of his interpretation. This is very much the ideal historian proving 
his credentials. 
At the same time, the ostrich scene presents Dio at the very centre of senatorial experience. In his 
account of the Senate’s reaction, Dio creates what Maud Gleason has called a ‘corporate identity’.39 
The key is the shifting focalisation of the scene. To begin with, the first-person plural sets out a shared 
response to the emperor. It was laughter which overtook us – ἡμᾶς – as a group.40 Dio’s individual 
response then follows, as he persuades the other senators to follow him in chewing on their laurel 
garlands. With it, action enters the first-person singular: αὐτός τε διέτραγον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς 
πλησίον μου καθημένους διατραγεῖν ἔπεισα – I myself chewed, and persuaded the others sitting near 
me to chew. Once that singular action has been taken, the Senate returns to its first-person plural 
unity, with ἀποκρυψώμεθα. The indirect object is only implied, but it is clearly Commodus from 
whom they were hiding their true opinions. Dio thus creates a clear divide between a united Senate 
and the emperor. As a whole, the scene is focalised from the perspective of the Senate as a group, all 
undergoing the same reaction of laughter at the ridiculous display in front of them. To that extent, it 
conforms to Gleason’s ideas of a ‘shared experience as well as shared status’.41 But there is more stake. 
Dio’s transition into the singular asserts the greater importance of his own role within that group. 
He is the fulcrum of a united Senate. His sharing in their laughter, and his efforts to prevent its violent 
consequences, offer a personal confirmation that his reading of events is an accurate one. 
The phenomenon of a united senatorial experience with Dio at its centre can be seen widely in the 
contemporary books. The short reign of Didius Julianus in 193 provides a variety of shared responses 
to the emperor which range from genuine fear to open contempt. The same kind of enforced 
                                                             
39 Gleason 2011: 45, in reference to Dio’s use of the first person generally. 
40 Dio’s use of the first-person plural has been used to suggest a close identity with Rome, at the expense of his 
Hellenophone background. For a full discussion, and a demonstration that his connection is instead to Roman 
political power in his role as a senator, see Burden-Strevens 2015b: 290-96. 





deception underpins the account of the challenges faced by the elite after his accession in 193. 
Julianus spent his first night in power feasting in the palace, even while the body of the murdered 
Pertinax was still inside the building. The next morning saw the Senate having to greet their new 
ruler: 
τῇ δὲ δὴ ὑστεραίᾳ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀνῄειμεν ὡς αὐτόν, πλαττόμενοι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ σχηματιζόμενοι 
ὅπως μὴ κατάφωροι ἐπὶ τῇ λύπῃ γενώμεθα (74[73].13.2). 
On the following day we approached him, forming and fashioning ourselves in some way so 
that he could not detect that we were in a state of grief. 
As a criticism of Julianus, Dio’s account coincides with wider themes from elsewhere in the Roman 
History. In particular, forcing senators to hide their true emotions is evidently connected with the 
kind of parrhēsia discussed in the previous chapter.42 Unlike the ostrich scene in the amphitheatre, it 
really was grief, λύπη, which affected Dio and the other senators. This difference aside, the 
presentation of an elite experience is much the same. The reality of their grief was hidden behind a 
mask, aimed at protecting themselves from the anger of the emperor. This was a universal moment 
of despair and pretence. Dio too appears in the same role. As part of the collective action, he is able 
to identify both the apparent situation from the emperor’s perspective, and the reality which he and 
his peers were actually experiencing. There is no room for disagreement among the elite in Dio’s 
account: this was a shared despair, confirmed by his personal experience as a senator. Its effect is 
strengthened by a refocalisation of attitudes towards the new emperor around Dio’s own position. 
He writes that ‘we’ were afraid of Julianus and the soldiers (ἐφοβούμεθα), especially those who had 
supported Pertinax: 
                                                             
42 The idea of a false happiness too is wholly in keeping with the beginnings of other reigns. Thus the Senate 
didn’t know how to respond to Tiberius or Caligula and their capricious characters, unable to either speak 
honestly or flatter them safely (57.1; 59.4 respectively). A more direct contrast can be seen shortly before this, 
at the start of Pertinax’s reign: anyone executed for treason was posthumously pardoned, suddenly allowing 
their relatives to grieve openly (74[73].5.2-3); see also Vespasian (65[66].10.2a) and Nerva (68.1.2) for examples 
of emperors undoing the effects of tyrannical maiestas charges. 
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καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἷς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἦν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπό τε τοῦ Περτίνακος τά τε ἄλλα ἐτετιμήμην καὶ 
στρατηγὸς ἀπεδεδείγμην, καὶ ἐκεῖνον πολλὰ πολλάκις ἐν δίκαις συναγορεύων τισὶν 
ἀδικοῦντα ἐπεδεδείχειν (74[73].12.2). 
And I was one of them, since among other honours I was made praetor by Pertinax, and had 
often shown that [Julianus] was guilty of many things when representing other people in 
trials. 
Even so, they went to the senate house (προήλθομεν). The same pattern occurs as in the amphitheatre 
under Commodus. A narrative primarily told in the first-person plural contains within it an example 
of how Dio in particular represents the fears which he and his fellow senators felt. His involvement 
shows the most extreme take on the Senate’s position: though everyone shared in it, Dio personally 
had the most to fear. Moreover, the episode is also reinforced by Dio’s public career. He is the 
successful figure in trials against an always guilty Julianus; and he is the one rewarded with the office 
of praetor for his qualities. 
In presenting himself at the centre of a senatorial attitude to Julianus, Dio constructs a homogenous 
body whose experiences are uniform. This presentation seems to ignore a basic fact: Julianus was 
himself a senator.43 Indeed, this seems to have been acknowledged by Dio in a fragment preserved in 
the EV (332), but which does not survive in Xiphilinus.44 On Dio’s account of how ‘we’ senators were 
forced to conform to the emperor’s expectations, Julianus is immediately set up as their opponent. 45 
There is not even the suggestion that Julianus may have had supporters among the Senate’s numbers, 
despite his successful political career.46 As with Commodus, everyone faced the same danger from a 
corrupt emperor. The image of Dio at the centre of the Senate is not just about self-presentation. It 
                                                             
43 And according to the HA was consul alongside Pertinax in the 170s (Did. Jul. 2.3). 
44 As the EV puts it, he came from a senatorial background, but he had a terrible nature (ἦν τὸ μὲν γένος 
βουλευτικὸν τὸν δὲ τρόπον δεινὸν ἔχων). 
45 Again, Pertinax provides an immediate point of contrast. He was a καλὸς κἀγαθός (74[73].1.1) and proved 
himself δημοτικός – republican – in his rule (74[73].5.1). 





also demonstrates the level of control Dio can exert over his narrative. The senatorial position is 
made fully consistent, and shaped around his personal opposition to Julianus. This is not Dio placing 
himself into a Senate which is already unanimous. Instead, he is the source of that unanimity as 
narrator, and the chief exponent of its senatorial concerns as a protagonist. 
One final scene encapsulates the effect of Dio’s self-location as the leading figure within the Senate. 
Under Septimius Severus, Dio describes the trial of Baebius Marcellinus (77[76].8.1-9.2). Adam 
Kemezis has described the scene as typical of Dio’s ‘chatty’ anecdotal style in the contemporary 
books.47 I would say it is just as typical of Dio’s style of self-presentation. Marcellinus is executed for 
his part in a conspiracy. It was reported that the nurse of Apronianius, the governor of Asia, had 
dreamt that Apronianus would become emperor. Apronianus was condemned to death, but he was 
not the only victim of this extremely indirect accusation. A witness under torture had said that he 
had seen an unnamed bald senator involved in the discussions of this dream. When this was reported 
in the senate house, there was panic, as senators surreptitiously felt the top of their own heads and 
sought out bald men among their number, to divert suspicion away from themselves. After much 
panic, it transpired that the senator in question was wearing a purple-bordered toga. Marcellinus was 
identified as the bald aedile. He challenged the accusers, saying that the witness would clearly still 
be able to recognise him. His identity was then confirmed (after a subtle prompt) by the witness, and 
Marcellinus was killed before the emperor even found out what was going on.48 
This episode contains almost all of the features identified above. For the vast majority of its 
description, the scene is focalised from a collective senatorial perspective. Events happen in the first-
person plural throughout. When the bald senator is mentioned, ‘we’ were in a terrible situation (ἡμεῖς 
ἐν δεινῷ πάθει ἐγενόμεθα, 77[76].8.3), and ‘we’ all looked around (πάντες…περιεβλέπομεν, 77[76].8.4). 
                                                             
47 Kemezis 2014: 90. 
48 The scene itself has a characterising role for Severus’ reign. It compares directly to the trial of Asiaticus under 
Claudius, who also faced execution based solely on his baldness. There, though, the accusation met with ridicule 
from the Senate, rather than fear – but unfortunately for Asiaticus, it was not enough to prevent his death at 
the hands of Messalina’s favourites in the Senate (61[60].29.4-6). 
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The only exception comes when Dio introduces his personal reaction. In a moment of apparent self-
deprecation, he writes, οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι τὸ τότε μοι συμβάν, εἰ καὶ γελοιότατόν ἐστιν; ‘I won’t hide 
what happened to me, even if it was totally ridiculous.’49 Dio was so worried that he touched his head 
to make sure he had hair himself. After this reaction, the perspective quickly returns to a collective 
position. After noting that many people did the same thing too, Dio writes that ‘we looked at those 
who were balding’ (ἐς τοὺς φαλακροειδεῖς ἀφεωρῶμεν, 77[76].8.5). The plural continues thereafter.50 
For Maud Gleason, the first-person focalisation marks out first a ‘heightening suspense’ for the Senate 
as a whole, and then Dio’s ‘isolation from his peers’ as he switches to the singular. Unanimity is 
restored when Marcellinus is identified, and immediately distanced, as the Senate sacrifice an 
individual to protect the collective whole.51 But this refocalising technique is far from unique to this 
episode. As in the examples discussed above, Dio’s authorial comment intrudes into the narrative 
with two effects. Firstly, it confirms his historical credibility. There is a suggestion here that Dio could 
have omitted detail, had he wished to. A shift in the indirect object of the deception instead reaffirms 
his honesty. Earlier, ‘we senators’ hid their laughter from Commodus (ἀποκρυψώμεθα, 73[72].21.2); 
here it is the reader who is addressed directly.  Dio’s assurance that he will not hide anything (οὐκ 
ἀποκρύψομαι) claims to bring his audience to the same level of understanding of the episode as Dio 
and his senatorial peers. As Dio himself claims before the account of the games, and as Septimius 
Severus promises him in a dream, he really is writing down everything that happened.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for the understanding of Dio’s self-presentation as a 
senatorial eyewitness, the account of Marcellinus’ trial reasserts his own position at the heart of the 
Senate.52 Just as he took the lead in protecting his peers from Commodus, just as he had the most to 
                                                             
49  οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι τὸ τότε μοι συμβάν, εἰ καὶ γελοιότατόν ἐστιν, 77[76].8.4. 
50 ‘We’ looked at him, ἀπείδομεν (77[76].8.6); ‘we’ approved of Marcellinus’ suggestion, ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ τοῦτο 
ἡμῶν (77[76].8.7). 
51 Gleason 2011: 54-56. 
52 For a contrasting scene, see 80[79].5.1-2, and the treason trial of Silius Messala and Pomponius Bassius under 
Elagabalus, on similarly minimal charges. Dio was not present. The full extent of the Senate’s reported 





fear from Julianus, so too Dio himself provides the clearest demonstration of the panic which the 
senators were feeling. Dio’s actions in checking his own hairline are reported, even though they are 
wholly ridiculous (γελοιότατον). This is far from Gleason’s suggestion of ‘isolation’. When many other 
people (ἕτεροι πολλοὶ) are then described as doing the same thing, it provides another example of 
Dio’s individual behaviour representing a corporate experience.  
The condemnation of Marcellinus is not the end of the trial. Dio goes on to describe the fate of his 
prosecutor, Pollienus Sebennus. Dio writes that he was tried by the people of Noricum for his conduct 
as governor, and was only spared death by the intervention of his uncle Auspex (77[76].9.2-4). Both 
Pollieni were, like Julianus, senators.53 Though the detail of Sebennus’ career is uncertain,54 Géza 
Alföldy’s prosopographical work has shown that the governor of Noricum was at this time a senator 
of praetorian rank. Moreover, the two known governors who preceded him both held the suffect 
consulship shortly afterwards; his successor, Sabinus, who is described as handing him over to the 
people of Noricum, became consul immediately after holding the office.55 It is not unlikely then that 
Sebennus also had a career in the Senate. In addition, several generations of Pollieni, including the 
uncle in question, are known to have held consulships themselves. In any case, for Dio his association 
with the Senate does not matter. Sebennus’ actions make him a threat to a collective Senate. 
Whatever his social status, he is presented as an outsider. The scene reinforces Dio’s view of Julianus. 
It is precisely at moments of open division within the senatorial order that Dio reasserts the Senate’s 
unity, and locates himself at its centre. 
                                                             
leads to the use of a third-person verb, but more strikingly also removes all sense of emotion from a scene 
which survives in full. Dio’s presence supplies the atmosphere as much as the detail of events in the senate 
house, 
53 The name survives in Dio as Pollenius; see PIR2 P 537-40 for his place among other successful Pollieni, also 
tabulated by Mennen 2011: 116-18. She sees them as part of an established senatorial core. 
54 Mennen 2011: 188 n. 152 suggests that he was aedile in 205. This appears to be a conflation with Marcellinus 
from Dio’s narrative. 
55 Alföldy 1974c: 159-60. 
108 
 
Where the trial has been discussed by scholars, it has been taken as an example of the challenges 
which faced the Senate under Septimius Severus. Gleason has argued that the fabrication of charges, 
and the strong emotional reaction indicate the lack of control available to the Senate when faced 
with tyrannical excess. From a narrative perspective, I would argue the very opposite. The trial of 
Baebius Marcellinus demonstrates the full extent of control which Dio exercised over his creation of 
Severan Rome. He is able to delineate the Senate, and to externalise anyone who opposed his self-
defined position at the centre of senatorial experience. It has been argued that Dio’s lack of opposition 
to the tyrannical emperors he describes is a cause of embarrassment. Unlike other senators, such as 
Claudius Pompeianus abandoning Rome under Commodus, the Roman History has been taken as a 
defence of complicity.56 But there is also a direct benefit to Dio’s approach. It allows him to subsume 
all elite experience in an account of his own views. He can alienate opponents, while positioning 
himself at the centre of legitimate public life. Gleason is correct in writing that the senators ‘are 
accustomed to functioning as a collectivity’, inasmuch as the Roman History is concerned.57 But that is 
a consequence of Dio’s self-portrayal as the embodiment of senatorial life. The more united the 
Senate, the more he can explain both logoi and erga, and the more reliable his position as a historian. 
Dio’s political career is the cornerstone of his reputation for reliability among scholars, who have 
used the Roman History to access a senatorial view of Severan Rome. Dio may claim to be the voice of 
the Senate, but as a protagonist opposing other senators, he himself makes it clear that there were 
other voices within its number. As narrator, Dio gets to decide who counts as senatorial, and who 
does not. 
Dio the Consul 
As a historian and as a senator, Dio has been held up as the ideal source for reconstructing Severan 
Rome. So too, at the end of his career, he has been seen as suffering directly from the consequences 
of a changing balance in politics between the Senate and an increasingly proactive army. In 229, Dio 
was granted the honour of a second, ordinary consulship alongside the emperor. His period in office 
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was not a successful one. As he himself reports it, military opposition to his appointment forced him 
out of Rome. During his time as governor of Pannonia Superior, he claims that he gained a reputation 
for discipline among his soldiers.58 That reputation preceded him to Rome, where he faced open 
opposition from the Praetorian Guard, who demanded his surrender to them (802.4.2). Severus 
Alexander chose instead to appoint Dio consul. This produced such uproar that the emperor was 
forced to tell Dio to spend his consulship away from Rome, out of fear for his life (802.5.1). Dio’s 
retirement immediately followed. Suffering from some kind of ailment of the feet, Dio returned to 
his native province of Bithynia (802.5.2); presumably it is there that he died.  
On the face of it, the end of Dio’s career works as a crystallisation of the political opposition between 
the Senate and the army. With Dio as a senator, the scene presents the full triangulation of power 
which has come to underpin modern reconstructions, as senatorial and military figures vie for 
authority and for the emperor’s favour.  This is how it has most often been read. Dio’s account of his 
own difficulties, alongside the murder of Ulpian which immediately precedes it (802.2.2-4), has been 
taken as an indication of the Praetorians’ growing influence over imperial politics; in turn, it has the 
been used as an explanation for a wider disdain towards the army.59 The underlying assumption is 
that Dio’s first-hand narrative correlates directly with a historical context. His portrayal of the 
Praetorians’ actions is not questioned, and instead either confirms or explains his contemporary 
narrative, as the climax to a lifetime of struggle against the militarisation of public life. 
I agree that the consulship can be seen as climactic. I do not agree that it has to be read as a reflection 
of a political reality. Dio’s narrative is much less detailed than earlier parts of the contemporary 
history. He himself apologises for this, due to his absence from Rome as a governor, and through 
                                                             
58 Dio says that he was governor of Africa, Dalmatia and then Pannonia Superior in the 220s (49.36.4 refers to 
the final post; 802.1.2-3 lists all three). The chronology is uncertain; see esp. Schmidt 1997: 2634-38; Molin 2016a: 
441-46. 
59 e.g. Bering-Staschewski 1981: 120-23; Aalders 1986: 282; Rich 1989: 88; Sünskes Thompson 1992: 83; Gowing 
1992: 31-32; de Blois 1997: 2663; Campbell 2005: 25; Hekster 2008: 7-8; Handy 2009: 22-24; Mennen 2011: 149; 
Kemezis 2012: 404-405; Markov 2016: 58-60. 
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illness (802.1.2); it seems likely that Xiphilinus has truncated it further still.60 It is therefore very 
difficult to be certain of the precise detail of Dio’s record. Even so, the account of the consulship can 
be located relatively securely within the historiographical project of the Roman History as a whole. 
There are two areas of particular interest here: his interaction with the emperor and his interaction 
with the army. In both cases, Dio goes beyond simply holding office. His consulship engages with the 
wider thematic framework of the Roman History, fulfilling a series of ideals of public behaviour. The 
earlier books of the contemporary history, as seen in the last section, equate Dio’s personal view what 
that of the entire Senate. His consulship is a confirmation of his personal legitimacy. 
The scheme of idealised self-location is especially visible in Dio’s interaction with the emperor during 
his consulship. His relationship with Alexander is much closer than being his consular colleague. Dio 
writes that the expense of his consulship was covered by the emperor himself. It is Alexander too 
who advises Dio to serve his term outside Rome, demonstrating a worry for the basic wellbeing of his 
fellow consul. As reflected when Dio visits Alexander in Rome and Campania (802.5.1-2), their 
relationship is presented as a very personal one. While it seems unlikely that Alexander would 
appoint an unknown or an opponent as his consular colleague, the specific portrayal of the nature of 
the relationship is still open to manipulation by the historian. On closer investigation, the appearance 
of this favour fits closely with some of the themes explored elsewhere in Dio’s narrative. 
As with parrhēsia’s role in the Principate, the pattern is set in book 52, where Maecenas offers 
Augustus some advice on the kind of people who should be allowed to remain in the Senate. Its 
numbers have been swelled by unsuitable candidates; Augustus should remove everyone who is not 
fit to serve (52.19.1). He follows this up with an important caveat. Augustus is told that he should not 
cast out men who are virtuous but too poor to maintain their status, but should instead provide them 
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with the money they need.61 It is a piece of advice which Augustus ultimately heeds. Dio records a 
complex process by which Augustus investigated the membership of the Senate,62 in order to 
decrease its size by removing flatterers (54.13.1-4). A second reform soon follows (54.26.3-9). At the 
same time, on two occasions he distributes money to poor senators to ensure that they could afford 
the expense of holding office (53.2.2, 54.17.3). It is an approach which is part of an overall 
praiseworthy attitude towards the Senate. As Dio has Tiberius comment in his eulogy, Augustus 
removed bad senators, gave money to good but poor ones, and voted with them on an equal footing 
(56.41.3). When Alexander pays for Dio’s consulship he is engaging in the kind of practice which has 
been praised much earlier in the Roman History. 
Over the course of the Agrippa/Maecenas debate and the early imperial reigns which follow, Dio 
establishes a thematic link between emperors and their favourites. Rulers who value good advice 
from virtuous senators make every effort to ensure that they are kept in places of authority – even 
when that means generous grants of cash. As with parrhēsia, Tiberius shows how this can function in 
both positive and negative forms. During his early years of good rule before the death of Germanicus, 
he does exactly the same thing as Augustus, giving money to senators who cannot otherwise maintain 
the minimum wealth requirement (57.10.3-4). As his reign progresses, it is informers who receive 
that money (54.4.8). The pattern continues with other Julio-Claudians. When Caligula gives money to 
actors (59.2.5), he is demonstrating the same kind of inversion as Tiberius, distributing wealth to the 
lowest and most reprehensible social groups, rather than the ἀγαθοί of the Senate. This depiction of 
corruption extends into the epitomised books. It is perhaps best demonstrated by Domitian, who 
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(52.19.2). 
62 τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐξήτασε. Cary’s translation – ‘he purged the senatorial body’ – suggests rather too negative a 
process; Cary 1914-27 VI: 316. 
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rewarded informers with wealth, honours and offices only to then punish them for informing 
afterwards (67.1.3-4).63 
Within the contemporary books, numerous contrasting examples are provided which set up Dio as a 
return to acceptable practice. Caracalla promoted the eunuch and ‘poisoner and sorcerer’ 
(φαρμακεὺς καὶ γόης) Sempronius Rufus (78[77].17.3); Macrinus appointed Adventus as his co-consul 
and urban prefect – something Dio describes as a joke (79[78].14); among many other examples, the 
rise of Comazon under Elagabalus to the consulship and the urban prefectures is described as one of 
the most constitutionally unacceptable events (80[79].4.1-2). Under Commodus things reach their 
extreme. During the brief account of the dominance of Cleander, the imperial freedman who rose to 
be Praetorian Prefect, Dio writes that he sold offices across the empire. This includes the claim that 
some men became senators by spending all they had, being stripped of their property like exiles 
(73[72].12.3). Here, the transfer of money is turned on its head: senators are made penniless, rather 
than being given the money they lack. The reader of the Roman History has been primed to see the 
distribution of wealth as an important aspect in the relationship between emperors and their 
favourites. As they reach Commodus and the Severans, they are presented with a glut of corrupt 
officials being given authority by equally corrupt emperors.  
The result is a consistent, reflexive connection between the quality of emperors and their senior 
officials. Looking at the interaction between Severus Alexander and Cassius Dio, it is important to 
note that it is not just the emperor’s virtue which is being described here. As a direct and important 
corollary to this, Dio reinforces the idea that he is a virtuous senator as well. It is specifically the 
educated and deserving members of the political elite who should be supported financially, according 
to Maecenas; this then forms the basis of the approach taken by Augustus. Dio’s consulship works as 
a culmination of a theme. After a series of corrupt appointments, Dio’s consulship is a return to 
respectability. It is the same pattern seen in Dio’s encomium of Maecenas after his death (55.7). There, 
Maecenas is praised for his qualities, and Augustus for his willingness to recognise them. Alexander 
                                                             






even goes beyond Augustus, and the advice of Maecenas. He not only pays for Dio’s consulship, but 
ensures that he is given a position of importance even in the face of military opposition. Within the 
context of the Roman History, this is the ideal kind of interaction between an emperor and his 
subordinates, built around mutually reinforcing virtue. There is little to support its accuracy outside 
the narrative’s continued motif of reflexive praise and critique. 
The technique of self-location in relation to Severus Alexander is highly reminiscent of an author 
from outside the historiographical tradition, but who gains the same benefits from claiming a 
personal engagement with the emperor. Pliny’s Epistles 10 is built entirely around such a relationship. 
Like Dio, Pliny’s correspondence with Trajan has traditionally been used as the source of a unique 
insight into imperial government in the provinces. In recent years, this has come under more careful 
scrutiny. Carlos Noreña has shown that there is more at stake than a straightforward collection of a 
governor’s correspondence. He notes the consistency with which both Pliny and Trajan appear as 
highly positive figures. More pertinently to this study, he also highlights the ways in which Pliny 
creates the impression of a highly personal relationship between himself and the emperor.64 The 
comparison with Pliny also highlights the connection between Dio’s historical and senatorial 
presentations. The biographical elements of the Epistles consistently shape Pliny’s image as an 
admirable voice of elite activity, whether in resistance to a tyrant or as a companion to a more 
respectable emperor, regardless of the realities of his career. Noreña’s analysis of Epistles 10 concludes 
that, ‘The epistolary personae of Pliny and Trajan in book 10… are interdependent, complementary, 
                                                             
64 Noreña 2007: esp. 244-52 on the “friendship” between Pliny and Trajan. This paper was one of three published 
in quick succession, alongside Stadter 2006 and Woolf 2006, to challenge assumptions about the nature of the 
letters in Ep. 10. Assessments of their relationship are not always this positive; Gibson 2015 argues that the 
Epistles are structured to give an increasingly gloomy image of Trajanic rule. Lavan 2018 offers an alternative 
view, which nonetheless stresses the contrivance of the arrangement of the letters. He sees Pliny’s letters as 
typical of imperial correspondence, and therefore unlikely to be fabrications; even so, by their very nature such 
communications are idealising. Any fabrication is not Pliny’s, but belongs to imperial correspondence as a 




and mutually beneficial to both correspondents.’65 It is easy to replace the names with Dio and 
Alexander. 
Just as Dio’s description of the emperor’s actions is linked closely to his own characterisation as a 
protagonist within the Roman History, so too the effect of his criticism of the Praetorians is not limited 
to a complaint about their indiscipline. As far as Dio himself is concerned, his interaction with the 
soldiers is a clear confirmation of his own qualities. It is his firm control over the troops in Pannonia 
which leads to their opposition, and which is strong enough that his reputation can spread to the 
Praetorians as well. There is a clear engagement with a long Roman tradition of valuing old-fashioned 
military discipline, despite an apparent lack of any particular tactical skill on Dio’s part.66 Within the 
Roman History more specifically, it places him alongside an array of outstanding figures. In the earlier 
imperial narrative, there are clear links to men such as Agrippa (54.11) and Corbulo (61[60].30.4-6), 
who are praised for their strong leadership; moreover, the specific construction ἐγκρατῶς ἦρξα (‘I 
commanded with discipline’, 802.4.2) has direct imperial parallels in the military discipline of Trajan 
(68.6.5) and Marcus Aurelius (72[71].3.3-4).67 The praise for Alexander continues too. Commanding 
ἐγκρατῶς is not always successful in the Roman History. The soldiers reject Macrinus’ attempts to instil 
any kind of discipline after the assassination of Caracalla (79[78].28.1). In close parallel to Dio’s own 
situation, the general Triccianus was killed by the Alban legion in Pannonia during the reign of 
Elagabalus, in response to his disciplined command over them when Macrinus was alive (ὧν 
                                                             
65 Noreña 2007: 261. 
66 Eisman 1977: 663-65 suggests that Dio’s occasional comments on Roman tactics are generic, inviting an 
assumption that he knows more, but never actually displaying it; cf. Hidber 2004a: 193-95 for Dio explicitly 
omitting details to give the impression of a full knowledge of events, ‘since he seems to know more than he 
actually records.’ See also Simons 2014 for Dio’s self-presentation as an expert on the Germanic frontier. 
67 The phrase is also found in Caesar’s speech to his mutinous troops at Vesontio (38.34-37, at 39.3). For a 






ἐγκρατῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ Μακρίνου ἡγεῖτο, 80[79].4.3). The disdain for the army is a fitting response from 
the more effective governmental pairing of Alexander and Dio.68 
It is important to redress the balance of scholarship to some degree here. For all the modern focus on 
the dangers of his second consulship, Dio’s own account comes to a close on a triumphal note. 
Whatever the threat from the Praetorians, it should not be ignored that within the narrative it is 
overcome. Dio writes that he visited the emperor in Rome and Campania for several days. His 
interaction with the soldiers during these visits is recorded thus: τοῖς τε στρατιώταις μετὰ πάσης 
ἀδείας ὀφθείς (802.5.2). Cary’s Loeb translation maintains a sense of impending peril: ‘during which 
the soldiers saw me without offering to do me any harm’.69 Dio’s Greek seems rather more positive 
than this. It is Dio himself who can act with full adeia, a complete fearlessness to which the soldiers 
(in the dative) are nothing more than witnesses. Alternative meanings of adeia are possible here. If 
this is a lack of fear at its most straightforward, this is a moment of personal bravery from Dio. 
Alternatively, if it is seen more in terms of the language of embassies, it is more a complete safety of 
conduct. In that case, the suggestion is more that the emperor is able to maintain control of the 
army.70 However adeia is taken, Dio’s continued engagement with the emperor reasserts the position 
of legitimate authority over the unacceptable protesting of the army. When Dio does retire, it is on 
his own terms, as a result of illness.  
But in Dio’s case, there is more to the soldiers’ actions than a distrust of anyone who wished to enforce 
discipline. Dio’s virtue as a commander is strengthened through the particular corruption of the army 
during Severus Alexander’s reign. When he is describing the growing threat from a resurgent Persia, 
Dio does not concentrate on Ardashir himself (referred to as Artaxerxes). In a comment which 
                                                             
68 Here I disagree with Madsen 2016: 137, who sees Alexander’s suggestion that Dio should leave Rome as a sign 
of weakness. Compared to a very similar situation under Elagabalus, Alexander looks concerned for the 
wellbeing of his consul. 
69 Cary 1914-27 IX: 485. 
70 It may be tempting to take this in contrast with Alexander’s reaction. He is afraid (ἐφοβήθη) that Dio would 
be in danger (802.5.1); Dio’s fearlessness then looks all the more powerful. It is difficult to know how direct such 
a comparison can be, given the possibility that some text has been omitted by Xiphilinus. 
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suggests that this is not due to Xiphilinus, Dio writes that Ardashir was barely worthy of mention 
(οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸς λόγου τινὸς ἄξιος δοκεῖ). The real threat is that the Roman soldiers in the East were 
either deserting to the Persians, or refusing to fight: such was their ill-discipline that some of them 
even killed their commander, the otherwise unknown Flavius Heracleo (802.4.1-2). In this way, the 
soldiers represent the worst kind of force in Dio’s narrative scheme. They are men who act in direct 
opposition to the empire, concerned exclusively with their own wellbeing.  
A depiction of soldiers as greedy and selfish may not be the most original or surprising depiction in 
Roman historiography, but that does not detract from its impact on Dio’s appearance in the scene. 
By incurring the wrath of the licentious Praetorians, Dio places himself in direct opposition to a 
corrupt body that has no interest in Rome’s wellbeing. Dio faces personal danger because of his 
commitment to protecting Rome from the excesses of the army. His efforts to enforce discipline in 
Pannonia, and its potential impact on the Praetorians, represent precisely the kind of positive role a 
statesman is supposed to play.71 A comparison can be made with the role of Cato in the republican 
books, summarised in the previous chapter. He is the only figure who engages in republican politics 
out of a genuine concern for the public good, in opposition to the self-interest shown by everyone 
else.72 That same concern with what will benefit Rome underpins the debate between Agrippa and 
Maecenas. By placing himself as an obstruction to military self-interest, Dio claims the position of a 
defender of Rome.  
The account of Dio’s second consulship demonstrates two important features of his self-presentation. 
The first confirms what was identified in the ostrich scene under Commodus. Dio not only appears as 
an important senator, but as someone who embodies the model of senatorial virtue as defined in the 
wider Roman History. As a disciplinarian, he aligns himself with leading figures from Rome’s past. And 
in his relationship with Severus Alexander, he acts as an example of how emperors should best 
engage with the elite. Alexander’s decision to pay for the expense of his consulship is not just an 
additional detail. It conforms to a narrative model which repeatedly equates financial transactions 
                                                             
71 Aligning with a series of figures positively associated with a concern for τὰ κοινὰ; see above, 74-82. 





with imperial character. Dio becomes someone who actively worked for the benefit of the empire, 
with the support of an emperor who appreciated his qualities and rewarded him for them. 
The second aspect brings us closer to the wider interest of this project: the connection between Dio’s 
self-portrayal and his presentation of imperial politics under the Severans. Over the course of the 
contemporary books, Dio presents himself as both the ideal historian for an unclear world, and the 
representative voice of the senators who inhabited it. The account of his second consulship cements 
a rift between the legitimacy of the Senate and the corruption of other groups. In this respect, it is 
only one final example of a process which occurs throughout Dio’s contemporary history. In its 
extant state, Dio’s narrative leaves no doubt about the uniform greed of the army.73 Legitimacy is 
represented by Dio as the voice of the Senate, rewarded with a deserved consulship. It is defined 
through its opposition to violence and selfishness. This is as much about Dio’s self-portrayal in the 
Roman History as it is an accurate portrayal of senatorial interactions with the army. In the terms of 
his narrative, Dio emerges from his position at the heart of the Senate, to take up the role of its 
champion. 
Creating Politics 
Over the course of this chapter, I have explored how Dio constructs Severan politics around himself. 
Dio’s Roman History is consistent in its presentation of the Senate as a unified body at the heart of 
Roman politics, which serves as the ultimate locus of legitimate authority. In the imperial books, an 
emperor is defined by his interaction with senators. This continues to be true into the contemporary 
history. Dio describes a Senate united in its despair at almost every single emperor, with the brief 
                                                             
73 The rather incoherent references to Ulpian (109 n. 60) are especially intriguing in this regard. The previous 
chapter highlighted the association between legitimate parrhēsia and legal contexts. This rather raises the 
question of what Dio would make of a jurist who was also Praetorian Prefect. A threat in charge of a violent 
force? A figure of respectability who could not control the soldiers, and so died at their hands? There is also 
then a question of what, if anything, originally lay behind Ulpian being placed in charge of ‘the rest of matters 
of rule’ (τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς, 802.1.1), as rendered by Xiphilinus. If there was a more nuanced account of his 
prefecture, it does not survive. 
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reign of Pertinax the shortest of exceptions to an otherwise unpleasant thirty years after his own 
entry into public life. It is an image which the vast majority of scholars have accepted. Dio continues 
to be seen as a reliable guide to the experiences of the senatorial elite under Commodus and the 
Severans, his eyewitness record privileged as the informed account of a political insider. His 
consulship alongside Severus Alexander in 229 is viewed as a first-hand confirmation of the political 
trends identified for the period as a whole. Dio, the traditional senator, was overthrown by the unruly 
Praetorians, flexing their increasingly honed political muscles. It is an approach which assumes an 
underlying historical context, and uses the Roman History to explore how senators responded. 
However successful Dio’s career was, however close he was to political events, that does not make his 
contemporary books an accurate depiction of what occurred during his lifetime. The picture of 
Severan Rome which Dio creates is his own retrospective interpretation. Unsurprisingly, it is a view 
which makes Dio himself the greatest source of authority in his narrative world. As a historian, he is 
the ideal figure to resolve the fundamental methodological challenges of historiography under the 
Principate. The impossibility of differentiating between logoi and erga under the early emperors 
disappears when Dio becomes an eyewitness. He is able to understand and explain both sides 
simultaneously, firstly as the protagonist forced into a world of pretence, and secondly as the 
narrator who can elucidate the underlying reality. And as a senator, he embodies the virtue of the 
institution as a whole. Within the bounds of the Roman History, Dio’s personal experience encapsulates 
the fears of senators living under tyrants, and the deception they were all forced to employ to survive.  
It is important to stress that the tensions between Dio’s historiographical world and the historical 
Severan Rome are visible in the narrative itself. The Roman History portrays the Senate as a uniform 
body, whose engagement in politics was collective, and whose experiences were shared. The accuracy 
of this image has begun to be questioned, though with strong rebuttal in Dio’s support.74 In order to 
maintain this image, senators themselves have to be excluded from its number. Even outside the 
more notable individual cases of apparent social disruption, Dio’s self-proclaimed enmity with Didius 
Julianus is built on an assumption of court cases against senatorial opponents. It is hard to imagine 
                                                             





that every senator would have agreed in 193 that Julianus was a dissolute reprobate.75 The image of 
the entire Senate masking their despair at the death of Pertinax is extremely effective as a means of 
establishing Dio as the true senatorial voice, but it is far from implausible that Julianus had his own 
supporters. So too informers are externalised from the senatorial whole, no matter their actual social 
status. The Senate as an institution is not sullied by its participation in tyranny; it only ever exists as 
the victim of anomalous outsiders. 
The acceptance of Dio’s narrative as a reliable guide to Severan politics is therefore flawed on a 
number of levels. It privileges the individual perspective of a historian who is fully in control of both 
the detail of his narrative, and the political structures it is built on. It accepts Dio’s view of legitimate 
senatorial activity as the definitive one, despite the high likelihood of disagreement from the 
members of the Senate; and it embraces Dio’s self-portrayal as the ultimate voice of united 
disaffection. Modern reconstructions of senatorial attitudes offer as little room for variety as Dio’s 
account of a united body. The number of senators killed by Septimius Severus has led to the 
conclusion that the emperor must have been universally loathed.76 It is not acknowledged that these 
men would have been replaced by new senators with every reason to support their patron. The 
modern reception of Dio’s second consulship epitomises this process. The only source for the unrest 
among the Praetorians in 229 is the Roman History itself. Dio’s autobiographical claims are accepted, 
apparently without concern for the effects of the scene on his appearance in the narrative. The 
consistency of the scene with the earlier contemporary books is clear, in the presentation of a 
respectable senator coming under attack from the corrupt troops.77 When the outcome of the scene 
                                                             
75 Indeed, there is a question whether Dio himself would have thought as much. Studies on the response to 
Domitian are showing the flexibility of Roman presentations of interaction with emperors who are considered 
in some way tyrannical after their deaths; see e.g. Hoffer 1999; Baraz 2012; Whitton 2015 on Pliny and Domitian; 
see above, 43 n. 7 for Tacitus’ engagement with his Flavian career; more generally, several papers in König and 
Whitton 2018 address post-Domitianic responses to regime change. It is very possible that Dio is reshaping what 
had been a more positive relationship with Julianus in much the same fashion. 
76 See esp. Letta 2014; cf. Okoń 2012, 2016. 
77 Scott 2015. 
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is so closely connected to the positive characterisation of its author, it seems reasonable to view Dio’s 
account with distinct reservations about its reliability.  Narrative coherence is not the same as 
historical reliability. 
Interrogating the reliability of the Roman History is therefore not just a matter of challenging its 
factual accuracy. Dio’s creation of a political atmosphere is just as suspect. He claims to speak for 
everyone, and yet it is clear even within his contemporary history that that isn’t really the case. That 
does not immediately mean that Dio was deliberately being deceptive or embittered in his narrative; 
he may well have believed himself to be the paragon of senatorial virtue. But we do not have to agree 
with him blindly. To put it in Dio’s own terms, we need to consider his report a logos which may not 
necessarily reflect directly underlying erga. Dio invites us to connect the two, but, as his anecdotes 
about dreams make clear, there is no obligation to acquiesce. Just as the atmosphere of senatorial 
unity in the Roman History has recently been heavily questioned,78 the motives behind its portrayal 
need to be considered. If Dio provides ‘a memoir of the governing class’,79 then it is a coherent class 
of his own creation. 
                                                             
78 Davenport 2012a; Kemezis 2012: 388, 413-14. 






After the sometimes bombastic self-assurance of Cassius Dio, Herodian presents a very different kind 
of challenge. The narrator of the History of the Empire after Marcus Aurelius – hereafter simply the 
History – is a shadowy figure. While Dio provides copious details of his career and personal 
involvement in Roman politics, Herodian is largely absent from the narrative. In addition to a small 
number of claims about his research, he informs the reader that he held a post in the imperial 
bureaucracy, ἐν βασιλικαῖς ἢ δημοσίαις ὑπηρεσίαις (1.2.4).1 It is now most commonly claimed that he 
was a freedman, or a freedman’s son, from Asia Minor. The evidence is minimal; along with the 
administrative role that supplies his status, the location comes from the fact that Herodian names 
more cities there than in other regions.2 This is only one option of many.3 Yet as early as Dick 
Whittaker’s Loeb translation there were doubts about the possibility of a reliable reconstruction.4 
Recent scholarship on the literary character of the History has only added to them, suggesting that 
even looking for a “real” Herodian is an error. Instead, we should accept that the author’s anonymity 
                                                             
1 On Herodian’s narratorial persona, see Hidber 2004b. 
2 First claimed by Cassola 1957: 214-16, and influentially supported by Alföldy 1971b: 219-33 (= 1989: 255-69). 
Recent subscribers to this position include Vielberg 1996: 59; de Blois 2003: 148; Hartmann 2008: 893-98; Hekster 
2008: 8; Mennen 2011: 14; Icks 2012: 6. 
3 His social standing and outlook are especially broad in their interpretation. It has been argued that Herodian 
was everything from an elitist senator (e.g. Sommerfeldt 1914-16; Platnauer 1918: 1; this traditional view has 
dropped out of favour) to someone who had an affinity with the masses (Rubin 1980: 33-34; Šašel Kos 276-78; 
Alföldy 1989: 275-77). Recently, the suggestion that he was an equestrian, possibly with a financial role, has 
started to gain traction (Galimberti 2014: 52-53; Arbo 2017: 207; Schettino 2017: 83-87). For overviews, see Gascó 
la Calle 1982; Roques 1990a: 1-15; Zimmermann 1999b: 302-306; Hidber 2004b, 2006: 1-8. 
4 Whittaker 1969-70 I: ix-xxviii. At xxvii: ‘In the end there is nothing that will positively identify the historian’s 
place of origin, unless some chance inscription turns up.’ 
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is inherent to the narrative.5 The issue is ably summarised by Denis Roques: ‘Hérodien est pour nous 
un mystère.’6 
Just as uncertain as Herodian’s biography is the dating of the History. Herodian claims to have written 
a history of events which he saw and heard across his entire lifetime.7 It is therefore considered that 
a composition date any later than the 250s is unlikely, since that would already make him over 
seventy years old if he was alive for the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180. His claim to have seen 
Commodus’ games of 192 as a boy have been challenged, as it seems likely that his narrative is based 
on Dio at this point.8 Beyond that, any decisions about more precise dating are based on which 
emperors seem most appropriate. The most common suggestions are Philip the Arab (244-249),9 or at 
some point under Decius (249-251) or Trebonianus Gallus (251-253).10 The lack of clear external 
evidence makes this debate impossible to solve definitively.11 I will not attempt to do so.12 The state 
of the text is not without problems either, though they pale in comparison to Dio. The eight books of 
the History are highly inconsistent in terms of length, with book 2 being nearly twice as long as book 
                                                             
5 See esp. Hidber 2006: 15-19; Kemezis 2014: 304-309. For more general discussions of the debate, Gascó la Calle 
1982; Hidber 2004b; Roques 1990a: 1-15; Zimmermann 1999b: 302-306; Hidber 2006: 1-15. 
6 Roques 1990a: 1.  
7 ἃ… παρὰ πάντα τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ βίον εἶδόν τε καὶ ἤκουσα (1.2.5). 
8 1.15.4; see e.g. Kolb 1972: 24-34; Alföldy 1989: 205-206; Sidebottom 2007: 78-79. 
9 Including the influential discussions in Widmer 1967: 70-71; Whittaker 1969-70 I: ix-xix. Zimmermann 1999b: 
293-302 argues for a publication to coincide with Philip’s millennial celebrations. 
10 Recently e.g. Alföldy 1989: 249-55; Timonen 2000: 16; Polley 2003. For recent overviews of the debate, see 
Hidber 2006: 10-15 (with the conclusion of some point after 249); Kemezis 2014: 300-304 (any point from 244 to 
253). 
11 Roques 1990a: 2-3 demurs on the question. Sidebottom 1997 ostensibly argues for a date under Gallienus, as 
a demonstration that the evidence is extremely weak; see Sidebottom 2007: 78-79 for clarification of his aims. 
12 All of these suggestions accept Herodian’s self-portrayal as a contemporary witness. Following the preceding 
investigation of Dio, I would simply note that Herodian gains considerably as a historical authority by making 






8; the first three are the longest.13 This discrepancy has led to the disputed suggestion that the text 
in its current form may consist of an unfinished revision, in which only the earlier books were 
produced in a final, fully edited form.14 The text itself, however, is relatively secure. Two manuscript 
groups have been identified, with separate attestations in the Excerpta Constantaniana.15 Interest in 
Herodian in the early-modern period in turn produced a large number of editions.16 It would be 
possible to label the History as the opposite to Dio’s account. It is a complete text, but one which is 
very difficult to contextualise. 
In the responses of scholars, too, Herodian’s treatment often directly opposes Dio’s. Their general 
reception is only the most obvious example. Dio’s reputation as a senatorial eyewitness stands in 
stark contrast to the disdain which has often been directed at Herodian’s account.17 More ironic is the 
attitude to the structure of his narrative. Herodian’s account is highly episodic, made up of individual 
vignettes.18 Each scene is essentially self-contained, and its most basic meaning can be understood 
without reference to a wider narrative context. On a straightforward level, it requires no knowledge 
of the rest of the History to see that Marcus Aurelius is virtuous, or that Caracalla is not. The effects 
on the narrative can be striking. There are, for example, only two figures from outside the imperial 
family who appear even by name in more than one scene.19 In what Adam Kemezis has called a 
                                                             
13 Tabulated at Hidber 2006: 138. He uses Whittaker’s Loeb, which produces lengths of 1,110, 1,142 and 1,062 
lines of Greek respectively for books 1-3, amounting to nearly half of the History’s length; book 8 has 596.  
14 Alföldy 1989: 240-45; Sidebottom 1998: 2813; Zimmermann 1999b: 295-302; Polley 2003: 207. For arguments to 
the contrary, see Kemezis 2014: 302-304; Hidber 1999: 148-53. 
15 The manuscript tradition is set out in Lucarini 2005: ix-xlvi, which incorporates twentieth-century 
scholarship (especially Nichipor 1975); see also Stavenhagen 1922: iii-xii. 
16 For Herodian’s differing reception in the early- and late-modern periods, see Hidber 2006: 28-45. 
17 As summed up above, 9-16. 
18 Hidber 2006: 124-31 lists the clearly divided scenes. 
19 One is the Parthian king Artabanus, who appears in wars against Septimius Severus (3.9.9-11), Caracalla (4.10-
11) and Macrinus (4.15). The other is Plautianus, Praetorian Prefect under Septimius Severus. He is the focus of 
a lengthy episode in which he plots to kill the emperor (3.10-12), and then appears by name twice, as the father 
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‘streamlining’ approach, Herodian only includes details when they immediately matter to plot 
progression.20 The result is a tendency to look at the History in terms of its individual episodes. That 
is, much like Dio’s fragmentary narrative is read as if it were coherent, Herodian’s fully extant History 
is treated as a collection of fragments.21 
It is increasingly clear that such readings are unsatisfactory. Although the general meaning of any 
scene can be understood on its own merits, the extent of connections between episodes has been 
shown in great detail. As with everything in Herodian’s narrative, the central point of interest is 
always the emperor.22 In the most extreme cases, this can involve the repetition of an extended form 
of narrative, which then span the full extent of the History. Thus, the invasions of Italy undertaken by 
Septimius Severus and Maximinus Thrax are closely related, with direct contrasts extending far 
beyond their simple success and failure.23 Andrew Scott’s investigation of assassination attempts led 
by Praetorian Prefects likewise includes scenes under emperors from Commodus and Caracalla.24 
More generally, repeated motifs create a more consistent basis for comparison. They are often highly 
visual comments on the general character of emperors. Speed of movement is important, as wise 
                                                             
of Caracalla’s wife (3.13.1; 4.6.3). Sidebottom 1998: 2790-91 provides a full list of fewer than forty names across 
the History as a whole. 
20 Kemezis 2014: 229-39, ‘streamlining’ at 236. He sees this as part of an approach to historiography which closely 
mirrors the recommendations of Lucian towards a rapid pace, and a lack of extraneous detail. 
21 Sidebottom 1998: 2776: ‘[The History] has been reduced to a mere quarry for historical data, and an 
unsatisfactory one at that, for it is often seen as little more than a rhetorical épitome [sic].’ 
22 As set out in Widmer 1967. The organisation of the most recent monographs reflects the inescapable 
centrality of emperors, covering the History by ruler; Zimmermann 1999b; Hidber 2006. 
23 2.11; 8.1-5. Pitcher 2012b: 280-82; Kemezis 2014 240-45. For example, Severus expected resistance in Italy, but 
was welcomed, while Maximinus was greeted by abandoned cities and spoiled crops. See also Pitcher 2018b for 
a broader comparison of the characterisation of these two emperors. 





emperors proceed calmly, compared to the rash haste of the corrupt; even changes in clothing are 
linked to imperial comparisons.25  
The unity of Herodian’s narrative is central to the following analysis, which has the ultimate aim of 
reassessing his final books. It is after the death of Severus Alexander that Herodian is generally 
considered to be at his most accurate and reliable.26  A cynical reader might note the convenience 
with which this coincides with the end of Dio’s Roman History.27 Even so, attempts have been made to 
justify putting greater faith in this section of the History for more positive reasons. 238 receives a 
considerably more detailed description than any other individual calendar year,28 with only the 
equally eventful 193 coming even close.29 In addition, the names reported over the course of the 
uprising in 238 can generally be connected to documentary evidence of activity by the Senate.30 
Whatever the basis of modern faith in its reliability, the History is the source for both the detail of 
events in the 230s, and the explanations behind them. Herodian is the basis for all reconstructions of 
social conflict and militarised politics as the basis of the breakdown in imperial authority. 
In order to challenge the dependence on Herodian, discussion of the History will be split into two 
parts. In the first chapter – ‘Structuring Rome’ – I examine in close detail how Herodian portrays 
political life in Rome. This is in many ways an extension of the scholarship which has looked at 
imperial characterisation in Herodian’s narrative, but from a different perspective. Several scholars 
have shown how Herodian locates himself within a wider context of peri basileias literature, writing 
                                                             
25 On haste, Hellström 2015. Zimmermann 1999b: 222-32 plots the changing garb of Caracalla, Macrinus and 
Elagabalus. 
26 See above, 15 n. 74. 
27 As Börm 2008: 74-75; Hartmann 1982: 71 argues that there is no reason to treat the later books any differently. 
28 After a rapid skim over the first years of Maximinus’ reign (7.1.1-3.1), the remainder of the last two books 
covers roughly six months of unrest. Burian 1988: 232 sees this as evidence of Herodian’s first-hand experience 
of events in Rome. 
29 See Hidber 2006: 139 for a comparison between the two narratives. 
30 It has been demonstrated that a board of XXviri was appointed in opposition to Maximinus in 238, some of 
whom Herodian names; Dietz 1980: 326-40; Haegemans 2010: 15-16. 
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concerned with the nature of rule. The actions of emperors are often explored through the traditional 
dichotomy of tyranny and admirable monarchy, or aristocracy. The proem to the History introduces 
the idea immediately. Herodian writes that the decades after Marcus Aurelius’ death were more 
wondrous than any other. No other time saw such imperial successions, or changing fortunes in civil 
and foreign wars; such unrest in the provinces, or conquest of cities, Roman and barbarian; such 
earthquakes and plagues, or strange lives of tyrants and kings, contrasting τύραννοι and βασιλεῖς 
(1.1.4).31 Thus far, discussions have focused on the emperors themselves. I demonstrate the ways that 
Herodian uses the very structure of Roman society to the same effect of comparing different rulers. 
Luke Pitcher has recently summed up Herodian’s approach to individuals in the History as follows: ‘In 
general, people receive characterizing detail in Herodian only to explain their actions in relation to 
the emperor of the day.’32 As will be suggested, this equally applies to Roman society as a whole.  
Below the emperor, Rome is split into three distinct groups: the Senate, the army, and the people. 
The immediate tendency of the History is towards universality. Events usually involve everyone or no 
one, with minimal grey area in between. This is true of the three social groups too. They exist as 
homogenous units, with shared attitudes and actions. In a narrative which focuses on civil wars, the 
insistence on universal actions can often lead to a sense of inconsistency. I argue that this is in fact 
indicative of the dominance of Herodian’s wider historiographical approach. In conjunction with the 
episodic structure outlined above, uniform social groups invite easy comparisons across different 
reigns. Their actions become illustrations of the characteristics of each emperor. As a political 
scheme, this is extremely simplistic; as a means of organising a moralising narrative, it allows for a 
greater degree of sophistication than the History is usually granted. 
                                                             
31 This is part of a wider project of literary self-location, which also includes direct interaction with Thucydides 
and Herodotus. See esp. Hidber 2006: 75-117 for a comprehensive discussion of how the proem fits into a much 
broader historiographical world. On Herodian and the peri basileias tradition, see also Stein 1957: 76-90; Roques 
2990b: 42-46; Sidebottom 1998: 2776-80; Zimmermann 1999b: 19-21, 1999c; Kuhn-Chen 2002: 253-60; Bekker-
Nielsen 2014: 233-45; Galimberti 2014: 33-45; Kemezis 2014: 229-34. 





In the second chapter on Herodian – ‘Soldiers and Senators’ – I present a more focused engagement 
with Herodian’s depiction of the emperor Maximinus Thrax, and the tumultuous events of the year 
238. It is in this part of the narrative that the modern interpretation of social conflict appears to be 
confirmed most evidently. Maximinus is viewed as the first “soldier-emperor”, the first man to rise 
from the ranks of the army to the peak of imperial authority.33 According to Herodian, and 
consequently most scholars, Maximinus alienated the senatorial elite to such a point that they rose 
up against him in two separate rebellions in 238.34 Though modern reconstructions reject Herodian’s 
overt moralising, they accept the underpinning account as accurate. Following on from the first 
section, I demonstrate some of the significant problems with such approaches. Even though 
Maximinus appears to be absent from most of the narrative of 238, the same process of using the 
structure of Roman society to compare emperors is taking place continuously. Far from seeing 
Herodian’s final two books as representing Herodian at his most reliable as a descriptive historian, I 
suggest that we should instead consider them in respect to his position as a creative historiographer. 
Maximinus is presented as an external threat to the empire; as the uprisings of 238 progress, its 
capital, Rome, starts to take on the same damaging characteristics. This effect is sophisticated. 
Herodian builds on a narrative structure which frequently repeats scenes and rhetorical tropes, and 
subverts them. The three social groups remain homogenous and easily identifiable, but their roles 
start to change as Maximinus’ reign progresses. Familiar themes of military violence are twisted, as 
the soldiers becomes victims of popular and senatorial savagery. Ultimately, the emperor’s barbarian 
heritage comes to define not only Maximinus himself, but also the entire empire. Such is the nature 
                                                             
33 The concept of soldier-emperors is closely linked to the debate around the Crisis of the Third Century (above, 
7-9). A detailed guide to the Soldatenkaiserzeit, the fifty years from the accession of Maximinus in 235 to that of 
Diocletian in 284, is found in Johne et al. 2008; see also Heil 2006 for a discussion of the usefulness of the term, 
concluding in its favour. 
34 7.3; see Haegemans 2010: 79-130 for the most detailed recent assessment of Maximinus’ regime. His military 
background is his defining feature within scholarship, to the degree that he is often still referred to as simply 
a soldier, e.g. Campbell 2005: 27; Johne 2007: 129, 2008: 586; Hekster 2008: 39; Mennen 2011: 39; Ziolkowski 2011: 
118. Speidel 2016: 342-46 provides a synopsis of the overwhelmingly negative reactions to his reign. 
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of Maximinus’ reign that his death in open warfare resembles a peaceful scene, and his severed head 
is a cause of celebration. The conflict between homogenous social groups is therefore just one tool in 
the rhetorical construction of Maximinus, which presents him as little more than a marauding 
barbarian. Historians claim to be putting Herodian’s rhetorical excesses to one side when they use 
the History to reconstruct 238. Unfortunately, that is not the case. 







Herodian’s History begins with a eulogy, and soon afterwards a death. After a short introductory 
proem (1.1), Marcus Aurelius makes a brief appearance as an idealised embodiment of virtuous 
imperial power. Herodian sums up his character, describing an educated and restrained philosopher, 
before reporting a death-bed speech to the imperial amici (1.2-4). He then begins an account of the 
reign of Commodus. His virtue is summarised by his restraint and dignity, labelled by Herodian as 
both σώφρων and σεμνός. The connection between morality and good rule is a consistent feature of 
Herodian’s historical understanding, and reoccurs frequently across the History.1 As for Marcus, in 
addition to his σεμνότης and σωφροσύνη, he was very simply a champion of all virtue.2 Though his 
appearance in Herodian’s narrative is brief, it has long been recognised that Marcus provides a model 
for imperial behaviour which can be observed throughout the History.3 In general terms, Marcus 
represents the ideal form of rule, a βασιλεία or ἀριστοκρατία, in contrast to the perils of corrupt 
τυραννίς.4  
In addition to a strictly moral concern, recent studies have begun to stress Marcus’ importance in 
establishing the structural framework of the History. Thomas Hidber has described the summary of 
his reign as a confirmation of the proem. Herodian not only states that he will describe the reigns of 
tyrants and emperors; he also frames it around the idea of transitions of power (1.1.4). Hidber has 
shown how Marcus fulfils both aspects. In Hidber’s reading, Marcus certainly performs the moral role 
                                                             
1 See esp. Kuhn-Chen 2002: 266-87 for a general overview.   
2 ἀρετῆς δὲ πάσης ἔμελεν αὐτῷ, 1.2.3. Though authorial self-presentation is not my main interest here, it is 
worth noting that this includes praise for Marcus as πολυίστωρ, very learned (1.3.3), when he uses historical 
parallels to illustrate the danger of Commodus becoming emperor at a young age (1.3.3-6). This is obviously a 
reflection on Herodian’s own learning as much as anything else. 
3 See e.g. Widmer 1967: 16-27; Whittaker 1969-70 I: lxii-lxiv; Alföldy 1989: 14-24; Zimmermann 1999b: 123-25; 
Kuhn-Chen 2002: 324; Hidber 2006: 188-95.  
4 See above, 126 n. 31.  
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which has traditionally been ascribed to him, as the central figure through whom all virtue is 
expressed.5 But this is predicated on an analysis of power transfers as organisational tools. Succession 
narratives create moments of direct comparison between emperors, as occurs when Herodian’s 
narrative begins with the transition from the elderly and virtuous Marcus Aurelius to the corruptible 
and inexperienced Commodus. This scheme continues throughout the History. Herodian quickly 
establishes the character of a new ruler as soon as he comes to power, often in direct contrast to his 
predecessor, and always in connection to the themes of virtue which Marcus embodies.6 For Hidber, 
this is the ‘great compromise’ of a structure set out according to time and imperial reigns, κατὰ 
χρόνους καὶ δυναστείας (1.1.6); it allows Herodian to write a narrative which is focused on individual 
emperors and their characters, but which is not explicitly biographical.7 
A similar move towards investigating the structural workings of the History has been made by Adam 
Kemezis. The thematic concerns are still present. Kemezis views Marcus as the effective ruler against 
whom all the later chaos is contrasted; as he summarises, ‘the norms laid down by Marcus will become 
a key to interpreting the whole rest of the narrative. Put simply, under Marcus, the empire worked.’8 
But there is also a structural element. Kemezis has examined at length the irony of speeches in 
Herodian, which almost always either fail in their efforts to persuade, or describe events in a way 
                                                             
5 Summarised at Hidber 2006: 232-43. 
6 The discussion forms a large portion of his monograph. The structure is introduced at Hidber 2006: 152-87, 
with more detailed analysis of Marcus Aurelius as a thematic model at 188-243; 243-72 covers the role of 
Commodus as the first young emperor, and as a model for the contrast between experience and youth.  
7 Hidber 2016: 131-52. 
8 Kemezis 2014: 235; see more generally 234-39 on how this plays out. While I am unconvinced by his overall 
reading of the History as ‘Antonine’, the general point very much stands that Marcus’ reign appears more 





which Herodian himself proves to be false.9 Kemezis sees Marcus as an exception,10 accurately 
predicting Commodus’ descent into corruption should he not have effective advisors. I would suggest 
rather that his speech very much introduces this idea. Marcus is entirely unable to prevent things 
going wrong. If, as Kemezis argues, ‘Herodian’s world is one in which rhetoric seems to have lost its 
power to describe or influence reality’, this would seem to apply directly to Marcus as well.11 My 
disagreement with Kemezis’s conclusion notwithstanding, his underlying observation regarding the 
structure of speeches – and the role of Marcus as an early demonstrative example – remains valid. In 
combination, then, a speech and the immediate succession of a new emperor are not only used to 
confirm Marcus’ quality. Instead, the encomiastic opening of the History, and the immediate descent 
into corruption under Commodus, establish some of the central concepts around which Herodian will 
structure his entire narrative. 
The demonstration of Marcus’ role as a structuring force is an important starting point in a discussion 
of Herodian’s political narrative. In addition to the transitions of power and the play with speeches, 
the same process can be found in a third organisational factor. In the immediate aftermath of Marcus’ 
death, Herodian describes the response as the news spreads across the empire. In so doing, he 
presents a social structure which will underpin the remainder of the History: 
τοσαῦτα εἰπόντα τὸν Μᾶρκον επιπεσοῦσα λιποθυμία κατεσίγασεν· ὑπὸ δὲ ἀσθενείας τε καὶ 
ἀθυμίας αὖθις ὑπτίαζεν. οἶκτος δὲ πάντας ἐλάμβανε τοὺς παρόντας, ὡς μηδὲ κατασχόντας 
αὑτῶν τινὰς ἐς οἰμωγὴν ἀναβοῆσαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐπιβιώσας μιᾶς 
                                                             
9 Kemezis 2014: 252-60.  
10 Along with Crispinus, the commander who successfully inspires the people of Aquileia to resist Maximinus 
on the grounds that a smaller army defending its home is stronger than a large but foreign invader (8.3.4-6); 
Kemezis 2014: 252.  
11 Following Sidebottom 1998: 2818 n. 208, this is one of many speeches containing ‘hoped for effects which do 
not happen’. I would add that Marcus’ final sentence seems particularly ironic. He instructs his advisors that 
their close attention to Commodus would be the best display of favour to his memory, and concludes that this 
is the only way to ensure that it is preserved (1.4.6). Despite their failure to follow Marcus’ instructions, his 
reputation is very much intact in Herodian’s eyes.  
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ἀνεπαύσατο, πόθον τε τοῖς καθ’ αὑτὸν ἀνθρώποις ἐγκαταλιπὼν ἀρετῆς τε ἀίδιον μνήμην ἐς 
τὸν ἐσόμενον αἰῶνα. τελευτήσαντος δὲ Μάρκου, ἐπειδὴ διεφοίτησεν ἡ φήμη, πᾶν τε τὸ παρὸν 
στρατιωτικὸν καὶ τὸ δημῶδες πλῆθος ὁμοίως πένθει κατείχετο, οὐδέ τις ἦν ἀνθρώπων τῶν 
ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἀρχὴν ὃς ἀδακρυτὶ τοιαύτην ἀγγελίαν ἐδέχετο. πάντες δ’ ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς 
φωνῆς, οἱ μὲν πατέρα χρηστόν, οἱ δ’ ἀγαθὸν βασιλέα, γενναῖον δὲ ἕτεροι στρατηγόν, οἱ δὲ 
σώφρονα καὶ κόσμιον ἄρχοντα ἀνεκαλουν, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐψεύδετο (1.4.7-8). 
After speaking, Marcus fainted and fell silent, and fell back weak with exhaustion. Everyone 
present was so taken with sadness that some of them could not hold back from crying out in 
despair. He lived for a day and a night before dying, leaving the people of his own age a feeling 
of loss, and an eternal memory of his virtue for the generations to come. When the news that 
Marcus had died reached them, all of the troops present and the whole populace were 
overcome by grief. There was not one person across the Roman empire who heard such bad 
news without weeping. Everyone praised him as if in one voice, some as an upright father, 
others as a good king, others as a noble general, and others as a moderate and disciplined 
ruler. And nobody lied. 
Herodian’s moralising point is readily apparent: Marcus was a beloved emperor, whose death led to 
grief across the empire. In this role, it has been identified as the introduction of a repeated motif 
across the History of reactions to an emperor’s death.12 Analysis of the passage can go further. Much 
as this scene certainly does represent a model for moralising judgements in the History, it also 
demonstrates two key ways in which Herodian presents those judgements. He presents a reaction to 
Marcus’ death which is universal, and which is explored in relation to specific social groups. 
The shared nature of the responses is difficult to ignore here. The repetition of πᾶς across Herodian’s 
account is a little crude, reinforced by the insistence that no one – whether οὐδέ τις or οὐδείς – 
offered any sort of disagreement. Even where there is actual difference in people’s actions, it is 
presented as an additional aspect of their agreement. Though four different kinds of praise are listed, 
the people involved still speak as though they were sharing one voice, ἐκ μιᾶς φωνῆς. In this regard, 
                                                             





Marcus’ death is a confirmation of a trend also seen in Herodian’s portrayal of his character when 
still alive. There too Marcus is described as mastering all virtues, and no one could outdo his all-
encompassing qualities.13 This is Herodian introducing the idea of good imperial rule in a series of 
absolutes. Marcus embodies all good qualities, and everyone loves him for it.14 But the universality of 
support for Marcus is not expressed simply through a generic reference to “everyone”. Herodian 
breaks the response down into three separate groups. Two are referred to explicitly here. The army 
and the people were overcome equally in their grief at his death. The third is referred to in the phrase 
οἱ παρόντες, the ones who were actually present by his death-bed. They are the political elite, defined 
at the start of Marcus’ speech as the emperor’s advisors and family members, including Commodus 
(1.4.1).  
The role of the Senate, the people, and the army in the narrative is not in itself a new observation. 
Discussions of Herodian’s presentation of political events have often emphasised the relative 
                                                             
13 There are several examples in chapter 1.2 alone. Herodian describes Marcus’ effort to pursue all virtue (ἀρετῆς 
δὲ πάσης ἔμελεν, 1.2.3). In the same way, he attempts to educate Commodus with every care (μετὰ πάσης 
ἐπιμελείας), employing teachers from everywhere (πάντοθεν, 1.2.1). Conversely, good character traits are the 
only things he considers valuable (μόνα, 1.2.2), while he himself was the only emperor (μόνος τε βασιλέων, 
1.2.4) who lived in a truly philosophical manner. It is in this context that he falls behind no one 
(μηδενὸς…ἀπολείπεσθαι, 1.2.3) in his literary skill. 
14 The repetition of πᾶς and its derivations is common throughout the History. Caracalla’s reign, for example, 
includes two occasions when four terms are used in quick succession. At the massacre of young men in 
Alexandria, the soldiers, ‘surrounded on all sides (πανταχόθεν) the whole of the youth (πᾶσαν νεολαίαν) and 
anyone else who was there and killed them, killing them in every way (παντὶ τρόπῳ), armed men surrounding 
unarmed men on all sides (πανταχόθεν)’ (4.9.6). Herodian then introduces his assassination with a comment on 
Caracalla’s endless desire for knowledge (4.12.3). ‘As a very curious person, he not only wanted to know 
everything about men (τὰ ἀνθρώπων πάντα), but also to meddle in the matters of gods and spirits. He always 
suspected everyone (πάντας) of plotting, and so made great use of every oracle (χρηστηρίων τε πάντων) and 




influence of the three groups at different points in the History.15 I would suggest that there is much 
more to their presentation. The description of universal despair occurs in a moment of structural 
transition which is important for both Hidber and Kemezis. The response to Marcus’ death from the 
three groups defines the terms for unity in Herodian’s narrative world, and reflects the emperor’s 
embodiment of imperial virtue. In this respect, the three groups take on a structural role of their 
own. Their introduction at the beginning of Herodian’s account establishes a means for the 
comparison of rulers across different reigns. Exactly like the successions themselves, the actions of 
the Senate, the army, and the people reflect the character of the emperor. 
The conjunction of changes in power with the responses of the three groups is consistent throughout 
the History; as is their connection to the moral comparisons outlined by Hidber. The united, positive 
attitude to Marcus is a rare phenomenon. Its only reoccurrence comes after the accession of Severus 
Alexander. The scene begins with the restoration of the same virtues emphasised under Marcus. 
Alexander’s grandmother and mother surrounded the young emperor with respectable advisors, 
ensuring that the empire entered a state of greater moderation and dignity (τὸ σωφρονέστερον καὶ 
σεμνότερον, 6.1.1). This is almost immediately followed by a confirmation of the same qualities, this 
time with superlatives. The advisors appointed by Alexander’s relatives were the most dignified in 
their age and most moderate in their lifestyle (καὶ ἡλικίᾳ σεμνοτάτοι καὶ βίῳ σωφρονεστάτοι, 6.1.2).16 
The direct moral comparison to Marcus has been explored by Hidber in detail.17 I add the response to 
Alexander as a further similarity: 
ἤρεσκέ τε τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ συγκλήτῳ βουλῇ, τὸ σχῆμα τῆς 
βασιλείας ἐκ τυραννίδος ἐφυβρίστου ἐς ἀριστοκρατίας τύπον μεταχθείσης (6.1.2). 
                                                             
15 See e.g. de Blois 2004: 561; Marasco 1998: 2857-63; Kuhn-Chen 2002: 315-22. 
16 As an example of his different use of political narrative from Dio, Herodian’s interest in imperial advisors is 
exclusively from a moral position. There is no mention of the social class of these men. This is about keeping a 
young emperor on track, rather than showing respect for the Senate. 





It pleased both the people and the soldiers, and also the Senate, that the form of rule changed 
from outrageous tyranny into a kind of aristocracy. 
The three groups of people, soldiers, and Senate were united in their support for an emperor who 
had re-established ἀριστοκρατία. Even the Senate – the group most likely to be affronted by the 
accession of a thirteen-year-old emperor18 – are in favour of the new ruler. It is the same expression 
of universal favour, expressed in the same terms. 
Such straightforward equivalence is accompanied by Herodian’s use of this social structure to create 
more subtle forms of comparison. The characterisation of Macrinus at the start of his reign directly 
refers back to Marcus Aurelius. Herodian writes that Macrinus grew a long beard and mumbled a lot, 
in an attempt to be philosophical. Though he sought out the daily habits of Marcus, he did not copy 
the rest of his lifestyle;19 he was in fact engaged in corrupt vices, which earned him the disdain of the 
soldiers (5.2.3-4). Unsurprisingly, this direct allusion to Marcus has often been noted.20 But again, the 
three social groups also confirm the nature of the new regime. Macrinus’ pretend virtue is mirrored 
in the lack of sincerity behind the support he received. The army was driven not by loyalty but by 
fear of Parthian invasion (4.14.3); the senators were not happy about his accession, but at their escape 
from Caracalla’s tyranny (5.2.1);21 and the people could only shout acclamations to an emperor who 
was absent from Rome (5.2.3).22 When Marcus died, he was mourned universally, and nobody lied (καὶ 
                                                             
18 The idea of youth as being easily corrupted is prevalent throughout Herodian’s characterisation of emperors, 
as discussed in Hidber 2006: 243-72. Alexander’s mother and aunt remedied this by appointing a council of 
experienced advisors, not unlike that recommended by Marcus himself before his death. 
19 ἐζήλου δὲ ταῦτα ὡς δὴ Μάρκου ἐπιτηδεύματα, τὸν δὲ λοιπὸν βίον οὐκ ἐμιμήσατο, 5.2.4; see also 1.3.1 for 
Marcus’ learned and virtuous ἐπιτηδεύματα, and 1.1.6 for Herodian’s general intent to describe the 
ἐπιτηδεύματα of emperors. 
20 e.g Sidebottom 1998: 2810; Zimmermann 1999b: 217; Hidber 2006: 216; Hellström 2015: 57. 
21 For a similar sentiment, see Dio 79[78].18.4. 
22 Herodian returns to the theme after Macrinus’ death, writing that he died while finally trying to get to Rome, 
as he should have done immediately (4.9.12). 
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οὐδεὶς ἐψεύδετο, 1.4.8); Macrinus created a reign in which nobody, emperor included, was telling the 
truth. 
The list goes on. Though total social cohesion may be limited, all but two claimants to power have 
some description of a reaction based on the three groups. Clodius Albinus appears as little more than 
a frontier general;23 Gordian III is afforded a single sentence to bring the History to an end.24 The 
remaining fourteen regimes, including the three described above, are all described at least once in 
these social terms. Many include the same kind of brief summaries which mention all three groups. 
They follow similar patterns of imperial characterisation. Pupienus and Balbinus (8.8.1), like Pertinax 
before them (2.4.1-4), enjoyed full support from the Senate and people, but were hated by the army. 
Both regimes were excellent in moral terms, but very quickly ended with the rulers’ assassinations. 
Conversely tyrants like Caracalla (4.5.2-5) and Elagabalus (5.5.1-2) relied on military support to quash 
any opposition, despite hatred from senators and the people.  
When Herodian describes the responses of the Senate, the army, and the people towards their new 
emperors, he is not merely recording the attitudes of different social groups. As is established from 
the death of Marcus Aurelius at the very outset of the History, these responses are part of an 
organisation of material which focuses on emperors. They are tools in the characterisation of rulers. 
It becomes possible to make easy comparisons between emperors – and in particular those who either 
relied on or lacked military support. Marcus is therefore important not only in the introduction of 
Herodian’s general concern with imperial character. The account of his death also establishes the 
means through which themes will be explored. The presentation of Roman society is one aspect 
within Herodian’s structural scheme. The same three groups appear repeatedly, in a historical 
interpretation which prioritises universal action. Herodian begins by saying that he will write an 
                                                             
23 Albinus has no real character in the History beyond being simple enough to be tricked into accepting the title 
of Caesar (2.15.1-5). The civil war is told entirely from Severus’ perspective (3.5-7); cf. the detailed account of 
Niger’s panic when he heard that Severus was approaching, and his attempts to prepare his army (3.1). See 
Zimmermann 1999b: 189-94. 





account κατὰ χρόνους καὶ δυναστείας (1.1.6). His creation of a social structure is part of an interest 
not in the three groups themselves, but how they fit into the δυναστεῖαι he relates. 
Social Groups and Episodic Comparisons 
The explicit description of the three groups’ attitudes towards emperors introduces the idea that 
they are involved in the characterisation of emperors, but that is only a starting point. The 
connection between social structure and imperial character runs much deeper in Herodian’s 
narrative world. It can already be seen in an aspect of the History which has often perplexed scholars. 
Herodian’s anonymity has a particular effect in a structure which emphasises comparisons. Part of 
the difficulty in establishing his social background is the lack of evident connection to any one of the 
main social groups he describes.25 As Adam Kemezis has made clear, this self-occlusion from the 
narrative has a rhetorical effect beyond the creation of uncertainty. It enables Herodian to claim an 
omniscience which would not be possible for an identifiable individual, while rejecting the idea that 
a specific social stance holds the key to a legitimate explanation of events.26 It also has an effect on 
Herodian’s interests in comparing emperors. The lack of association with any particular social 
perspective ensures that the emperor’s position is the sole element of continuity. There is no 
expectation that Herodian will pay closer attention to any of the other three groups, creating a 
neutral baseline on which imperial activity can be constructed. He presents an external view of Rome, 
which at least appears free from the social biases which are common in the elite world of literature. 
Herodian’s capacity as a moral judge is as universal as Marcus’ qualities. 
As universal judge, Herodian’s verdicts on emperors are just as far-reaching. They extend into the 
very structure of his narrative world. The preceding introductory chapter set out the organisation of 
the History into individual episodes, with repeated scene types and motifs running across its full 
                                                             
25 See above, 121 n. 3. 
26 Kemezis 2014: 260-72; cf. Dio’s senatorial claims. Kemezis argues that this represents a profoundly negative 
worldview, in which there is nothing to be gained from being associated with the higher levels of Roman 




span.27 The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of one specific motif, which is 
associated with a particular recurring scene. Within Herodian’s narrative of imperial succession, 
almost all emperors engage in some form of procession. The scenes follow the same general pattern. 
They usually involve an acclamation at the praetorian camp; sacrifices; a procession to the palace; 
and some kind of speech before the Senate.28 As with the examples discussed by other scholars, these 
moments are directly comparable. The Senate, army, and people are not passive audiences. They are 
given an active role in establishing particularly vivid comparisons between the emperors involved. 
Herodian’s social groups provide the supporting cast for the almost cinematic performance of 
imperial character, not just from their opinions, but through the description of their actions as scenes 
progress. 
The clarity that the social groups provide can be seen in the processions which occur during 
Herodian’s account of 193. There are four in total: three in Rome, led by Pertinax, Didius Julianus, and 
Septimius Severus; and a fourth involving Pescennius Niger in Antioch. There are clear and well-
documented comparisons between the four men on a moralising level, as is made clear by Pertinax 
and Julianus. Summed up bluntly, and wholly in keeping with the depiction of Marcus Aurelius, they 
are characterised as σεμνός (Pertinax, 2.4.1) and ασεμνός (Julianus, 2.7.1).29 This extends to their 
movements through the city. Pitcher has noted that both men begin their respective scenes at home, 
but soon diverge in their actions. Pertinax at first thinks that he is going to be executed on 
Commodus’ orders, but nevertheless delivers a speech of great dignity (2.1.5-7); Julianus is drunk, and 
persuaded to make an attempt for power by his corrupt companions (2.6.6-7).30 Septimius Severus is 
then marked out by his readiness to invade Italy, in comparison to both the cowardly Julianus, and 
                                                             
27 Above, 124-25. 
28 Not all occurrences of this motif include all of these elements; see Sidebottom 1998: 2815 n. 191 for similar 
variation in formulaic revolt scenes. 
29 Summed up most clearly in Zimmermann 1999b: 151-70. 





the complacent Niger.31 The morality of individual emperors is very much at the forefront of these 
scenes. 
Beyond their personal traits, all four emperors are characterised by a repeated combination of two 
features. The processions themselves relate spatial transitions through Rome or Antioch, which are 
then illustrated through the actions of the social groups around them. The accession of Pertinax 
provides the first instance. When Pertinax was offered power by Laetus and Eclectus, they first went 
to the camp in order to win over the soldiers (2.2.1). After the soldiers reluctantly agreed to support 
Pertinax due to popular pressure, he was led to the palace by all the people and the soldiers, who 
were carrying laurels (δαφνηφοροῦντες πᾶς ὁ δῆμος καὶ τὸ στρατιωτικόν, 2.2.10). Before describing 
the emperor’s interaction with the Senate, Herodian again refers to the two groups accompanying 
Pertinax through Rome, saying that he will describe what happened after the soldiers and people 
conducted him to the palace (ἐν τῇ βασιλείῳ ἑστίᾳ τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῦ δήμου… νύκτωρ 
ἀναγαγόντων, 2.3.1). The connection between group activity and physical movement is paralleled in 
the Senate’s eventual reaction. In one voice, they all acclaimed Pertinax emperor (πάντες 
ὁμοθυμαδὸν, 2.3.3), after which he delivered a speech. He was then led to offer sacrifices at the 
temples, before being accompanied back to the palace again (2.3.9). Each stage of Pertinax’s spatial 
progression is marked out by the three social groups. The soldiers unwillingly acquiesce to his reign, 
while the people and Senate are delighted. Pertinax’s movement through Rome in the History is 
marked out by celebratory crowds, though always with a threat of military discontent lurking in the 
background. The attitudes which will define his short reign and assassination are not only described, 
but also performed. 
The contrast with the next imperial procession is striking. Famously, Julianus bought power from the 
Praetorian Guard after the assassination of Pertinax.32 What follows is a reversal of the previous 
scene, with the same social groups at its core. Herodian writes that Julianus was rightly afraid that 
                                                             
31 Zimmermann 1999b: 171-88; Hidber 2006: 203-10. 
32 Herodian is more restrained than Dio in his depiction of the event. Rather than Dio’s bidding war (74[73].11.3-
5), Herodian claims that the Praetorians would not trust Sulpicianus, and so only dealt with Julianus (2.6.8-11).  
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he would face opposition from the people (εἰκότως ἐδεδίει τὸν δῆμον ὡς ἐναντιωσόμενον, 2.6.12).33 
But there is more of a difference than just a shift from the earlier festive atmosphere: 
ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς πανοπλίας καὶ φράξαντες αὑτοὺς οἱ στρατιῶται ἐς φάλαγγος σχῆμα ὡς, 
εἰ δέοι, καὶ πολεμήσοντες, ἐν μέσοις αὑτοῖς ἔχοντες τὸν ἴδιον βασιλέα, ὑπέρ τε τῆς κεφαλῆς 
αἰωροῦντες τὰς ἀσπίδας καὶ τὰ δόρατα, μή που καὶ λίθων τις βολὴ ἀπὸ τῶν δωμάτων ἐπὶ τῇ 
πομπῇ γένοιτο, ἀνήγαγον αὐτὸν ἐς τὰ βασίλεια, μηδενὸς τῶν δημοτῶν μήτε ἀντιστῆναι 
τολμῶντος μήτε μὴν εὐφημοῦντος ὥσπερ εἰώθασι προπέμπειν τοὺς βασιλέας (2.6.13). 
Therefore the soldiers took up all their arms and came together in the form of a phalanx, so 
that they could fight, if necessary. They surrounded their own emperor, holding their shields 
and spears above their heads, in case anyone threw rocks from the houses onto the 
procession, and led him to the palace. None of the people dared to stand in their way, but nor 
did they cheer as they normally would to escort emperors. 
It is not simply the case that Julianus was personally corrupt, or that he went to the palace with an 
armed guard. Pertinax had muted support from soldiers who had put aside their arms (2.2.9), but the 
complete favour of the people. Julianus faced the opposite situation. Rather than laurels, Julianus was 
surrounded by the apparatus of war, hidden in the middle of a military formation. The soldiers were 
willing to protect him against popular hostility. They had their own private ruler, an ἴδιος βασιλεύς, 
who had risen to power through a private transaction, as opposed to a public appointment. The 
people in turn took on the role of unwillingly being forced to accept the new emperor.34 There was 
no active resistance to the armed troops, but nor did anyone engage in the standard welcoming of a 
                                                             
33 For a comprehensive survey of moments when fear dictates the actions of emperors, including both Julianus 
and Pertinax, see Opelt 1998: 2928-36. 






new ruler.35 The result is a highly visual form of comparison between the two emperors and their 
progressions to the palace.  
In some respects, the next procession seems to correct the conflict between the military and the 
people. Pescennius Niger heard the news from Rome that the people were calling for him to become 
emperor while he was in Syria (2.7). Unlike the unwilling acquiescence of the soldiers under Pertinax, 
or the people under Julianus, Niger appears to have been able to secure both. He delivered a speech 
to the army and the Antiochenes (2.8.2-5), followed by a procession (2.8.6). Immediately, εὐθέως, the 
whole army and the assembled crowd declared him emperor. There is no hesitation from either 
group, nor any hint of dishonesty. But there is a problem. The procession which followed occurs in 
the wrong place. Niger was accompanied to temples, like the earlier emperors, but in his case, they 
are specifically the ones in Antioch (τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἀντιοχείας). This becomes more pronounced when 
the procession reached an equivalent of the imperial palace. Herodian writes that they went to 
Niger’s own house, which was now called the palace, and decorated it with the symbols of imperial 
power.36 The scene follows the same pattern of visual imagery confirming the general nature of a 
rule. The crowd are described as decorating the house on the outside, κοσμήσαντες ἔξωθεν. It looked 
like an imperial palace, just as the procession looked like an imperial accession in Rome. But external 
appearances could not mask the reality that it was only ever a pretence. Niger’s power began as 
provincial and ephemeral, a fitting opening to a usurpation which would never secure authority over 
Rome.37 
                                                             
35 For the sake of completion, the Senate are omitted entirely from Herodian’s version of the accession; cf. the 
senators’ fear and Julianus’ highly self-laudatory speech in Dio 74[73].12. 
36 οὐκέτι αὐτὴν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀλλὰ βασίλειον αὐλὴν νομίζοντες, πᾶσι κοσμήσαντες ἔξωθεν βασιλικοῖς συμβόλοις. 
37 Gordian’s acclamation in Carthage results in a similar scene, with a procession which includes local men 
dressed up as Praetorians, and the claim that the city looked like Rome for a short time (7.6.2). See Buongiorno 
2014: esp. 69-70 (Niger), 75-76 (Gordian) for the contrast between being acclaimed emperor and actually 
attaining ἀρχή. I would however suggest that the difference within Herodian’s narrative is in gaining practical 
authority, rather than Buongiorno’s suggestion of a formal process of recognition by the Senate. Gordian I was 
formally appointed by the Senate (7.7.2), but that was not enough for him to gain ἀρχή. 
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Beneath the presentation of a false Rome, there is a striking point of further divergence. The two 
earlier processions involve the army and the people, who are labelled the δῆμος. This is not the case 
for Niger’s attempted accession. The groups in 2.7.6 are τὸ στρατιωτικὸν πᾶν καὶ τὸ συνειλεγμένον 
πλῆθος, the whole army and the assembled crowd. This is not a simple shift in terminology. 
Throughout the scene, Herodian contrasts the people in Antioch with the δῆμος of Rome. Niger heard 
about the opinion of the Roman people, τῆς τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαίων γνώμης (2.7.6); he could then only 
assemble the soldiers and the rest of the people in the East, τοῖς λοιποῖς κατὰ τὴν ἀνατολὴν 
ἀνθρώποις (2.7.7). Niger was able to secure support from the Σύροι (2.7.8), but his speech asserting 
legitimacy contains references to both Ῥωμαῖοι (2.8.2) and ὅ τε Ῥωμαίων δῆμος (2.8.4). As with 
Pertinax and Julianus, it is the δῆμος in Rome whose opinion is important. But it is absent from Niger’s 
acclamation. The spatial discord between Antioch and Rome is reflected in the lack of correct popular 
involvement. Niger’s house is a false palace, and his crowd of supporters is equally a false δῆμος. 
Herodian’s report of 193 concludes with the accession of Septimius Severus in Rome. His procession 
includes a more standard itinerary. He arrived at the city gates, then offered sacrifices at the temple 
of Jupiter and ‘the other appropriate temples for emperors’,38 before going to the palace; he gave a 
speech to the Senate in the curia on the following day (2.14.1-3). It forms a sort of middle ground 
between the three scenes which precede it in book 2. Though they are not in battle formation, the 
soldiers’ presence is enough to create an atmosphere of fear.39 But the people and Senate also go on 
to play a more positive role in the scene. Both groups greet Severus in a much more festive setting, 
bearing laurels as the people and soldiers had done for Pertinax (ὁ δὲ δῆμος καὶ ἡ σύγκλητος 
δαφνηφοροῦντες, 2.14.1).40 If they had been cowed by their terror at the emperor’s arrival, then even 
this is a demonstration of Severus’ greater success in establishing his position than the derision aimed 
at Julianus. The universal involvement of all three groups confirms the reality of Severus’ power, 
                                                             
38 ἔν τε τοῖς λοιποῖς ἱεροῖς νόμῳ βασιλικῷ καλλιερήσας (2.14.2). 
39 They are gripped with two types of fear, ἔκπληξις and δέος. See Opelt 1998 on fear in Herodian, 2941-43 on 
Severus. 
40 Following a formula established when Commodus returned to Rome in 180. The people and Senate came out 





compared to the pretence of Niger’s Antiochene reign. Severus may have shown too much favour to 
the military to be considered a morally respectable ruler.41 But his procession through Rome in the 
History shows the comparative strength of his position. All three social groups are seen playing their 
role; if there is any deception, it is from Severus claiming that he will return to the days of Marcus 
Aurelius, rather than from any of the groups he ruled.42 
The detail of the four processions in 193 has led to some historians claiming that they are a valuable 
account of what took place in Rome. David Potter has preferred Herodian’s record of Julianus’ rise to 
power, rejecting Dio’s more rhetorically extreme account of the auction of Rome.43 Maria Schettino 
has gone further, arguing that the detailed description of events in the praetorian camp suggests that 
Herodian had a source who was in the Praetorian Guard.44 But these are not simple records of what 
happened in Rome or the eastern provinces. Herodian’s account is shaped around easily comparable 
social groups, taking part in the same formulaic processions. The four emperors are at the centre of 
everything. They are clearly compared through Herodian’s comments on their individual character, 
as has been observed elsewhere.45 That comparison extends into the actual events of 193 as well. The 
interaction between the emperor and the three social groups creates a series of easily comparable 
tableaux, which are demonstrative of the emperor’s rule as a whole. Pertinax was respected, and fell 
victim to military corruption; Julianus was slovenly, using the pretence of wealth to gain military 
support which immediately deserted him; Niger tarried in the East, content with a sham reign; and 
Septimius Severus used fear and deception to secure power. 
                                                             
41 Summarised in de Blois 1998a: 3417 as a competent general who took his military exploits too far as emperor. 
More detailed studies include Zimmermann 1999b: 171-203; Hekster 2017; Pitcher 2018b: 243-48. 
42 2.14.3-4. Herodian follows the same general theme in Severus’ speech as Dio (75[74].2.1-2), though with less 
detail. According to both authors he promised not to kill senators, but was lying.  
43 Dio 74[73].11. Potter 2014: 96-97; cf. Appelbaum 2007: 201-203 for the view that Herodian exaggerated Dio’s 
narrative, in an interpretation which favours HA Did. Iul. 2.6. 
44 Schettino 2017: 88. 
45 See above, 138-39 n. 29-31. 
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The number of processions in 193 makes it especially helpful to elucidate Herodian’s comparative 
scheme, but they are not restricted to that one year. Herodian is consistent in presenting these scenes 
in a way which closely corresponds to the defining aspects of the reign in question. Caracalla and 
Geta return to Rome seemingly in good order, proceeding through Rome with the Senate and the 
people carrying laurels.46 The temporary nature of their agreement is then demonstrated by their 
return to the imperial palace, which was immediately divided into two separate buildings. A calm 
start is followed by immediate distrust in the procession scene, reflecting their brief shared rule.47 
Severus Alexander leaves Rome to go to war with Persia, with all three groups providing an escort. 
In anticipation of his failure in the eastern campaigns, the scene is one of universal despair, inverting 
the familiar image of cheering crowds.48 The foreign traditions of Elagabalus are actively performed 
in the narrative. Elagabalus led the stone which represented his eponymous god in a procession 
through the streets of Rome, running in front of it himself. Rather than the emperor, an eastern deity 
was at the centre of the scene. Both the army and the people also took part. The non-Roman imperial 
procession ended with the deaths of many onlookers, killed in a rush for goods thrown down to them 
by the emperor. Eastern disruption is put on display.49  
The exploration of emperors is at the core of these procession scenes. In an organisational scheme 
which places the comparison of emperors at its heart, Herodian’s three social groups are integral to 
the illustration of the differences between reigns. It is not simply that their attitudes are recorded. 
Their actions in the History are readily comparable across different reigns. Within this structuring of 
his narrative world, Herodian goes a long way beyond simply imposing moralising themes onto 
political events. His interest in emperors underpins the very manner in which he presents them. 
                                                             
46 With the same use of δαφνηφορῶν to depict the people’s involvement. 








The connection between Herodian’s portrayal of emperors and his construction of Roman society has 
serious consequences for the History’s political narrative. The comparison between different scenes 
relies on the identification of the three core concepts: the emperor himself, who is perhaps the most 
obvious protagonist in any given scene; the type of scene being portrayed; and the participants who 
provide the backdrop for the vignette, surrounding the emperor. The formation of effective 
comparisons is therefore aided by the simplistic representation of politics. As the procession scenes 
discussed above make clear, Herodian’s repeated scenes are differentiated primarily through the 
configuration of the three social groups. The composition of the groups themselves does not change. 
They are presented as entirely homogenous, and consistent across the full extent of the History. 
Unsurprisingly, in a narrative which is built primarily around civil war and attempted conspiracies, 
there are moments of tension between Herodian’s comparative scheme and the coherence of his 
account. Where they occur, his thematic concerns trump any need for plot consistency, highlighting 
the extent to which the depiction of a political environment is secondary to Herodian’s concentration 
on emperors. 
The most straightforward group to analyse in the History is the Roman people. Several scholars have 
investigated Herodian’s portrayal of popular activity, especially in relation to his attitude towards 
the people.50 But the depiction of the people can also demonstrate some of the methods used to define 
social groups. Herodian’s people are a simple entity, but that does not make their presentation 
simple. Throughout Herodian’s narrative, their actions are united: at no point is there any suggestion 
of different popular groups with varying opinions. Indeed, their opinion is shared even when it is 
inconsistent. In book 1, Herodian describes how the people hate Commodus owing to an array of 
omens, and a major fire in the city (1.14.7); shortly after, he writes that the people still favoured the 
emperor, only to oppose him due to his appearances in the amphitheatre (1.15.7). Herodian’s 
terminology is consistent too. They are usually ὁ δῆμος, with occasional uses of the related δημότης 
                                                             
50 e.g. Sidebottom 1998: 2822-26; Kuhn-Chen 2002: 315-17; de Blois 2003: 152-53. 
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and δημώδης.51 Herodian does sometimes refer to an ὄχλος, but its appearance is highly 
concentrated, used to create a contrast between trained soldiers and ad hoc militias,52 or to describe 
the rioting in Rome in book 7.53  
As clear as the definition of the people is, it is also restrictive. The dēmos is almost always located in 
the city of Rome.54 Pescennius Niger’s procession through Antioch has already provided one example 
of Herodian externalising the assembled crowd, τὸ πλῆθος συνειλεγμένον, from the legitimate dēmos 
in the capital.55 There is popular involvement in his uprising, however, in relation to his downfall. 
Antioch gains a dēmos to reinforce Niger’s defeat by Septimius Severus. When Niger returned to the 
city, he was not met by the laurel-bearing crowds who greeted Severus at Rome (2.14.1), but instead 
finds that the remaining people, τὸν λοιπὸν δῆμον, had all run away. The scene is not one of festive 
celebration, but universal despair (3.4.6). The comparison between Severus and Niger is clear from 
the general mood, and reinforced by the very different role of the dēmos. This extends to other 
examples. When Maximinus invaded Italy, the dēmoi of the northern cities fled (8.1.5), before the 
dēmos of Aquileia resisted him (8.2.3; 8.3.3). Those same Italian populations welcomed Septimius 
Severus in 193 (2.11.6) and Pupienus in 238, after Maximinus’ death (8.6.5). The decision to call a group 
of people the dēmos is made selectively, and is connected to the wider scheme of imperial 
comparisons which underpins the History.56 
                                                             
51 A word-search of the text results in 136 mentions in total, with 124 of δῆμος itself.  
52 When Maximinus invaded Italy, he besieged Aquileia with an army; the Aquileians were an ὄχλος (8.2-3). 
53 7.7, 7.9-12. The sole exception of nineteen total instances comes when Elagabalus throws down gifts to the 
crowds, τοῖς ὄχλοις, at the end of his orientalising procession through Rome (5.6.9).  
54 Of the 136 examples, only twelve refer to people outside the capital. 
55 The use of πλῆθος is extremely varied in the History, referring to the size of any group. This ranges from the 
dēmos itself, which uses its size to cow the soldiers into supporting Pertinax (2.2.9), to assembled senators 
(1.17.2), to the number of logs on Septimius Severus’ funerary pyre (4.2.10). 
56 See elsewhere Caracalla’s massacre of the Alexandrians, which begins with the emperor being welcomed by 





Herodian’s depiction of the people sets out an approach which becomes more complex with the other 
two groups. The dēmos is easily identifiable, and always acts as a unified collective. Even when the 
people are located outside the limits of Rome, their interaction with emperors follows a consistent 
pattern of comparisons between rulers. Away from the people, this is less straightforward. The army 
and the Senate usually appear as homogenous groups, but that is not always the case. Both are 
described as divided at various points in the History. Even so, it is striking how consistently Herodian 
maintains the impression of unity. His approach is similar to the overall ‘streamlining’ of events 
described by Adam Kemezis.57 Where division is unavoidable, it is included in the narrative, but only 
to a minimal degree. The homogenous groups are at most either restored as quickly as possible, or, 
more frequently, not even acknowledged to have been divided at all. 
One approach used by Herodian closely resembles Cassius Dio’s construction of the Senate in his 
Roman History: sections of the group are externalised, separated from a collective which remains 
unified. The clearest example comes from Herodian’s portrayal of the army during the short reign of 
Pupienus and Balbinus in 238.58 After Maximinus was killed by the army outside the walls of Aquileia, 
the new co-emperors are involved in related procession scenes which look entirely familiar to those 
discussed above. Herodian follows the progression of the severed head of Maximinus as it was 
transported through Italy (8.6.6-8). It first came to Pupienus in Ravenna, where it was announced 
                                                             
Carthage (7.4.5); Capelianus, the general loyal to Maximinus, takes his army to kill both the leading figures and 
the people of other cities in North Africa (7.9.11). 
57 Above, 124 n. 20. 
58 Herodian’s terminology for the army is much less specific than the people. An army as a mass of troops is 
generally ὁ στρατός or τὸ στράτευμα, while a more abstract group is either οἱ στρατιῶται or τὸ στρατιωτικόν. 
The latter two are open to different meanings, depending on the immediate context. In Rome, they generally 
seem to refer to the Praetorians (both terms are used during Pertinax’s acclamation at the camp, 2.2.3-10), 
though this is very rarely specified. Note however 1.12.8, and the appearance of ‘the infantry soldiers of the 
city’ (οἱ τῆς πόλεως πεζοὶ στρατιῶται), in reference to the urban cohort; 2.13.1-2, where there is a contrast 
between ‘the soldiers in Rome’ (τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ στρατιώτας) and ‘the camp’ (τὸ στρατόπεδον), the latter 
referring to the Praetorians. See Roques 1990b: 64-68 for more detail. 
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that the army now agreed with the Roman people (ὁ στρατὸς τὰ Ῥωμαίων φρονεῖ). Everyone 
celebrated. The head was then sent to Rome, where Balbinus himself made sacrifices alongside the 
Senate, while the people ran to the circus ‘as if possessed’.59 Pupienus then travelled to Aquileia, 
where he was met with many of the standard actions seen under other emperors. Delegations came 
out of the city carrying laurels, along with the now disarmed soldiers who had been besieging the 
city. Such a welcome was deceptive: the troops were angry that the Senate had chosen new emperors 
(8.7.1-2). When Pupienus returned to Rome with part of the army, he was met by the Senate and 
people, who welcomed him as though he were celebrating a triumph.60 It is no surprise to find that 
the joint-rulers were popular among the Senate and people as their reign began, but hated by the 
soldiers (8.8.1); nor is it a surprise when that military opposition leads to their deaths (8.8.3-6). This 
appears to be an entirely standard example of Herodian’s social scheme in action.  
But things are not quite this straightforward. The death of Pupienus and Balbinus is predicated on 
divisions within the Roman army which Herodian minimises. Pupienus brought with him a personal 
bodyguard made up of German soldiers. Their presence is integral to the plot of the joint rule, 
infuriating the soldiers: 
οἱ μέντοι στρατιῶται διοίδαινον τὰς ψυχάς, καὶ οὔτε ταῖς εὐφημίαις τοῦ δήμου ἠρέσκοντο, 
ἐβαροῦντό τε αὐτῶν αὐτὴν τὴν εὐγένειαν, καὶ ἠγανάκτουν ὅτι ἄρα ἔχοιεν ἐκ συγκλήτου 
βασιλέας. ἐλύπουν δὲ αὐτους καὶ οἱ Γερμανοὶ παρόντες τῷ Μαξίμῳ ἔν τῇ Ῥώμῃ διατρίβοντες 
(8.8.1-2). 
The soldiers however seethed internally and were not happy with the praise given by the 
people. They disliked their noble birth and were angry that they could have emperors chosen 
by the Senate. And the Germans staying alongside Pupienus in Rome angered them. 
                                                             
59 ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶντες, 8.6.8. The location creates its own very positive comparison with the people’s appeals 
to Niger (2.7.3) and their slaughter by Caracalla (4.6.4) in the same place. 





Angered by the presence of Pupienus’ German bodyguard in Rome, the Praetorians barged into the 
palace to murder the emperors. Pupienus tried to summon his German allies, but was stopped by 
Balbinus, who was afraid that it was part of a plot by his colleague to gain sole power. As a result, both 
men were killed. The basic narrative is about two opposing military units struggling for supremacy, 
and yet Herodian still presents a unified army. Herodian can say flatly that the soldiers opposed the 
new regime, even as he has just referred to a bodyguard which has a personal loyalty to Pupienus 
(8.7.8). 
The effect depends on a strict definition of the army, which portrays the Germans as a completely 
separate group. From the outset, they are introduced as separate from the Roman military. Pupienus 
has a Γερμανῶν συμμαχία, an allied force of Germans (8.6.6). The ethnic aspect is not rare in the 
History. Many armies are described in these terms, such as Severus’ Illyrian soldiers fighting civil wars 
against the easterners of Niger (3.2-4) or the Britons of Albinus (3.7.2-3).61 It is rather their status as 
allies which marks them out. Σύμμαχοι are always external to Rome in Herodian. They are either 
from beyond frontiers, such as Pescennius Niger’s attempts to gain support from Parthia, Armenia 
and Hatra,62 or referred to as an additional force alongside the Roman στρατός.63 That distinction 
                                                             
61 Herodian’s tendency to provide an ethnic descriptor has led to claims that he saw Illyrians and Pannonians 
as vital to the disturbances of the third century; Šašel Kos 1986: 434; Alföldy 1989: 100; de Blois 1998a: 3420-24. 
Sidebottom 1998: 2793 effectively dispels any claims for their particular quality within the History. It is worth 
noting that these definitions are flexible, depending on the contrast being emphasised. Severus’ army is 
‘Illyrian’ when fighting Niger, but then ‘Roman’ after his invasion of Parthia (3.9.3-12). 
62 2.8.8, 3.1.1-3; see also Severus’ troops from Osrhoene (3.9.2), and Caracalla’s German allies from beyond the 
Danube (4.7.2). 
63 Severus is described leading many allies and nearly the whole Roman army (3.6.6); some of Maximinus’ 
foreign soldiers are subjects, other friends and allies (7.2.1); so too his German allies come from defeated 
opponents or friends and allies (7.8.10, mentioned again at 8.1.3). The apparent exception sees the soldiers in 
Rome called the allies of Maximinus by the senator Gallicanus – even here, they are made foreign, described as 




remains consistent throughout the murder scene. While it is true that Herodian identifies the 
Praetorians specifically, they are also referred to simply as soldiers (στρατιῶται).64 The same cannot 
be said for the Germans. They are mentioned explicitly on seven occasions in total, as simply ‘the 
Germans’ (Γερμανοί), or ‘the German allies’ (some variation on σύμμαχοι).65 The distinction is 
especially clear when the emperors are killed. After debating the value of German help (8.8.5), ‘the 
soldiers all rushed in, in one mind’ (εἰσδραμόντες οἱ στρατιῶται ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἅπαντες, 8.8.6). These 
are the murderers, contrasted again with the Germans who can do nothing to stop them (8.8.7). The 
Praetorians were part of the Roman army in Herodian’s structure of the empire; Pupienus’ bodyguard 
was not.  
On one level, there is a clear inconsistency in Herodian’s description of Pupienus and Balbinus, and 
their assassination. It is evident that the German bodyguard was part of the army, and it has been 
suggested that they were probably auxiliary vexillations from the army on the Rhine.66 But whatever 
their historical origin, the defining element of the German troops is their externality to the army. 
Focusing solely on the apparent plot-holes of Herodian’s narrative misses the point. His insistence 
that the Germans were not soldiers is entirely in keeping with the wider organisation of society in 
the History. By making all the soldiers opposed to the senatorial co-emperors, Herodian maintains the 
basis for comparisons with other regimes. The impression of homogeneity is key to facilitating this. 
Along with familiar tropes like laurels and soldiers in their peacetime attire, the clear delineation of 
the three social groups creates a variety of comparative options. The image of Pertinax comes to mind 
as a direct equivalent, another senator who alienated the army and paid with his life. But it also 
demonstrates the contrast to emperors like Severus Alexander and Marcus Aurelius, with their 
universal, honest support. If the narrative acknowledged the divisions within the army itself, such 
juxtapositions of emperors would become more difficult. Alienating certain bodies within the army 
                                                             
64 Over the full narrative (8.8.1-7) they are soldiers twice (8.8.1, 8.8.6) and πραιτωριανοί three times (8.8.5 twice, 
8.8.7). Elsewhere, the Praetorians are usually a more traditionally Hellenic bodyguard, δορυφόροι; the only 
other time they are πραιτωριανοί is at 5.4.8. 
65 They are the Germans at 8.8.2, 8.8.5 and 8.8.7 (twice), and the German allies at 8.6.6, 8.7.8 and 8.8.5. 





is much less forceful than all the soldiers (οἱ στρατιῶται ἅπαντες). The modern reader, looking to 
reconstruct the events of 238, might be frustrated by Herodian’s lack of consistency and hyperbole. 
But both are important to the aims of a narrative which is primarily interested in how the army can 
be used to explore emperors, rather than an accurate presentation of how individual units were 
involved. Self-evidently within the narrative itself, Pupienus was not hated by everyone in the 
military. But in Herodian’s construction of Rome, all στρατιῶται need to view the co-emperors with 
disdain. 
In the exclusion of particular military bodies from the united collective of the army, Herodian is 
relatively subtle in his maintenance of homogeneity. As an example of senatorial activity will show, 
the inconsistencies in the History can be much more brazen. Herodian’s political elite is much more 
homogenous than even Dio’s. Such is the Senate’s coherence that there is no word for an individual 
senator in the History. They are ἡ σύγκλητος βουλὴ, or simply ἡ σύγκλητος;67 individual members are 
referred to as being part of that homogenous group.68 Even more so than the people, the Senate is 
exclusively located in the city of Rome; individual ‘men from the Senate’ are found in the provinces, 
but the Senate acts collectively from the capital alone. Herodian also seems to have had little concern 
with the role of the equestrians in relation to political life. They are mentioned only seven times, 
usually as τὸ ἱππικὸν τάγμα, and almost always have a direct connection with senators.69 The political 
elite in Herodian’s Rome is monolithic in its unity of mind and experience. 
                                                             
67 Roques 1990b: 47-49. 
68 In elaborate periphrasis, Albinus is neither a senator nor a patrician, but ‘a man by birth from the nobility of 
the Senate’, ἀνὴρ τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου εὐπατριδῶν (2.15.1); Gallicanus is simply ‘a man from the 
Senate’, τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου ἀνὴρ (7.11.3). See also e.g. Quadratus and Quintianus, both τῆς βουλῆς (1.8.6); Severus 
Alexander’s sixteen advisors, τῆς συγκλήτου βουλῆς (6.1.2); Capelianus, τῶν ἀπὸ συγκλήτου (7.9.1). 
69 Four references connect the equestrians directly to the Senate, with a combination of the σύγκλητος and the 
ἱππικὸν τάγμα (4.2.4; 5.5.9; 5.7.7; 7.7.5). A fifth group of young men from the equestrian order accompany 
Pupienus and Balbinus as an armed guard, immediately after they have been appointed by the Senate (7.10.7). 
The equestrians act as a separate group in the funeral of Septimius Severus, when the whole equestrian order 
(πᾶν τὸ ἱππικὸν τάγμα) rides around in formation (4.2.9 – notably just after they have been connected to the 
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Macrinus is the only apparent exception, and in many respects he proves the rule. In a letter to the 
Senate, Herodian has Macrinus attempt to justify his appointment by contrasting his qualities as 
someone from the equestrian order, ἐκ τῆς ἱππάδος τάξεως, with the good fortune of those who were 
of noble birth (5.1.5). This is the only mention of Macrinus’ equestrian status in the History, and it is 
ultimately proved wholly irrelevant. The Senate’s only involvement under Macrinus is to acclaim him 
emperor; his death was due to the alienation of the soldiers, who were affronted by his extravagance; 
there is no mention of his social status whatsoever (5.2.5-6). In contrast to Dio’s insistence that 
Macrinus’ equestrian status was the root of his problem,70 Herodian seems unconcerned about the 
distinction. 
There is however one moment in the History when the Senate appears to be divided. When Caracalla 
and Geta began their joint rule, they quickly descended into mutual hatred (4.3). This is reflected in 
a split among ‘everyone who had a position of rank or honour’ (ὅσοι ἐν ἀξιώσει ἢ τιμῇ τινὶ, 4.3.2). The 
climax of their division is a plan to divide the entire empire in two (4.3.5-9). The concept of senatorial 
unity forms parts of the representation of Rome. Just as the empire’s territory would be split in half, 
so too the Senate would be broken up on geographical lines (4.3.6). After Geta’s death, it briefly looks 
like the division will continue. Caracalla went to the senate house, where he delivered a speech and 
threatened all of Geta’s friends (4.5, esp. 4.5.7). There is no explicit mention of different groups of 
senators, but the location not just in Rome, but in the senate house itself, leaves no room for doubt 
that the rift between the brothers extended to the Senate as well.71 The events which secure 
                                                             
Senate at 4.2.4, in the same funerary context). A final reference to πᾶν τὸ ἱππικὸν τάγμα apparently refers to 
the cavalry in Rome, called in during the reign of Commodus to suppress a riot (1.13.3). It is considered a later 
interpolation; Stavenhagen 1922: 25; Whittaker 1969-70 I: 82; Lucarini 2005: 19. Roques 1990b: 49 notes the lack 
of detail with disappointment: ‘Tels sont les maigres renseignements qu’Hérodien fournit sur le rouage 
essential de la société romaine du IIIe siècle.’ 
70 See esp. Dio 79[78]. 41. 
71 For an attempt to reconstruct a ‘pro-Geta faction’ from senators and imperial officials in Rome (including 






Caracalla’s sole rule, however, are formulated around a procession through Rome which conforms to 
all expectations. Caracalla hurried to the camp, throwing the people into a state of confusion in his 
haste,72 and secured the support of the soldiers by raising their pay and distributing money (4.4.4-8), 
and he leads a heavily armed military force through the streets to the senate house.73 His speech in 
the Senate is followed by attacks against the Senate and the people, using the army as his prime tool 
(4.5.2-5). Any suggestion of division among senators is quickly obliterated.  
We can see how Herodian unwrites the disunity by looking more closely at the experience of the 
senators themselves. After removing Geta and threatening his friends in the senate house, Caracalla 
unleashed his anger universally: 
τῆς τε συγκλήτου βουλῆς ὅσοι γένει ἢ πλούτῳ ὑπερεῖχον, ἐπὶ βραχυτάταις ἢ οὐδ’ ὑφεστώσαις 
αἰτίαις ἐκ τῆς τυχούσης διαβολῆς, ὡς ἐκείνου φίλοι, ἀνῃροῦντο (4.6.2). 
Anyone in the Senate who stood out by birth or wealth was killed as [Geta’s] friend, based on 
any slanderous attack at all that put forward the most trivial or non-existent charges. 
Though the excuse for attacking senators was their affiliation with Geta, in reality everyone in the 
Senate faced the same danger. The generic ὅσοι were accused as though they really were his 
supporters. The point is reinforced in a list of Caracalla’s victims which follows: ‘If there was anyone 
who was connected to the imperial household, or who was of noble descent in the Senate, he killed 
them all.’74 Herodian returns to his universalising tendencies, describing a scene in which everyone 
of note risked death. The focus on Geta’s friends during the speech at least leaves the possibility that 
Caracalla himself had favourites among the audience, who might be expected to avoid the worst of 
the emperor’s anger. That possibility is quickly extinguished. Any nuance regarding the composition 
of the Senate is then completely ignored. 
                                                             
72 Hellström 2015: 50-51 notes the similarities between Caracalla’s actions and the haste of the soldiers after 
they assassinate Pertinax.  
73 Like Julianus’ soldiers, they were more heavily armed than was appropriate for a procession (4.5.1). 
74 καὶ εἴ τι γένος ἦν βασιλικὸν ἢ ἐν συγκλήτῳ ἐξ εὐπατριδῶν καταβαῖνον, πᾶν ἐξέκοψεν (4.6.3). 
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Though the abandonment of any distinction between groups of senators may seem crude, its effect 
is significantly ameliorated by (and closely related to) the structure of the History, with its episodic 
focus on imperial reigns. Though the assassination and its consequences provide a narrative arc 
which spans books 3 and 4,75 it contains several configurations of imperial rule, all of which show 
different features. The basic character of Caracalla’s shared rule with Geta is imperial division. The 
plan to divide the empire may be an extreme form, but it is only an extension of the move to split the 
palace physically, where Herodian even describes corridors being blocked off to delineate two 
separate imperial households.76 It becomes useful to represent divisions at every level of society, 
including the Senate. That ceases to be the case once Geta is dead. Caracalla’s procession marks a new 
scene after the assassination itself, and with it a new focus on a sole ruler. In this context, the Senate 
can be united once again, and the standard comparisons between reigns can come to the fore.  
Though there may be some sense of narrative inconsistency, it comes as a result of a historiographical 
approach which is primarily interested in emperors. Hidber observes a shift in the nature of imperial 
rule in Caracalla’s speech to the Senate, as Herodian establishes the themes which will dominate his 
depiction of the sole rule: lies, uncontrolled cruelty and an attempt to win over the military.77 This 
transition is confirmed by the changing formulation of the three social groups. The army and people 
return to their unified norm, as aggressors and victims under a tyrant. And most importantly, the 
Senate is confirmed as a homogenous unit once again. Any deviation from that scheme is exclusively 
in relation to a divided reign, and it is resolved in the inception of a united regime. In that structural 
and thematic respect, the History is fully coherent. 
These are only three examples of structural approaches which recur throughout Herodian’s 
narrative, always facilitating the same over-arching interest in the individual men in charge of the 
empire. His depiction of the soldiers varies considerably. The rise to power of Elagabalus is dependent 
                                                             
75 On which see esp. Hidber 2006: 163-65. 
76 Despite what seems to be an obvious rhetorical flourish, the point has sometimes been taken as an accurate 
depiction of a real physical division. Potter 2014: 135; Schöpe 2014: 227-28. 





on the apparently universal loathing of the soldiers towards Macrinus (5.3.1, 5.4.1-2), only for there 
to be troops on each side to fight a civil war (5.4.5-7). In civil wars, the conflict between armies simply 
ends, with no real suggestion that it might not be a completely straightforward process.78 When there 
is fighting between the cavalry and the urban cohort in Rome itself under Commodus, it is quickly 
replaced by a familiar narrative of a homogenous army against the people.79 The Senate meanwhile 
can stand as a separate, united entity opposed to the provincial governors during the reign of 
Maximinus. As his comment that Gordian was appointed governor of Africa by lot suggests, Herodian 
was apparently aware of even the processes by which senatorial governors were selected.80 A conflict 
which could easily have been described as internal to the political elite is constructed as a central 
Senate facing the opposition of governors on the periphery.81  
Within all of these examples, Herodian’s main social groups remain easy to identify, and united in 
their actions. Moreover, this extends even to points where the basic events of the narrative would 
appear to preclude it. The default status for the Senate, the army, and the people is one of unity. This 
is broken only when unavoidable, and resolved immediately when necessary. Herodian’s social 
scheme can be jarring when it is read as a descriptive account, but it remains fully consistent with 
the central discussion of emperors in the History. Herodian is not interested in exploring the internal 
structure of the political elite, or in creating a comprehensive picture of what different branches of 
                                                             
78 The only exception comes after Severus defeated Niger. Severus offered an amnesty to soldiers who were 
deserting to the Parthians out of fear of him (3.4.7); cf. the speed with which the opposing armies at Aquileia 
all become στρατιῶται in contrast to Pupienus’ Germans (8.7.2-8.1). 
79 During riots caused by Cleander. The distinction between military groups occurs at 1.12.9; after a speech from 
Commodus’ sister Fadilla, and therefore a change of scene, things were resolved when the (now unified) soldiers 
and people (οἱ μὲν στρατιῶται… ὁ δὲ δῆμος) decided to stop (1.13.5). 
80 7.5.2. Other governors described as members of the Senate include Pescennius Niger (2.7.4), Albinus (2.15.1) 
and Capelianus (7.9.1). 
81 7.7.5-6. They sent out the opinion of the Romans and the Senate (τὴν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῆς συγκλήτου γνώμην), 
and most of them ‘joined the Romans’ (προσέθεντο Ῥωμαίοις). The few governors who supported Maximinus 
are therefore both non-senatorial and non-Roman. 
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the army thought at any one time. Instead, his narrative is directed towards easy comparisons. To 
that end, creating homogenous groups is extremely effective. 
Reading Herodian 
Though this chapter has argued for a more careful reading of Herodian, it has not sought to reject 
established responses. The importance of comparing emperors in his narrative has long been 
observed.82 If anything, this concentration on rulers needs to be made even more prominent in 
interpretations of the History. As this chapter has shown, Herodian’s interest in comparable reigns is 
not limited to the personal morality of emperors. It percolates through to his presentation of Roman 
society as well. The tripartite empire made up of Senate, army, and people provides a consistent 
means of calibrating imperial actions. When Marcus died, his support was both universal and 
genuine. Only Severus Alexander was met with the same positive unanimity, and even that changed 
during his military campaigns. The respective failings of other emperors can all be seen in the nature 
of their interaction with these three groups. The effect is reinforced by an episodic structure which 
invites direct comparison between repeated scenes. After Caracalla is described processing through 
Rome with the entire army, advancing on the senate house fully armed, it comes as no surprise that 
he goes on to massacre the Senate and the people. Herodian has recently been described as, ‘all about 
the emperors’.83 That does not only apply to the actions of the emperors themselves. 
There are significant consequences from the structural focus on comparable reigns. From a modern 
perspective, Herodian’s analysis of historical and political events seems extremely crude. The main 
groups involved exist as monolithically homogenous collectives. Their actions are internally 
coherent wherever possible, with a ready externalisation of any disunity. Where the progression of 
the narrative requires division, it is only ever temporary, and always resolved at great speed and with 
minimal disruption. Herodian’s approach to history is universalising at every opportunity. That, 
however, does not immediately make it simplistic, or simple to unpick. Herodian can be nuanced, in 
the same way that he is also extremely consistent: not necessarily in his narrative, but always in his 
                                                             
82 e.g. Widmer 1967: 16-34. 





thematic exploration of imperial power. The limits of the definition of the army or the people may 
change in the narrative, but their structural role in the illustration of an emperor’s reign does not.  
The implications for historical scholarship are especially noteworthy in light of the previous 
discussion of Cassius Dio. The Roman History’s presentation of a Senate under attack has led to 
Herodian’s formulation of social groups being seen as a reflection of the same political 
developments.84 If Dio’s creation of a united Senate is a simplified version of political life, Herodian’s 
social groups are significantly more so. The reason is straightforward. It is not that Herodian is 
inherently a bad historian, but that his aims in writing the History differ considerably from what 
modern scholars desire. When the equestrian order essentially does not exist, and when the 
Praetorian Guard can be equated with the army as a whole, Herodian is clearly not attempting to 
portray the nuances of political life. Herodian’s historiographical scheme is a comparative study of 
rulers, with Marcus Aurelius as its exemplary model. In order to understand Herodian’s political 
narrative, it is vital to acknowledge that these comparisons underpin every aspect of the History’s 
world. 
 
                                                             








Soldiers and Senators 
Maximinus the Thracian 
It would be something of an understatement to say that history does not remember Maximinus (235-
238) with any great fondness. The attacks against his reign started quickly. Herodian is clear that 
Maximinus was nothing more than a soldier. His reign began with the assassination of Severus 
Alexander by mutinous troops (6.8-9), and according to Herodian was characterised by a determined 
association with the army. Maximinus not only never visited Rome in his three-year reign, but he is 
described as expelling everyone from the camp on the Rhine/Danube frontier so that he could be 
surrounded by military men and no one else (7.1.3). Despite a successful campaign against Germanic 
tribes (7.2), Maximinus was really nothing more than a violent and greedy tyrant (esp. 7.3). This 
proved his undoing. A revolt against excessive taxation led to the rebellion of Gordian I (7.4.1-2); 
though it proved unsuccessful, it encouraged the Senate into opposition in Rome. They appointed 
the ex-consuls Pupienus and Balbinus as co-emperors (7.10.1-6), inspiring a military response from 
Maximinus which would eventually lead to his death. He invaded Italy at the head of an army, but 
was stalled at the northern city of Aquileia (8.1-4). There, Maximinus suffered the same fate that 
brought about his reign, dying at the hands of his men (8.5).  
The defining aspect of Maximinus’ character in the History is his background. Famously, he is 
described as μιξοβάρβαρος, a semi-barbarian (6.8.1). Herodian twice refers to rumours about his 
origins as a shepherd in Thrace, who was able to build a successful career due to his terrifying size.1 
The general overview of his reign shows how these supposedly barbarian roots come to define his 
character, and his approach to power: 
ὁ δὲ Μαξιμῖνος παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν πολλὴν τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐποιήσατο, τραχύτατα καὶ μετὰ 
πολλοῦ φόβου τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ χρώμενος, ἔκ τε πραείας καὶ πάνυ ἡμέρου βασιλείας ἐς τυραννίδος 
ὠμότητα μετάγειν πάντα ἐπειρᾶτο, δυσμένειαν ἑαυτῷ συνειδώς, ὅτι πρῶτος ἐξ εὐτελείας τῆς 
ἐσχάτης ἐς τοσαύτην τύχην ἤλασε. φύσει δὲ ἦν τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ γένος, βάρβαρος (8.1.1). 
                                                             
1 Firstly at 6.8.1, and repeated with the caveat that it was a rumour at 7.1.2. 
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When Maximinus took control he brought about a great change, exercising his authority very 
harshly and with much fear. He tried to change everything from a mild and altogether gentle 
monarchy into a cruel tyranny, aware of the hatred towards him for being the first person to 
rise from wholly insignificant origins to such great fortune. But in his behaviour, just like his 
birth, he was by nature barbarian. 
In this moment of imperial succession, Herodian describes an emperor who fits easily into the 
moralising pattern of imperial characterisation built around Marcus Aurelius. He is the very opposite 
of moderation and restraint (1.1.2). While Severus Alexander had transformed the empire into an 
aristocracy after the excesses of Elagabalus (6.1.2), Maximinus reverts to tyranny. Far from σεμνότης 
and σωφροσύνη, Maximinus is characterised by his savagery (ὠμότης) and low-birth (εὐτελεία). The 
themes of savagery and fear which are introduced here are consistently associated with Maximinus’ 
character.2  
Recent scholarship has understandably been quick to condemn the obvious rhetorical excesses of 
Herodian’s portrayal.3 At the same time, however, there is a fundamental reliance on the History in 
all of the most recent reconstructions of Maximinus’ reign. As has long been recognised, the Historia 
Augusta follows Herodian very closely in its biographies of Maximinus and the other emperors of 238. 
The basic shape of events remains the same, with more extreme details added.4 Both extended 
narratives of Maximinus’ reign are therefore built around the same chronological structure. The 
same can then be said of modern reconstructions too, in which the same basic outline of events is 
recorded universally: Maximinus was appointed by the soldiers; he alienated the Senate; his 
rapacious collection of taxes caused a revolt in North Africa, which failed; the cause was taken up in 
                                                             
2 For general discussions of Maximinus’ moral depiction in the History, see Burian 1988; Opelt 1998: 2943-45; 
Hidber 2006: 225-29; Martin 2006; Pitcher 2018b: 238-42.  
3 See Haegemans 2010: 6-9 for an overview of the change in attitudes in the twentieth century, and the move 
away from using Maximinus’ barbarity as the starting point for understanding his reign. 
4 Already, with numerous examples, Mommsen 1890: 261-69, and sufficiently evident that it could be summed 





Rome; and ultimately Maximinus died after rushing into an invasion of Italy, despite his apparently 
superior military position.5 The result is an approach to Maximinus which accepts Herodian’s account 
of what happened, but questions his explanations.  
His interactions with the Senate provide a demonstration of this process. The most detailed 
investigation of Maximinus in the last decade has been carried out by Karen Haegemans. She is clear 
in challenging the idea that the emperor was especially aggressive towards the political elite, but 
nevertheless sees the uprisings of 238 as indicative of their alienation. As Haegemans concludes a 
discussion of Maximinus’ appointment policies, ‘it seems as though rather than being vengeful, 
Maximinus just showed a clear disinterest in the aristocracy.’6 Similarly, his reputation for greed in 
the History is explained by a need to pay for military campaigns, which is then taken as a sign that 
‘the emperor ignored his civil duties as well as the misfortune of his people.’7 The rhetoric of 
barbarian savagery is put to one side, but otherwise Herodian’s narrative is fully accepted.8 
The more synoptic histories have followed suit. Thus, for example, David Potter has dismissed tales 
of his youth as a shepherd as ‘wild slanders’. Even so, he describes the situation in 235 as needing a 
diplomatic approach, and writes that Maximinus simply was not up to the task. ‘He plainly did not 
realize that part of his role as emperor was to play the urban politician, and that the consequence of 
failure in this role could be fatal.’9 The same tone comes through in Clifford Ando’s recent appraisal. 
At a time when the empire needed ‘intelligent leadership’, Maximinus it is claimed was ‘perhaps 
unable to comprehend’ the complex world of Roman politics, leading to descriptions of his ‘gross 
                                                             
5 Thus recently Drinkwater 2005: 28-33; Hilali 2007: 57-61; Hekster 2008: 14; Huttner 2008: 161-76; Haegemans 
2010; Ando 2012: 103-109; Potter 2014: 167-71; Kulikowski 2016: 112-16. 
6 Haegemans 2010: 96-106; cf. Hdn. 7.1.3-4, 7.3.3-4. 
7 Summarised at Haegemans 2010: 129-30; Hdn. 7.3, 7.4.2. 
8 Following her explicit justification in the introduction to the monograph: ‘[Herodian] just adapted his 
information to fit the framework of his highly moral text, which was written to please the reader… We just need 
to keep in mind that Herodian’s intention seems in the first place to have been moral in nature.’ Haegemans 
2010: 15-16. 
9 Potter 2014: 167.  
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irresponsibility as ruler’.10 Michael Kulikowski can note that ‘posthumous slander clouds almost every 
aspect of Maximinus’s reign’, and almost immediately assert that ‘Maximinus seems not to have cared 
very much about the offence he was causing at Rome’.11 There is a consistent pattern here. Herodian 
is challenged for his excessive moralising, but at the same time, his account is the most important 
basis for reconstructions of life under Maximinus.12 
When the previous chapter is taken into account, such an approach quickly appears problematic. 
These reconstructions are based on Herodian’s portrayal of Maximinus’ interaction with the army 
and the Senate. As his reign begins, their role as homogenous entities in the broader scheme of 
imperial comparisons is immediately apparent. His barbarian vices dictate the emperor’s character, 
and are displayed through his actions towards the two groups. Maximinus’ ὠμότης was driven in part 
by the fear that the Senate and his subjects would not respect him, because of his εὐτελεία (7.1.2). His 
anti-senatorial stance is confirmed with the report that he sent all of Alexander’s friends, who had 
been selected by the Senate, back to Rome (7.1.3). The emperor’s low birth then explains his 
interaction with the soldiers, with a strong emphasis on his desire for complete solitude among 
them.13 Herodian’s narrative has been taken as accurate in its content, if not its explanation. But the 
details he records represent a performance of the characteristics which define Maximinus, 
configured in a way which encourages comparisons to other emperors.14 His refusal to engage with 
                                                             
10 Ando 2012: 104.  
11 Kulikoswki 2016: 112-13. 
12 Johne 1993: 188-207 provides a lengthy discussion of what made Maximinus a tyrant, stressing his low social 
status and confiscations of wealth; the detail is derived primarily from Herodian. See also Drinkwater 2005: 60; 
Gerhardt 2008: 775-77; Mecella 2017: 202-207. 
13 Within one sentence, Herodian writes that Maximinus wanted to be alone (μόνος εἶναι βουλόμενος); that he 
wanted to have no one else with him who had any power through their knowledge of their superior nobility 
(μηδένα αὑτῷ παρεῖναι ἐκ συνειδήσεως εὐγενοῦς κρείττονα); and that there was nobody there to whom he 
would have to show respect (μηδενὸς αὐτῷ παρόντος ᾧ νέμειν αἰδῶ ἀνάγκην ἔχοι, 7.1.3). 
14 Maximinus dismissed or executed all of Alexander’s household (7.1.4), just as Caracalla had done after 





anyone apart from his soldiers is one aspect of a wider programme of imperial barbarity.15 In other 
words, scholarship which emphasises Maximinus’ disregard for political life remains fully invested 
in Herodian’s scheme of imperial characterisation.  
If this were true exclusively for events which involved Maximinus himself, it would already place 
considerable doubt on the value of Herodian’s narrative as a descriptive record of his reign. As will 
be argued in this chapter, however, the influence of imperial character runs significantly deeper. 
Maximinus does not simply reflect structural trends which reinforce the importance of the emperor 
in the historical model of the History. In many respects, his reign represents their culmination.  
Compared to other emperors, Maximinus is remarkably absent from much of Herodian’s account. 
The lengthy rebellions in book 7 put the emperor on the narrative’s periphery. In the final three-
quarters of the book (7.4-12), Maximinus is the focus of only one chapter (7.8, in which he finds out 
about the uprising of the Gordians) and the concluding subchapter (7.12.8, in which his army stands 
ready to invade Italy). This does not mean that his impact is not felt. Herodian manipulates the 
History’s structure to maintain close links between the emperor’s character and the narrative world 
which he frames. The remainder of this chapter will follow Herodian’s portrayal of events in Rome. 
As Maximinus’ reign progresses, Herodian presents the city going through a series of phases, in which 
the reader’s expectations are increasingly subverted. The rhetorical themes of barbarian savagery 
remain prominent, but their associated tropes are strikingly repositioned. Imperial power becomes 
a danger to Rome, before corrupting the familiar interactions of the empire’s three constituent 
groups. Repeated scenes play out in reversed roles, as violence is directed by the Senate and the 
people against the army. The people become an unpredictable ὄχλος, and Rome is transformed into 
                                                             
15 This also continues the idea of inconsistency. Maximinus faces two attempted uprisings at the start of his 
reign. The first is led by a former consul called Magnus, and involves ‘many centurions, and everyone from the 
Senate’, πολλῶν τε ἑκατοντάρχων συμπνεόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἁπάντων (7.1.4). By definition, for this 
narrative to actually take place, there had to be a senatorial presence with Maximinus. As explored in the 
previous chapter, this inconsistency is not problematic; it only reinforces the idea that the relationship 
between Maximinus and the Senate was one of mutual hatred. 
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a battlefield. Ultimately, after an explosion of violence and looting, it is restored by the emperor’s 
assassination. All the time, barbarity and savagery hold sway. Under Maximinus, Rome is turned 
upside down. Rather than approaching the later books as a reliable historical source, I believe that 
they demonstrate most fully Herodian’s over-riding interest in imperial character. His aim does not 
seem to be the production an objective record, but rather to explore events in the capital as a 
commentary on the emperor.  
Universal Opposition 
Herodian’s account of Maximinus begins on the frontier, and stays there for some time (6.9-7.2). The 
emperor survived two attempted coups and then led the army on an invasion of Germany. When the 
narrative returns to the capital, the three main social groups immediately appear, in what might 
seem a conventional demonstration of the universal hatred which Maximinus inspired. He abused 
the elite (7.3.2-4) and the people (7.3.5-6), and even the soldiers hated him (7.3.6). In a crystallisation 
of the opposition between Maximinus and Marcus Aurelius, Roman society is united again, though 
this time in their hatred of the new ruler. In other respects, though, it is far from typical. This is not 
merely a confirmation that Maximinus was a bad emperor. Throughout the summary, Herodian 
portrays an emperor whose entire rule represented an external threat to Rome. 
Herodian begins his description of Maximinus’ reign with a formulation which introduces the effects 
of a barbarian emperor. Maximinus was not completely incompetent. His invasion of Germany (7.2) 
was highly successful, leading Herodian to suggest that he could have conquered the whole region if 
he had wished to.16 In an apparent reference to the fulfilment of Marcus Aurelius’ campaigns, he 
claims that Maximinus could have advanced ‘all the way to the Ocean’.17 Any potential association 
with praise is immediately undercut in the transition from the invasion episode into the summary: 
καὶ ἐς δόξαν ἤρθη ἃν ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις βαρύτερος ἐγεγόνει 
καὶ φοβερώτερος. τί γὰρ ἦν ὄφελος βαρβάρων ἀναιρουμένων, πλειόνων γινομένων φόνων 
                                                             
16  See Berger et al. 2010 for recent archaeological evidence which may support the extent of Maximinus’ 
advance as far east as the Weser, with further discussions collected in Pöppelmann et al. 2013. 





ἐν αὐτῇ τε Ῥώμῃ καὶ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἔθνεσιν; ἢ λείας [αἰχμαλώτους]18 ἀπάγειν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, 
γυμνοῦντα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀφαιρούμενον τῶν οἰκείων (7.3.1); 
He would have been raised to a good reputation from his deeds had he not been so oppressive 
and fearsome towards his own people and subjects. For what was the point in destroying 
barbarians when there were more deaths happening in Rome itself and among the subject 
nations? What was the point in carrying off plunder and prisoners from the enemy while 
stripping and robbing his own people of their possessions? 
After briefly resembling a positive force as a general, Maximinus abruptly returns to a barbarian 
stereotype. His regime away from the frontier is characterised by the fear of his subjects, while 
Herodian begins to move Maximinus away from any shared identification with Rome. The repeated 
contrast between barbarians and Romans, between hostile foes and those who are meant to be the 
emperor’s own people, blurs the position of Maximinus as a supposedly Roman emperor. His positive 
achievements in war bring about the same suffering for his allies as much as for his enemies. Herodian 
has just described Maximinus bringing plunder and prisoners, αἰχμαλώτους καὶ λείαν, back to 
Sirmium as winter set in (7.2.9). These were the legitimate spoils of a war against a foreign enemy. 
But the same violent approach was then turned against Rome. The threat which barbarian opponents 
traditionally posed against the empire is being carried out by Maximinus himself. The passage is 
highly reminiscent of Herodian’s introduction to his reign at the start of book 7. There, Maximinus 
was barbarian by nature and birth; here we see his nature given free rein, as foreign wars give way 
to attacks against Rome. 
As 7.3 progresses, Herodian presents an imperial greed which puts an increasing strain on any 
suggestion that Maximinus could be seen as a legitimate Roman ruler. He is portrayed as a figure who 
is not only external to Rome’s political world, but indeed external to Rome itself. Herodian begins 
what at first seems a fairly generic attack: Maximinus took money from the rich, allowing informers 
                                                             
18 αἰχμαλώτους questioned by Stavenhagen 1922: 182 accepted by Cary 1969-70 II: 168; Lucarini 2005: 143. 
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to flourish in his search for wealth.19 He is then described as humiliating the elite based on minimal 
justification (7.3.3-4). A closer reading demonstrates a more specific link to Herodian’s character 
outline earlier in the book. Maximinus is described as summoning opponents from across the 
provinces on small and insignificant charges, ἐκ μικρᾶς καὶ εὐτελοῦς διαβολῆς (7.3.3). There is an 
irony in Herodian’s presentation of Maximinus here. The emperor’s own insignificant background, 
his εὐτελεία, is a recurrent theme at the start of his reign.20 That same trait is now directed against 
members of Rome’s elite. Moreover, the specific targets only reinforce this reference to his low birth. 
The men facing charges are from the highest levels of the elite, including former consuls and even 
those who had been granted triumphs (7.3.3). The reader is reminded of Maximinus’ origins in a 
moment of stark contrast to the elite who suffered during his reign. This may not be the specifically 
Roman view of social order found in Dio’s Roman History, but it is nonetheless an indication of a moral 
inversion under Maximinus, linked to his particular traits. Like Septimius Severus, his motive was 
φιλοχρηματία (3.8.7; 7.3.2).21 Maximinus though gains an additional pettiness, delighting in 
insignificant charges as a man who should have been insignificant himself. 
From the elite, Herodian’s catalogue of imperial greed moves to its effects on the other two main 
social groups. After taking everything from the rich, Maximinus turned to money which was intended 
for public functions (7.3.5-6). Funds reserved for the grain supply, or public festivals and building 
works, was stolen. Maximinus even robbed the temples of their precious metals. The connection with 
the people is explicit. Herodian uses a term derived from δῆμος no fewer than six times over the 
course of his hundred-word account of the seizures in Rome. The target is specifically popular, with 
three of these connected to sources of wealth.22 Everything that could be, following Herodian’s 
standard rhetoric, was taken from public buildings and turned into coin (πᾶν ἐχωνεύετο, 7.3.5). 
                                                             
19 Herodian is typically universalising. The informers are granted total licence (ἄνεσίς τε γὰρ πᾶσα), and the 
victims lose all their possessions (τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πάντων, 7.3.2).  
20 It occurs three times in 7.1.2. 
21 The same vice is shared by the soldiers after they sold the empire to Didius Julianus (2.6.14). 
22 Public affairs/finances, τὰ δημόσια; money left for public gifts, νομὰς τῶν δημοτῶν; decorations on public 





Resistance to Maximinus is just as marked by its connection to the people. His actions angered the 
people, leading to a public grief; such is the threat posed by the emperor that some of the people even 
set up watch around the temples, to defend them from attack.23  
The transition into popular opposition to Maximinus does not change the focus on his barbaric 
nature. With this attack on the public, Maximinus fully embraces his heritage. Rome is made to look 
as though it were under attack: 
πένθος τε δημόσιον ἐνεποίει δίχα μάχης καὶ ἄνευ ὅπλων ὄψις πολιορκίας, ὥς τινας τῶν 
δημοτῶν καὶ χεῖρας ἀντιθεῖναι καὶ τοὺς νεὼς φρουρεῖν, ἑτοίμως τε ἔχειν πρότερον 
ἀναιρεθέντας πρὸ τῶν βωμῶν πεσεῖν ἢ σκῦλα τῶν πατρίδων ἰδεῖν. (7.3.6) 
A public grief was brought about by the appearance of a siege without fighting or weapons, 
such that some of the people turned to opposition and set up watch around the temples, 
ready to be killed and fall before the altars rather than see the plundering of their homeland. 
Even though there is no actual fighting in Rome, it nonetheless resembled a siege. The militaristic 
language continues, further alienating Maximinus from his subjects, presenting him as an external 
and wholly threatening force. The people are willing to die in defence of the temples, a rapid 
upscaling of a situation which has just been described as lacking any weapons. In turn, the valuables 
being taken out of the temples have become the spoils of war. Luke Pitcher notes the irony of an 
emperor taking spoils away from Rome,24 but I would suggest that Herodian’s description is even 
stronger. The phrase σκῦλα τῶν πατρίδων works as a forceful summary of Maximinus’ actions. 
Rome’s inheritance has become the prize of a barbarian’s conquest, his own heritage as an outsider 
reinforced in his celebration of ransacking a Roman opponent.25 The success of the German campaign 
                                                             
23 The people, τοὺς δήμους (7.3.5); a popular grief, πένθος τε δημόσιον (7.3.6); and resistance from some of the 
people, τινας τῶν δημοτῶν (7.3.6). 
24 Pitcher 2012b: 281 n.18. 
25 The idea is perhaps punned on earlier, with his treatment of despoiled senators. Maximinus is described as 
σκύλας δὲ καὶ ὑβρίσας, abusing and insulting them (7.3.4). 
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is turned on its head. Roman military success against external enemies is meaningless, overwhelmed 
by an internal barbarian aggression. 
The picture of opposition to Maximinus is completed with the inclusion of the soldiers. Their role 
appears somewhat arbitrary. After extended descriptions of the alienation of the Senate and the 
people, Herodian’s account of opposition from the soldiers is much briefer. He concludes with the 
comment that the soldiers were also unhappy, because their relatives and friends were reproaching 
them for being responsible for Maximinus’ actions (7.3.6). Within the wider context of the History, the 
cause of military unrest is a strange one. There is no shortage of soldiers opposing emperors, but 
elsewhere this is due to either excessive discipline or perceived weakness.26 Though there is no 
specific linguistic suggestion that we should see this as the army engaging on a personal level with 
the people, even interaction between soldiers and their families is unique to this scene. Two other 
references note that soldiers have families,27 but they have no effect on the progression of the 
narrative; this agency of relatives over the troops is unique. It is also the only moment before his 
eventual assassination at which Maximinus faces any kind of hostility from the soldiers as a whole.28 
In many ways, this feels like an attempt to ensure that Maximinus is hated by everyone. As the 
complete opposite of Marcus Aurelius, he is opposed by the elite, the people, and the troops. 
                                                             
26 As Maximinus himself would discover, when killed by his own soldiers as the siege of Aquileia dragged on 
(8.5.6-8). See also Pertinax (2.5.1); Macrinus (5.2.5); Elagabalus (5.8.1); Severus Alexander (6.7.10); Pupienus and 
Balbinus (8.8.1). 
27 At 3.8.5 he mentions a contentious law issued by Septimius Severus that allowed soldiers to marry (above, 15 
n. 71); 8.5.8 mentions the fact that the soldiers had families, but they played no role beyond their existence in 
the camp at Alba Longa. 
28 Though there are two assassination plots, even they were driven by the ex-consuls Magnus and Quartinus 
respectively, with specifically limited military support (7.1.4-11). The first is supported by everyone in the 
Senate (7.1.4), but includes only a few soldiers (στρατιωτῶν μὲν ὀλίγους, 7.1.6). The other is made up of 
Osrhoenian archers. In neither case does Herodian refer to the army as a whole, or anything more than a small 
group acting outside the usual homogenous mass. See Zimmermann 1999a: 256-60 on the plots, including brief 





Herodian’s universalising approach, and his tripartite social structure, are strong enough to over-
rule a historiographical approach which usually views the army as an independent force. 
With the explanations for the soldiers’ hatred of Maximinus there is a final reference to his status as 
a barbarian. Their opposition arose from the reproach of their relatives and close friends, their 
συγγενεῖς and οἰκεῖοι. This comment comes at the very end of 7.3, and recalls the complaints which 
introduce the summary of life in Rome under Maximinus. As Herodian began, what is the point in 
expanding Rome’s power, γυμνοῦντα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀφαιρούμενον τῶν οἰκείων – ‘when stripping 
and robbing the possessions of your own people?’ (7.3.1). The army was responsible for Maximinus’ 
rise to power, but it also suffered as a result of his reign. In the repetition of οἰκεῖοι, Herodian 
completes a scheme of universal hatred towards Maximinus, and also reinforces his total 
externalisation from Rome. The soldiers are connected to τὰ οἰκεία, the metaphorical shared 
household of Herodian’s empire. In this specific episode, they were able to interact productively with 
other groups that comprise it. Maximinus could not.  
The cumulative effect of 7.3 is to present Maximinus as more than simply universally loathed. He 
becomes a direct threat to Rome, an emperor who was a barbarian enemy, rather than a defender of 
the subjects who were meant to be his own people. This scheme of social unity will quickly break 
down as Herodian moves onto the more specific scenes of rebellion against Maximinus. Nonetheless, 
it creates an effective backdrop for the events to follow. Herodian takes advantage of a structural 
scheme which by this stage in the narrative is extremely familiar. The Senate, the army, and the 
people all reaffirm his twin, and inextricably linked, defining characteristics: he was hated, and he 
was a barbarian. 
Barbarian Agents and Subverted Expectations 
The overview of Maximinus’ reign in 7.3 shows how Herodian portrays the barbarian ruler as a 
subversive force, corrupting the role of the emperor. The next series of episodic scenes continues 
that theme. It tells the story of the North African revolt of Gordian I and II, based in the city of 
Carthage (7.4-9). Maximinus himself is largely absent. He appears in one scene, after the news of the 
uprising had reached the frontier, in which he delivered an angry speech and then began the march 
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on Italy (7.8).29 Nonetheless, his peripheral location does not render Maximinus unable to influence 
the narrative. The revolt itself is framed around the actions of his agents, all of whom share in the 
characteristics and motifs which defined Maximinus as an external threat. An unnamed tax collector 
was responsible for causing unrest in the first place (7.4.2), and the Gordians are eventually defeated 
by the senator Capelianus (7.9).30 In Rome, events are shaped around the Praetorian Prefect 
Vitalianus.  
The connection of these three men to the emperor is not limited to supporting him. In their depiction, 
we can start to see how Maximinus’ characterisation remains central to the entire Carthaginian 
uprising. On a simple level, all three men show a strong resemblance to the barbarian ruler. In the 
case of the first agent, that connection is explicit: he was especially cruel in collecting taxes out of a 
desire to gain favour with Maximinus, who was generous to men like himself. The desire to copy 
Maximinus is supported by a textual echo, as he acted violently and with every savagery, τραχύτατα, 
καὶ μετὰ πάσης ὠμότητος (7.4.2). Capelianus meanwhile was only pretending to support Maximinus, 
with the intention of taking power for himself should anything go wrong (7.9.11). His behaviour after 
the Carthaginians were defeated cements the comparison. Following the example of Maximinus in 
Rome, Capelianus attacked the cities of North Africa as though they were foreign enemies. He 
engaged in the sacking of temples, ἱερῶν σύλησις,31 and robbed money from private and public 
                                                             
29 His barbarity is preserved in several ways. Not only did Maximinus rely on an aide to write the speech for 
him (7.8.3), but he concluded by shaking his hands and head about, as if physically threatening Rome itself 
(7.8.9). 
30 On Capelianus’ career, Dietz: 1980: 109-20; Zimmermann 1999a: 264 n. 585. 





sources alike (7.9.10).32 These are the barbarian qualities of Maximinus – both the vice itself, and its 
employment – taking effect around Carthage too.33 
As events in Rome show, it is not just the supporters of Maximinus who are imbued with their 
master’s savagery. The episode of Vitalianus’ assassination sees the traits of a barbarian emperor 
spread throughout Roman society. In 2018, Andrew Scott published an investigation of one of the 
repeated plot types in the History. His article traces the development of conspiracies against emperors 
which are led by Praetorian Prefects. He describes a number of episodes, including the failed 
assassination attempts against Commodus, the successful plots which led to the accessions of 
Pertinax and Macrinus, and in some detail analyses the ambiguity of Plautianus’ conspiracy against 
Septimius Severus. Scott writes that this traditional conspiracy type, found from accounts of Sejanus 
onwards, is a demonstration of normative imperial activity. He then sees a distinct shift in the 
narrative, which aligns with the end of conspiracies of this kind following the accession of Macrinus. 
The orderly world of Praetorian Prefects vying for power is replaced by chaotic instability. As Scott 
concludes: ‘As Herodian’s employment of this plot type runs out, so does the relatively normal state 
of affairs at Rome, and the power of the prefect is seemingly dispersed to the military as whole, and 
concomitantly instability and chaos increase.’34 
There is one significant exception to Scott’s assertion that Praetorian Prefects have less of a role in 
the second half of the History. It is an episode from the reign of Maximinus, concerning the prefect 
Vitalianus (7.6.4-9). In several ways, the scene conforms to the model set out by Scott. As with earlier 
examples, it revolves around a Praetorian Prefect, and a sealed letter ostensibly carrying secret 
imperial instructions. To follow Kemezis, as Scott seems to be in his discussion, it also displays 
                                                             
32 In doing so, he seems to fulfil Maximinus’ promise to his frontier army that the people of Italy would flee, 
leaving the emperor to distribute their property to the troops (7.8.8). 
33 The barbarian aspects are not limited to Maximinus. Capelianus also burned and plundered the villages and 
fields, echoing Septimius Severus’ treatment of the Persian villages near Ctesiphon in the use of ἐμπίμπρημι 
and λεηλατέω (7.9.12, 3.9.10).  
34 Scott 2018b, quoting 457. 
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‘streamlining’: Vitalianus is the only named figure who is not an emperor, while a lack of detail in the 
build-up to the plot creates an easy and seamless transition straight into the assassination attempt.35 
But there is a fundamental difference. In a total inversion of the normal plot type, Vitalianus is the 
only prefect who is the target of an assassination attempt.  
The role reversal is reflected in how the assassination unfolds. From the outset, Vitalianus is 
presented as having the opposite relationship with the emperor to other scenes. Whereas Laetus and 
Macrinus faced imperial wrath, Vitalianus was extremely close to Maximinus, being both very dear 
(φίλτατος) and dedicated (καθωσιωμένος) to him. Rather than having a prefect fearing for his life, in 
this case Gordian’s plot is explained because of the fear other people felt towards Vitalianus. Along 
with his rule by fear (φόβος), Vitalianus acted τραχύτατα καὶ ὠμότατα, very harshly and very cruelly. 
This is exactly the same language used to introduce Maximinus at the opening of book 7. Instead of 
opposing the emperor, he has become a proxy for Maximinus, taking on his barbarian attributes 
(7.6.4-5).36 The shift in relationship is mirrored in the inversion of the role of secret correspondence 
in this assassination. Laetus and Macrinus are saved by their interception of secret letters ordering 
their respective executions;37 Vitalianus was killed upon receiving one. Gordian sent him a letter 
which appeared to be from Maximinus, allowing the assassins to strike while he was checking the 
authenticity of its imperial seals (7.6.8).  
Perhaps the greatest twist then comes in the conclusion. The assassination may not have resulted in 
an immediate regime change, but it did have some effect on Rome. At first, this appears to be quite 
positive. Herodian describes scenes which are familiar from many ancient accounts of tyrants being 
overthrown: 
                                                             
35 Above, 124 n. 20; Scott 2018b: 435.  
36 See Opelt 1998: 2944-45 for comparisons between Maximinus and Vitalianus. 
37 One of Commodus’ favourite young boys inadvertently took a list of condemned individuals to Marcia the 






συκοφάνται τε οὖν καὶ οἱ γενόμενοι τινῶν κατήγοροι ἢ ἔφευγον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδικηθέντων 
ἀνῃροῦντο, ἐπίτροποί τε καὶ δικασταὶ οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου ὠμότητος ὑπηρέται συρέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ 
ὄχλου ἐς τοὺς ὀχετοὺς ἐρριπτοῦντο (7.7.3). 
And so informers and those who had been accusers either fled or were destroyed by their 
victims, while procurators and jurymen who had been agents of [Maximinus’] brutality were 
seized by the mob and thrown into the sewers. 
Herodian presents a fairly generic idea of informers being removed from Rome,38 with the added 
specific reference to the ὠμότης of Maximinus’ barbaric regime. This appears to conform to a promise 
made by Gordian in a letter to the Senate and people (7.6.3-4). He had denounced Maximinus’ ὠμότης, 
promising to exile informers and pardon those tried unjustly. There is already an indication that this 
may not in fact be the case. Informers were seized ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου, by the mob. Herodian is very 
specific in his introduction to this scene that the δῆμος is not acting in its usual role. He writes that 
every δῆμος has the potential to become an ὄχλος, and the Roman one is worse than any other (7.7.1). 
This is only the second time in the History that the people in the city of Rome are called an ὄχλος; its 
repetition in the attacks against informers immediately suggests considerable unruliness, perhaps to 
the extent that they, like Maximinus, should now be thought of as outside the normal social 
structure.39 
Whatever the significance of the terminological choice, it is clear that there is a close link between 
popular action against informers and Maximinus. It is not just unruliness which follows the 
assassination of Vitalianus. The people’s actions directly resemble the emperor’s. Immediately 
following on from the previous passage, widespread violence broke out: 
                                                             
38 Gordian himself had banished them in the letter sent to the Senate (7.6.4); Pertinax (2.4.8) and Macrinus (5.2.2) 
did the same in their respective attempts to return Rome to a state of freedom. 
39 Cf. the ὄχλοι in Rome, after the oriental procession of Elagabalus (5.6.9). There may be a suggestion that the 
people cease to be the true δῆμος when under disruptive eastern influence. 
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φόνος τε οὐκ ὀλίγος ἐγένετο καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικησάντων ἀνθρώπων· δανειστὰς γὰρ ἑαυτῶν ἢ καὶ 
ἀντιδίκους ἐν πράγμασιν ἀγοραίοις, καὶ εἴ τις πρός τινα βραχεῖαν αἰτίαν εἶχε μίσους, 
ἐπαναβαίνοντες ταῖς οἰκήσεσιν ἀπροσδοκήτως, ἐπηρεάζοντες ὡς συκοφάντας ἐσύλησάν τε 
καὶ ἐφόνευσαν. ἐν προσχήματι ἐλευθερίας ἀδείας τε εἰρηνικῆς ἔργα πολέμου ἐμφυλίου 
ἐγένετο, ὡς καὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπάρχοντα μετὰ πράξεις πολλὰς ὑπατικάς (Σαβῖνος δὲ ἦν 
ὄνομα αὐτῷ), βουλόμενον κωλῦσαι τὰ γινόμενα, ξύλῳ παισθέντα κατὰ τοῦ κρανίου 
τελευτῆσαι (7.7.3-4). 
There were many murders, and by no means of guilty people. If someone had creditors or 
legal opponents, or any other petty excuse for hatred, they would break into their houses 
without warning and label them informers, then rob and murder them. In the appearance of 
freedom and peaceful fearlessness, acts of civil war took place: when the greatly experienced 
urban prefect, who was called Sabinus, wanted to put an end to what was happening, he was 
hit on the head with a club and killed. 
As Herodian’s own quick repetition puts it, informers may have been driven out by the wronged (ὑπὸ 
τῶν ἀδικηθέντων), but it was not just wrongdoers (μηδὲν ἀδικησάντων) who were killed. 40 This idea 
is reinforced by two verbal parallels with Maximinus’ own extremes of savagery as emperor. In his 
schema of tyranny against the three social groups, Herodian has Maximinus encouraging informers 
to make accusations: πρόκλησις δέδοτο συκοφάνταις ἐς τὸ ἐπηρεάζειν (7.3.2). After the death of 
Vitalianus, that situation is subverted to extreme effect. After getting rid of actual informers, the mob 
turned on other opponents, and accused them of being delatores as well: ἐπηρεάζοντες ὡς 
συκοφάντας. The reversal of the linguistic structure creates a deeply ironic moment, in which 
Herodian presents people maliciously informing on their enemies for being informers. When the 
prefect Sabinus tried to calm things down, he too was killed. We are presented with a Rome which is 
in thrall to informers, where the lives of the political elite are in danger. The savagery of Maximinus 
may have been removed, but it is merely replaced with a tyranny which looks exactly the same. 
                                                             





The second echo has much the same effect. As discussed in more detail above, the people of Rome 
become particularly angered by the appearance of a siege, even though there was no actual fighting, 
nor any weapons (δίχα μάχης καὶ ἄνευ ὅπλων ὄψις πολιορκίας, 7.3.6). The failure to escape tyranny 
after the assassination of Vitalianus is reinforced by a similar but contorted construction of 
appearance and reality. His death led to the appearance, πρόσχημα, of freedom; civil war was now the 
reality. While the people had been defending Rome from a barbarian Maximinus, they themselves 
now descended into open warfare in the streets, turning weapons against their fellow Romans. The 
people ultimately took up the mantle of the barbarian invader. Earlier, they had protected the city 
from Maximinus’ attempts to take its wealth as σκῦλα, the spoils of war (7.3.6). In this episode, they 
were the ones pillaging Rome. If anyone was accused of being an informer, the mob robbed and killed 
them, ἐσύλησάν τε καὶ ἐφόνευσαν. The threat to Rome is not limited to Maximinus as an external 
force, or even his supporter Capelianus, who sacked North African cities. These are three of only four 
uses of συλάω/σκυλεύω and their derivations in the entire History.41 The twisting of expectations 
leads to the people who are geographically bound to the capital becoming its ransacking enemies. 
It may have struck any reader that one group has been conspicuously absent so far in this conspiracy, 
even more so in the light of Scott’s interpretation above. There are soldiers in this account, but their 
role is almost hidden. Gordian sent his letter to Rome with a quaestor, who was given ‘some 
centurions and soldiers’ (ἑκατοντάρχας καὶ στρατιώτας τινάς, 7.6.5). This is the sole time that a 
military presence is mentioned in the entire episode. Thereafter, all their actions occur through 
third-person plural verbs, without any nominal mention of who these people were. They occur only 
twice in pronominal form, when orders were given to them (ἀυτοῖς, 7.6.6), and rumours spread by 
them (αὐτῶν, 7.6.9). Where the subjects of plural verbs are given even an article, they refer to other 
people – those who should have been attending Vitalianus but weren’t for various reasons (οἳ μὲν… 
οἳ δὲ, 7.6.8), and the people who were nearby after the murder (οἱ δὲ παρόντες, 7.6.9). Even as the 
subject of the third-person plural verbs changes, Herodian makes no explicit indication of returning 
                                                             
41 The fourth (8.4.10) is discussed below. 
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to the soldiers carrying out the plan. The assassins exist only through their actions, with no identity 
of their own.  
Contrast that with the role of the people. As the rumour spread, the whole demos ran around 
everywhere as if possessed (πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶν διέθει πανταχοῦ, 7.7.1), a return to a 
universalising approach after the τινες from the army.42 Herodian then stresses that the Roman 
people, even compared to other mobs, are particularly prone to unpredictable rioting. Within the 
riot scene itself, there is then the reminder that the informers are being thrown out of Rome by the 
mob, ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου. This is not a complaint about the army taking over after an assassination, but a 
depiction of violence which is ultimately driven by the masses.43 It is here that we see the completion 
of an ironic subversion of the tropes of misrule in the History. In 7.3.6, the soldiers were accused of 
being the agents of imperial violence, especially at the expense of the provinces. In the final point of 
subversion of all expectations around tyranny, it is the masses who were the informers, who were 
the barbarians, and who took up that aggressive military role. Though the narrative of his reign starts 
by stressing military support, in this episode, it is the people who have transformed into Maximinus. 
It is here that Scott’s reading of the apparent disappearance of the Praetorian Prefect assassination 
scene requires some reworking. On the one hand, it is certainly the case this is a demonstration of a 
growing unrest in the later parts of the History. However, this is not the result of an omission of 
normative narratives of power transfer, as Scott argues, but rather their careful subversion. Indeed, 
this reaches its peak in consideration of Scott’s view that Herodian is primarily concerned with the 
growing power of the military. Such a depiction could easily be expected at this point of Herodian’s 
                                                             
42 There is a close parallel with the assassination of Commodus. In 193, all the people went around in a frenzy, 
as if they were possessed, and ran about in all directions (πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἐνθουσιῶντι ἐοικὼς ἐξεβακχεύετο διέθεόν 
τε, 2.2.3). After Vitalianus, they did almost the same thing, minus the Bacchic hyperbole. In the earlier scene, 
the people restrain the army, rather than causing violence. See also 2.6.1, where the people ran around madly 
(διέθεόν τε ἐνθουσιῶσιν) looking in vain for the murderers of Pertinax. 






narrative, but we actually find something which seems to minimise the army’s role.44 This conspiracy 
may look convincing in its detail, but that is only the case when it is read in isolation from the rest of 
the History. Its expression is reliant on the careful deployment of social groups as homogenous 
entities, in roles for which they would normally be considered wholly inappropriate. As part of a 
wider thematic and structural framework, it is a demonstration of social chaos produced by the 
undermining of all the tropes which a reader of the History can come to expect. Monica Hellström’s 
recent suggestion that we might read 7.7.1-4 as a ‘reversal of the natural order’, as the people take up 
a role which is normally reserved for the military, is convincing.45 But in the specific connections to 
Maximinus, the social chaos in Rome is even more complex. It is not just that the soldiers and the 
people reverse roles. All expectations of how Rome is meant to function under a tyrant are subverted, 
as the empire begins to resemble its corrupt ruler. 
Rioting in Rome 
Compared to the uprising of the Gordians, the more successful rebellion led by Pupienus and Balbinus 
seems less direct in its connection to Maximinus. There are no more named individuals who remain 
loyal to the emperor, who can be used metonymically to represent his barbarian traits. The narrative 
appears more straightforwardly as an example of intense social conflict, in which senatorial co-
emperors rose up against the power of the army. In Rome, the appointment of new rulers led to 
violence between the army and the people, who were led by senators (7.10-12). This looks like a clear-
cut example of the social unrest which has come to define the third century. Herodian’s narrative is 
much more complex than this. The immediate aftermath of the appointment of Pupienus and 
Balbinus is marked by a series of episodes which overturn all expectations. As seen in the first riot, 
                                                             
44 It also raises the question of the assassination of Pertinax. In Dio’s account, the Praetorians are angered due 
to the scheming of the prefect Laetus (74[73].8-9). Herodian presents a situation driven exclusively by the 
Praetorians themselves. If his aim was to emphasise the newly militarised anarchy after the death of Macrinus 
(pace Scott 2018b: 456-57), it seems strange that his ‘streamlining’ of an earlier account would emphasise the 
military aspect at this early stage of the History. 
45 Hellström 2015: 253 n. 9. 
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the three social groups remain important as a foundation for comparisons in repeated episode types. 
As the narrative advances, the disruption of typical social structure grows only worse. 
Herodian’s account of the rebellion led by Pupienus and Balbinus begins in the same social terms 
found elsewhere in the History. After the news reached Rome that the Gordians had been defeated at 
Carthage, the city entered a state of fear at the potential retribution from the violent Maximinus 
(7.10.1). The people and the Senate in particular, ὅ τε δῆμος…ἥ τε σύγκλητος μάλιστα, were in a state 
of shock. In response, the Senate gathered in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus to decide on a course 
of action. Everything appears to have proceeded in good order among the senators. A series of votes 
led to the eventual decision to appoint Pupienus and Balbinus, who were duly voted the full honours 
of imperial office (7.10.2-5). The detailed account of a meeting between senators recalls the accession 
of Pertinax, and the peaceful exchange of speeches which led to his acceptance by everyone (2.3); it 
is a long way from the threatening speech delivered in the senate house by Caracalla (4.5).  
Any illusion of calmness is instantly broken. Immediately after the election of Pupienus and Balbinus, 
Herodian describes a moment of social tension. While the Senate was voting in favour of the two men, 
the people (ὁ δὲ δῆμος) were gathering outside the temple (7.10.5). As the senators attempted to leave 
the temple, the mob confronted them angrily, threatening the newly appointed emperors and 
demanding that someone from Gordian’s family should be appointed instead. The scene of violent 
opposition crystallises around a tripartite social order: 
ὁ δὲ Βαλβῖνος καὶ Μάξιμος ἐκ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ τάγματος νεανίας τούς τε πάλαι στρατιώτας οἳ ἐν 
Ῥώμῃ διέτριβον, περιστήσαντες ἑαυτοῖς ξιφηφόρους προελθεῖν τοῦ Καπετωλίου ἐβιάζοντο, 
ὑπὸ δὲ πλήθους λίθων καὶ ξύλων ἐκωλύθησαν, ἔστε δὴ ὑποβαλόντος τινὸς αὐτοὶ τὸν δῆμον 
ἐσοφίσαντο (7.10.7). 
But Balbinus and [Pupienus] surrounded themselves with the young men from the equestrian 
order, and men who had previously been soldiers who were staying in Rome. Armed with 
swords, they attempted to force their way out of the Capitol, but they were stopped by a hail 





This passage has been taken as evidence of direct popular involvement in imperial politics at even its 
highest levels. In Herodian’s account, the trick employed against the people was the appointment of 
Gordian III as Caesar (7.10.8-9).46 Such an interpretation is possible from reading the scene in 
isolation, but becomes more problematic when it is considered in terms of Herodian’s presentation 
of social order. All three groups are present in this scene, if somewhat contrivedly. The Senate, along 
with the equestrians, gather with former soldiers on one side; the people form the other.  
An overview of the social scheme of Herodian’s riots shows the importance of the three groups in his 
depiction of upheaval in Rome. A reorganisation of alliances soon follows, resulting in open fighting 
between the people, with the support of the Senate, and the army (7.11.1-12.7). Though the efforts to 
defeat the soldiers who were besieged in the praetorian camp dominate the rioting, a final 
redistribution is found at the conclusion of the scene, as the people and soldiers united in looting the 
homes of the wealthy, as much of the city burned down (7.12.7). All three possible combinations of 
the social groups are explored. Moreover, each shift in alliance is marked by an increase in the level 
of violence.47 The threat of violence from the people turned into warfare against the soldiers, and 
ultimately into a physical destruction of Rome which was ruinous to the wealthy. This is a far cry 
from the harmony after the death of Marcus Aurelius, or even the predictable events of an emperor 
like Pertinax, who faced consistent opposition from the soldiers alone.  
Closer reading of the different stages of Herodian’s riots greatly problematise any acceptance of their 
accuracy. Throughout the unrest in Rome, the three groups are presented in roles which are entirely 
inconsistent with the earlier narrative. The reaction to Pupienus and Balbinus demonstrates how this 
effect operates. As outlined in the previous chapter, there are many formulaic episodes of imperial 
                                                             
46 The involvement of the people in the uprising of 238 was most forcefully argued by Mullens 1948, who saw 
the regime of the co-emperors as a manifestation of popular unrest; see however Dietz 1980: 322-26 for a 
comprehensive rebuttal. For the role of the people in appointing Gordian III, see recently Lo Cascio 2005: 157; 
Gerhardt 2008: 775-76; Potter 2014: 168. The scene has also been viewed as an example of patronage networks 
more commonly associated with republican politics being deployed, Zimmermann 1999b: 147-52. 
47 They also coincide with a change in location. See Pitcher 2012b: 277-78 for a comparable example from the 
reign of Commodus, who becomes more tyrannical as he moves around the empire. 
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procession in the History.48 This example stands out from the others. Pupienus and Balbinus are not 
the only emperors to be hated by the people; Didius Julianus faced much the same problem. But the 
roles are reversed. Where Julianus advanced in a military formation (2.6.13), Pupienus and Balbinus 
were blocked by the masses who were sufficiently armed to drive the imperial party back to the 
senate house. This diversion from the standard formulation is reinforced by the efficacy of sticks and 
stones in the face of swords. The Gordians’ Carthaginian ὄχλος, armed with impromptu shields and 
weapons, had just been massacred by Capellianus (7.9.4-5); in Rome, the ὄχλοι (7.10.5) have no such 
problems.49 The role reversal is also seen in the explanation for popular opposition to the new 
emperors. Herodian claims that the people hated Pupienus because of his excessive discipline during 
his time as prefect (7.10.6), an accusation which already echoes Maximinus’ claims about why the 
Romans hated him.50 A broader scope of comparison adds a further level of subversion to the scene. 
The people themselves mirror the Praetorians from forty-five years earlier, who marched on the 
imperial palace to remove Pertinax for his excessive discipline (2.5.1). This is not just a moment of 
popular engagement in politics. It is an illustration of the collapse of normal social order in Rome. In 
Herodian’s scheme, the people become the source of violence to be placated;51 their successful 
obstruction defies all expectations concerning military actions. 
                                                             
48 Above, 137-44. 
49 Cf. 1.12.8 and 7.12.5 for examples of the people hiding on rooftops, because they can’t defend themselves 
against properly armed troops. 
50 Pupienus displayed a lot of discipline to the people (πολύ τε τὸ ἐπιστρεφὲς); Maximinus accused the Senate 
of being opposed to a rule that was disciplined and ordered (ἐπιστρεφῆ καὶ κόσμιον, 7.8.7). Maximinus claimed 
that the Romans opposed his discipline; it was actually his opponent’s which caused problems. This is very 
much in keeping with Kemezis: 2014 252-50 on the ironic role of speeches in the History (see above, 130-31). 
51 The Senate’s trick can perhaps be understood in this context. The figure most associated with deception in 
the History is Septimius Severus. He is described using a σόφισμα on five occasions: three times in his deception 
of the Praetorians when he came to power (2.13.1; 2.13.11; 2.13.12); gaining the short-term support of Albinus 
by appointing him Caesar (2.15.2); and taking the children of Niger’s general Aemelianus hostage (3.2.4). The 





The unexpected role of the people is supported by the unlikely reversal of one of the standard images 
of political conflict in the third century. In Herodian’s account of the rioting, the Senate were the 
main source of violence. The catalyst is a moment which inverts one of the standard tropes of Roman 
historiography. The soldiers left in Rome by Maximinus went up to the senate house to see what was 
happening in a meeting.52 They were unarmed. When a few soldiers went inside, two senators – 
Gallicanus and Maecenas – stabbed them in the heart with hidden daggers, killing unarmed men with 
their own concealed weapons (7.11.2-4). The very idea of an unarmed soldier being killed in cold 
blood is a bizarre twist on their usual role as the armed propagators of violence.53 The idea 
corresponds to the reformulation of tyranny after the death of Vitalianus. Usually, wealthy senators 
faced the threat of violence from greedy emperors throughout the History. In 238, the normal order 
of political aggression is turned upside down. 
It might be possible to suggest from both these scenes that Herodian’s scheme of homogeneity shows 
signs of weakness. There is some suggestion from Herodian himself that the mob which gathered 
outside the temple of Jupiter might have been responding to the friends and relatives of Gordian I 
(7.10.1). Meanwhile, just two senators are implicated in the murder of soldiers, while Gallicanus 
individually is presented as urging the people on to fight the soldiers (7.11.5-7). In keeping with his 
wider approach, Herodian maintains these possibilities only very briefly. In the first instance, 
Gordian’s supporters are not named as senators; the inference is possible, but it is not part of 
Herodian’s original scheme. Moreover, as seen above, the people were persuaded to oppose the new 
emperors primarily by their own hatred of Pupienus. Gordian’s friends may have arranged the mob, 
                                                             
of the Praetorians (8.8.5). The Senate’s response to the people thus takes on language associated with openly 
militarised civil war. 
52 Herodian is typically vague about what was happening in the Senate, saying simply that the people and 
soldiers wanted to find out what was going on (βουλόμενοι τὸ πραττόμενον μαθεῖν), 7.11.2. 
53 The contrast between armed soldiers and unarmed victims occurs on several occasions: the murder of 
Pertinax (2.5.3); the disbanding of the Praetorians by Severus (2.13.11); Caracalla’s massacre of the Alexandrians 
(4.9.6). There are many other examples of a less explicit threat from armed soldiers, as seen for example in the 
processions of Julianus and Caracalla described above, 139-41 and 152-54 respectively. 
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but they did not decide its opinion. Gallicanus and Maecenas conform to Herodian’s tendency to 
return quickly to homogenous group behaviour. Immediately after the senators stabbed the troops, 
Herodian writes that everyone (πάντες) was carrying a blade, whether openly or in secret (7.11.4). 
The two senators are thus far from unique with their concealed daggers. Moreover, Gallicanus’ 
individual role only lasts for one scene. After the soldiers successfully escaped to the camp and held 
off the people’s early forays, senatorial opposition is presented as much more generalised. Herodian 
writes simply that the anger of the people and the Senate grew.54 Gallicanus disappears from the 
narrative, to be replaced by homogeneity in senatorial fury. 
The portrayal of the violent unrest which followed Pupienus and Balbinus rests on a simplistic picture 
of Roman society. But even here, when the emperor is specifically not in Rome, Maximinus is 
inescapable. The idea of the people taking up his savagery has been introduced above. It becomes 
much more explicit in the later rioting. Regular attacks from the people followed the one led by 
Gallicanus, to no effect. The soldiers continued to resist, angry that they were being attacked by 
Romans who were behaving like barbarians, ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὡς ὑπὸ βαρβάρων (7.12.3). The Roman 
demos has fully embraced the model of Maximinus, and even surpassed his attacks on the city. Where 
the emperor made Rome look like a siege with his barbarian savagery (7.3.6), the people literally 
engaged in one.55 There is no longer the pretence of freedom that was seen under Gordian (7.7.4); 
Gallicanus openly incited civil war (7.11.6). Herodian’s inversion of the expected social roles works 
specifically in relation to Maximinus himself. The army and people do not merely change their usual 
functions as aggressors and victims respectively. They do so as the enactors of a barbaric tyranny 
which is unique to this one emperor. 
The Death of a Tyrant 
It is into this setting of disrupted society that Maximinus returns to the narrative. The story of his 
invasion takes up the majority of the History’s final book, centred around the successful resistance 
                                                             
54 μείζων ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ τε δήμου καὶ τῆς συγκλήτου ἐγένετο, 7.12.1. 
55 In the first attack on the camp, the people advance in order to besiege it, ὡς πολιορκήσοντες (7.11.8); cf. the 





against his army by the citizens of Aquileia (8.2-5). The invasion itself has been studied very 
effectively as an example of how Herodian’s comparisons between emperors operate across his 
narrative. Luke Pitcher and Adam Kemezis have noted the contrasts between his invasion, and that 
of Septimius Severus.56 They have also observed unexpected reformulations of thematic tropes. 
Maximinus’ failure has been linked to a subversion of Herodian’s standard geographical rules. Italy is 
transformed from a place of protected comfort into a hostile land, which actively hindered 
Maximinus and his troops. For Luke Pitcher, this is a demonstration of the ‘disconcerting 
deliquescence of old certainties’ for Maximinus, whose position is undermined even as his 
assumptions about Italy are washed away.57  
Away from the emperor’s personal actions, the same thematic play is found in the resolution of 
Maximinus’ reign, after his death. At the end of book 7, Rome was burning. A great swathe – bigger, 
Herodian reports, than the size of most cities – was destroyed, and its buildings looted (7.12.7). There 
is no indication of this at all in book 8. We next see Rome when Maximinus’ severed head reached the 
city, after his assassination. Herodian presents a festive atmosphere spreading across Italy, with 
celebrations of Maximinus’ death which were, apparently, impossible to describe succinctly (8.6.6-
7.1).58 Sacrifices were made, laurels carried, and everything was done in good order. All of this was 
brought about by the arrival of the dead emperor’s severed head.59 A verbal echo confirms the shift. 
As after the death of Vitalianus, the people ran around as if possessed (ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶν, 7.7.1). The 
same madness is found at the head’s arrival in Rome, as the people ran to the circus, again ὥσπερ 
                                                             
56 For example, the Italian cities had welcomed Severus, and he quickly moved on from them (2.11.6); Maximinus 
found those cities abandoned (8.1.4), and despite the expectation of an easy victory (8.2.2) he was fatally delayed 
at Aquileia. 
57 Pitcher 2012b: 280-82; Kemezis 2014: 239-45.  
58 οὐδ’ εἰπεῖν ἔστι λόγῳ (8.6.7). 
59 Cf. 3.8.1, when Septimius Severus sent the head of Clodius Albinus back to Rome. This is reported as one aspect 
of Severus unleashing his anger against Albinus’ supporters. He ultimately arrived back in Rome for a similar 
greeting with laurels, but in an atmosphere of significant fear (3.8.3). See Dio 76[75].7.4-8.4 for the same episode, 
and the terror it caused. 
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ἐνθουσιῶντες (8.6.8). This time their madness was celebratory, rather than murderous. It is a 
spectacular contrast to the end of the riot. There is no mention of any damage to the city; rather than 
being razed and pillaged, it now appears joyfully bedecked in flowers. 
As a narrative, this may seem extremely inconsistent. This is less the case when thinking in terms of 
Herodian’s comparative scheme, and the use of repeated scene types. As observed above, Maximinus’ 
reign is characterised by the subversion of familiar tropes and episodes. The response to his death is 
a fitting conclusion. The assassination of the emperor at the hands of the army would not normally 
be a cause for celebration. These are moments when the soldiers have previously run amok, and when 
an atmosphere of panic has taken over Rome. When the emperor was a barbarian, however, his death 
is a restorative event.60 Its detail presents a return to the standard roles for the three social groups. 
The army was not happy with the selection of Pupienus and Balbinus, but even its resistance follows 
earlier patterns. They pretended to show their support, as they had for Pertinax, out of the same 
necessity which saw the appointment of Macrinus, while secretly hating the new emperors.61 The 
death of Maximinus is a final moment of subversion, before normality in Herodian’s narrative world 
is resumed. 
The effect can be seen in a collection of military motifs from the siege of Aquileia and its immediate 
aftermath. While he was still alive, the absent barbarian reigned over a city which was being pillaged 
to increasingly violent degrees. After his death, a remarkable shift occurs in Herodian’s imagery. The 
final mention of σκῦλα occurs during the siege of Aquileia. After being covered in burning pitch, the 
besieging troops strip off their armour, leaving it looking like the spoils of war (8.4.10). Shortly 
afterwards, Herodian adds a second militarised motif. Herodian has already described the appearance 
of a siege, ὄψις πολιορκίας, without any fighting, and the appearance of freedom, πρόσχημα 
ἐλευθερίας, in a civil war. After the death of Maximinus, the Aquileians keep the gates locked, but 
trade with the army outside. The result was a condition of peace and friendship, even while there was 
                                                             
60 The violent death of Elagabalus had similarly positive results when Severus Alexander came to power (6.1). 
61 8.7.2-3; cf. 2.2.9 (Pertinax), 4.14.3 (Macrinus). Even their deaths return a degree of familiarity, even if it is one 





the appearance of a siege: ἦν εἰρήνης μὲν καὶ φιλίας διάθεσις, σχῆμα δὲ ἔτι πολιορκίας (8.6.4). The 
arms of the retreating soldiers meet the genuine definition of σκῦλα, but they are left alone. So too 
the reality of a siege is masked by an apparent peace. Both are dramatic inversions of images which 
have previously connoted unrest. The end of barbarian rule is not only marked by the death of 
Maximinus, but by a final reversal in the images of warfare.  
Herodian’s interest is not in the accuracy of his depiction of Rome, but in how he can use the city to 
comment on the emperor. The contrast between the destruction of Rome as Maximinus is about to 
invade Italy, and its restoration after his death, forms part of an overall depiction of a disruptive 
ruler. For Barbara Kuhn-Chen, Maximinus’ tax collector represents the negative form of an idea 
which is first mentioned under Marcus Aurelius, that subjects resemble their emperors.62 This 
approach can be applied much more broadly. As a peripheral barbarian in charge of Rome, Maximinus 
is the inversion of social and geographical expectations. This sets the tone for Herodian’s depiction 
of the entire empire during his reign. In a final crescendo, book 7 sees the ultimate aim of a barbarian 
actually achieved. The city itself was set alight, and its wealth looted. This should be the ultimate 
presentation of barbarian success against Rome. It is precisely from this point that the emperor’s 
fortunes declined. The invasion of Italy saw Maximinus first deserted by his abilities as a commander, 
and then by his soldiers. In a final ironic twist, his death follows an unlikely model. Maximinus was 
killed by mutinous soldiers outside his tent, alongside his son, after failing to win them over with 
appeals; all his friends were attacked and killed (8.5.6). The great barbarian emperor died the same 
death as Severus Alexander, the weak mother’s-boy he replaced.63 His disappearance from the 
narrative coincides with a public holiday to celebrate the emperor’s death, and with scenes of peace 
in the middle of a battleground. What could be more fitting a conclusion to Rome’s experiences under 
its subversive barbarian ruler? 
                                                             
62 Kuhn-Chen 2002: 290. 
63 6.9.1-7. Substitute Maximinus’ son for Alexander’s mother, and the two scenes contain all the same features. 
This includes threats to kill Alexander’s military prefect (6.9.4), which actually happened under Maximinus. 
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Writing Rome in the History 
This chapter began with an overview of how the History continues to be fundamental to 
reconstructions of the reign of Maximinus. The widespread approach to the evident moralising 
rhetoric of Herodian’s narrative has been to challenge its most obvious deployment. The barbarian 
origins of Maximinus, and the savagery which defines his character, have both been rejected. At the 
same time, however, the general structure of his account has been accepted. As I have argued here, 
such an approach is dangerous. It is misleading to suggest that Herodian’s rhetoric can easily be 
removed from the surface of an otherwise reliable narrative. I have shown in the preceding chapter 
that his interest in exploring and comparing the reigns he narrates extends beyond the specific traits 
of emperors, into the actions of a tripartite society which surrounds them. This analysis has 
demonstrated the extent to which this holds true, even when Maximinus appears to be absent. 
The reign of Maximinus is one of constant inversion in the History. His tyrannical sway is exercised 
from the periphery of the empire, but it is felt as acutely in Rome as anywhere else. Pitcher and 
Kemezis have highlighted the disruptive effect of Maximinus on the geography of the empire, but 
this extends much deeper into Herodian’s account. The very structure of Roman society is turned 
upside down during his reign, in a constant inversion of expectations. Maximinus begins his reign as 
a figure of universal hatred due to his inherent barbarian savagery. By the time book 7 comes to an 
end, the victims of his corruption have become its greatest perpetrators. The murder of the 
Praetorian Prefect Vitalianus unleashed a tide of citizen-informers. Things only got worse after the 
Gordians were crushed in North Africa. The Roman people are portrayed with the very same kind of 
savagery which Maximinus inflicted upon them, besieging the city and robbing it of its wealth; only 
unlike the emperor, they physically destroyed it as well. What starts off as an attack against the vices 
of a provincial general becomes the basis for Herodian’s depiction of the complete breakdown of 
order. 
Herodian’s exploration of unrest is reliant on a much wider narrative structure. It would be possible 
to understand the excesses of Maximinus, and indeed see some of the inversions described above, 
simply by reading book 7. The full extent of Herodian’s play with his reader’s expectations can only 





obvious enough twist on a completely standard Roman trope. Much less apparent without wider 
engagement with Herodian is the effect of the murder of Vitalianus, which introduces the inverting 
processes. Emperors plotting against a dangerous Praetorian Prefect sits in perfect opposition to the 
formulaic scenes which are familiar to Herodian’s reader. It flags up a subversive tone which then 
informs so much of the following action in Rome. So too the connection between the narrative and 
the character of Maximinus is much more natural after reading the first six books. The individual 
vignettes from 238 may feel easy to access, but that is already misleading. When placed in the History’s 
thematic and structural framework, these episodes are instead decidedly uncomfortable for the 
attentive reader. 
The impact of Maximinus’ character on the narrative should give scholars reason to pause when 
trying to use the History to reconstruct the political character of his reign. Herodian’s interest in 
comparing different emperors is far from a new observation, but the depth of its effect has not been 
pursued. It does not only involve listing personal qualities, but demonstrating them visually. That 
scheme relies on a social structure which clearly distinguishes between Senate, army, and people. It 
is one of absolutes, with minimal room for shades of grey. Each group is either favoured or attacked 
by emperors, and favours or hates them in return. This conceptualisation of social activity may be 
rather banal from a modern historical perspective, but it is surprisingly flexible when presented in 
Herodian’s neatly self-contained scenes. The occasional unavoidable division can be skipped over 
quickly, without impacting on a narrative which is easy to follow. The inversions of book 7 present 
the full extent of its rhetorical potential. The roles of Senate, army, and people cannot be so clearly 
swapped if there were any murky connection between them. Their transformation from victim to 
perpetrator of barbarity, or vice versa, is all the more effective because of Herodian’s strictly black-
and-white presentation.  
When Maximinus first appears as a barbarian soldier, his place within the History’s structure is clearly 
defined. Herodian’s vision of Roman society is remarkably simplistic. It is impossible for Maximinus 
to be anything other than a military figure in a narrative which is structured around conflict between 
clearly defined, homogenous groups, whose members are entirely distinct. But it does not follow that 
the rhetorical scheme is just as straightforward. Any attempts to mine Herodian’s narrative for the 
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detail of 238 ignore the frame which holds it together. Describing Maximinus as a politically 
incompetent general might seem like it avoids some of Herodian’s most obvious embellishments, but 
it completely accepts the structure of a narrative which is not especially interested in political events 
beyond the consideration of imperial character. Book 7 has gained a reputation as one of the History’s 





Conclusion: Rethinking the Third Century 
Rethinking Contemporary Historiography 
To bring this thesis to a conclusion, it is necessary first to return to the scholarship from which it 
originates. Historical interest in the third century has grown exponentially in both variety and extent 
over the past fifteen years. There is now a considerable body of work on the cultural history of the 
empire in this period, fuelled by a rising interest in the Greek literature of the Second Sophistic.1 In 
political terms, the representation of power is now as widely studied as its enactment, with the 
imagery and architecture of the Severan dynasty especially well served.2 As the range of approaches 
has broadened, so too engagement with the contemporary historiography has changed. Cassius Dio 
and Herodian are being taken more seriously as authors, deserving of closer literary investigation in 
their own right.3 Combining the reinterpretations of different kinds of evidence from the start of the 
century in particular has allowed for some striking reassessments of long-held assumptions. For 
example, Julie Langford’s analysis has transformed Julia Domna from a powerful member of the 
Severan dynasty into a tool to characterise the men of the imperial family, whether in written 
narratives or centrally promulgated images. Her actual character or authority are immaterial in these 
contexts.4 Alex Imrie’s reconsideration of Caracalla’s universal citizenship law can now be included 
in this interdisciplinary approach, in his emphasis of the edict’s role as a means of legitimising his 
                                                             
1 See above, 3 n. 3. 
2 See above, 16-21. 
3 Demonstrated most clearly by Fromentin et al. 2016, Lange and Madsen 2016 on Cassius Dio. 
4 Langford 2013: 7-13 introduces her approach; cf. Levick 2007 for a more traditional view. 
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regime after the execution of Geta.5 Episodes and individuals are being recast as part of a continuous 
process of dynastic legitimation after the end of the Antonine regime.6 
The growing complexity of analysis is reflected in the most recent anglophone synoptic histories of 
the third century as a whole. The studies by Clifford Ando, David Potter and Michael Kulikowski have 
contributed in various ways to the picture of the third century as inextricable from the longer-term 
developments of the empire, and indeed the wider ancient world. All three have rightly been praised. 
The basic structure of Ando’s overview, alternating between a chronological narrative and 
thematically organised chapters, has been applauded for its ability to combine short-term political 
change with longer, social and cultural processes.7 Potter’s timespan from 180-395 frames the third 
century as only one transformative period among many, incorporating it into a narrative which 
includes the reigns of both Constantine and Julian, and the religious disputes of the later fourth 
century.8 Kulikowski has not only followed suit with a chronological shift, placing the origins of the 
third century’s political developments back into the Antonine period.9 He has also emphasised the 
global context of the empire, connecting the third century with a much broader geo-political 
environment than Rome’s immediate frontier regions.10  
                                                             
5 Imrie 2018: esp. 113-33. He allows for Dio’s claims that the edict was an attempt to generate income (50-80), 
but this is only one of several apparent purposes. 
6 On the Severans specifically, see also Faust and Leitmeir 2011; Lichtenberger 2011; Rowan 2012; Kemezis 2014: 
30-89. Hekster 2015: esp. 209-21 makes the important point that their methods necessarily conformed to earlier 
practice, using dynastic claims as an example. 
7 Icks 2013 on Ando 2012; see also Levick 2014; Madsen 2014. 
8 ‘A significant benefit of his study of this period is that Potter’s work straddles and engages periods of great 
transformation, rather than allowing the work to be demarcated by it, thereby treating the Roman empire as a 
continuous and evolving organisation.’ Greenwood 2014 on Potter 2014; see also Hekster 2005 on the volume’s 
first edition. 
9 ‘Kulikowski knits this century into the fabric of an imperial program that began in the second century and 
was not fully completed until the middle of the fourth.’ Drake 2017: 567 on Kulikowski 2016. 





In such a context, the analysis I have offered here might at first appear rather restricted. It is limited 
not just to political narrative, but contemporary historiography. Chronologically its focus is 
relatively narrow, covering fewer than sixty years from the death of Marcus Aurelius to the events 
of 238. But its consequences have a much broader bearing. While recent scholarship has done 
considerable work to reposition the political developments of the third century, the underlying 
mechanisms have not received the same attention. A consistent pattern is still followed, which 
derives from the narratives by Cassius Dio and Herodian. As remarked in the introduction, the 
apparent corroboration of two contemporary narratives is a rare phenomenon at any point in the 
ancient world, and so their shared view has been highly influential.11 They present the same basic 
picture of conflict between a politicised army and a beleaguered Senate as is prominent across 
modern scholarship. Even as the range of approaches has gown vastly, the same political question 
has prevailed. The aim has been to explain how the army came to dominate imperial politics, at the 
expense of the Senate. Dio and Herodian’s moralising causes may have been rejected, but their models 
of the general political context continue to hold sway. 
But agreement between the two narratives does not inevitably mean they are accurate. This thesis 
has responded to the wider reassessment of the third century by pressing on some of the central 
assumptions which underpin modern reconstructions. The main force of my approach has been 
deliberately literary. The discussion of thematic frameworks, authorial self-presentation and 
imperial characterisation has taken place in a narrative, rather than historical context. But its impact 
is not limited in the same way. The separate investigation of Dio and Herodian has made it clear that 
both historians depict a highly simplified political world, especially in their presentations of the 
Senate. Moreover, they create this impression for very different narrative purposes. The two 
narratives are not reliable accounts. They are divorced from the events themselves, shaped to the 
specific interests of their respective authors.  
In Dio’s Roman History, scholars have an account which has met every traditional measure of 
reliability. The contemporary books are the report of a senator who was personally involved in the 
                                                             
11 Outlined above, 9-16. 
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events he describes. His immediacy as an eyewitness has become Dio’s defining feature as a 
historian.12 As I have argued, things are not this straightforward. Even before we get to the question 
of how Dio wrote about his lifetime, there is the pressing issue of the text’s preservation. The majority 
of the text from the contemporary books no longer exists. With the exception of the manuscript Vat. 
Gr. 1288, the text survives through Byzantine extracts, primarily the eleventh-century Epitome of 
Xiphilinus and the more obviously fragmentary Excerpta Constantiniana. The contemporary history 
therefore largely consists of those parts of the narrative which Xiphilinus or the excerptors decided 
were interesting enough to keep. The response from scholars has been overwhelmingly optimistic 
about the extent to which the surviving text reflects Dio’s views. This confidence seems misplaced at 
best. I have shown that the later interventions can result in an already simplified version of Dio’s 
explanations, with a tendency to omit the technical aspects of Roman politics, in favour of universally 
applicable moral lessons. This does not mean that it is impossible to study the epitomised books; it is 
clear that the extant narrative fits closely with the wider thematic framework of the Roman History. 
Even so, it is important to make a clear distinction. The contemporary history does not represent 
Cassius Dio’s full view of the Severan dynasty, nor should it be thought of as representative of a larger 
whole. It is a series of individual moments, assembled in chronological order, but with an unknowable 
amount of detail and judgement lost. 
Within that interpretative frame, Dio’s contemporary shows little nuance in its presentation of public 
life. There is a clear impression from the Roman History that the Senate was a united, corporate body. 
This is intrinsic to the modern view of the Severan period as well. When pressed, however, Dio’s 
construction of collective senatorial experience begins to fragment as much as his text. At various 
points, members of the Senate itself are portrayed as external threats to Dio and his peers. No 
possibility is left for Didius Julianus being anything but corrupt, while Comazon’s unprecedented 
authority is linked exclusively to Elagabalus; both men can only be antagonistic to the “legitimate” 
senators around them. There is only one form of legitimate political activity in the contemporary 
history, predicated on respect for ‘us senators’. Anything else is corrupt, and non-senatorial, no 
                                                             





matter what the social status of the people involved. The appearance is one of coherent opinions, but 
even within the narrative, Dio chooses who to include within the senatorial whole. Compounded by 
the loss of text, it is even more impossible to know how frequently senators were cast out of his 
exclusionary definition. 
This scheme of senatorial activity is beneficial to Dio in two respects, both of which are directly 
related to his self-presentation as a senator and a historian. It is not simply that his use of the first-
person plural claims a participation in shared actions. When he appears as an individual, Dio is 
consistently at the very heart of things. His reaction is the most extreme, and his responses and 
actions are presented as an encapsulation of the experience of the wider senatorial group. Through 
this self-location, he embodies the experiences of acceptable senatorial life, and by extension 
becomes the representative of legitimate politics. The effect is magnified by the specific 
methodological claims of the Roman History, in which proximity to events is especially important. It 
allows Dio to fulfil a dual role in his own account, and in doing so to breach the historiographical 
divide between logos and ergon. As a narrator, Dio can present events as they appeared from the 
outside; simultaneously, as a protagonist he is able to explain what he and his senatorial colleagues 
were really feeling. Dio’s depiction of the Senate is not therefore merely simplified. It engenders a 
highly effective twofold authority, where the senatorial and authorial aspects of his self-portrayal 
can come together. 
These observations are of no little significance to the use of Dio’s contemporary books to reconstruct 
the early third century. The key to Dio’s reputation in much modern scholarship is his status as an 
eyewitness insider. Andrew Scott’s view that the Roman History presents a senatorial experience of 
contentious social change is only the most recent reassertion of this position.13 But it is one thing to 
say that Dio was a senator. It is another to argue that his claims to represent a shared senatorial view 
of the Severans are accurate, especially when he himself is the main evidence for its existence. When 
Dio’s report is privileged, it leads to a clear distinction between “acceptable” senatorial behaviour 
and corruption. If the possibility of differing views among senators is granted – something which 
                                                             
13 Scott 2018a: esp. x-xi, 2-9. 
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seems entirely likely in the cases of Didius Julianus or Comazon – Dio’s model begins to look much 
too simplistic. The Roman History is the reaction of one senator. Dio may not allow anyone in his 
narrative world to disagree with his viewpoint, but that is no reason for modern readers not to do so. 
Herodian’s place in the modern synoptic histories of the third century is more limited 
chronologically, but much more comprehensive for the short period for which he is relied on. His 
History dictates reconstructions of the reign of Maximinus Thrax, and the tumultuous events of 238. 
For the most part, his reliability has been questioned due to a clear interest in the moral character of 
emperors. Marcus Aurelius provides a model of idealised imperial rule at the start of his narrative, 
against which later emperors are compared, and universally found wanting. Studies of Herodian are 
increasingly demonstrating the variety of means for such comparisons. Along with traditional 
virtues, the way emperors move, the way they speak, even the clothes they wear have been identified 
as means to explore the relative qualities of rulers. The repeated scenes and motifs used by Herodian 
are almost cinematic in their construction, putting character on display through the description of 
actions which confirm internal character traits. At first sight, the later books seem to be an exception. 
Herodian includes much greater detail than elsewhere, and for large parts of the narrative, the 
emperor himself is absent. The depiction of senators waging war against soldiers in Rome appears to 
be removed from a moralising scheme. 
These appearances are deceptive. As I have demonstrated, the very structure of Roman society in the 
History is itself closely linked to imperial characterisation. Herodian’s view of Rome is even less 
nuanced than Dio’s. His narrative is built around three monolithic social groups. The Senate, the 
army, and the people act as independent, homogenous entities. Like Dio, Herodian often externalises 
individuals, or specific groups, from the united whole. The German bodyguard of Pupienus can be 
described as completely separate from the army, while provincial governors exist outside the limits 
of a Senate located at all times in Rome. When internal divisions are avoidable, the History’s episodic 
structure allows them to be resolved with ease. When civil wars come to an end, Herodian can talk of 
‘the army’ without any need for reconciliation. The Senate, divided during the joint-reign of Caracalla 





Though several apparent discrepancies arise within the narrative as a result, they are not important 
to the History’s purposes. Herodian’s interest is not in the groups themselves, so it does not matter if 
their actions appear somewhat disjointed. In their function as an indication of imperial character, 
however, any such inconsistencies disappear. Within the scheme of repeating scenes, the three 
groups appear in a variety of configurations, reflecting the emperor at the centre of the episode. They 
provide an almost cinematic backdrop which confirms the moral comparisons Herodian makes. 
When Pertinax comes to power, Herodian shows the people thronging around him, as the Praetorian 
Guard are forced to join in; the testudo formation which gathers around Didius Julianus to protect him 
from the terrified crowds confirms the shift in ruling style with a grand display of threatened 
violence. Beyond moral qualities, the need for Pescennius Niger and Gordian I to dress up their 
followers like soldiers, and their houses like imperial palaces, presages the fleeting and ephemeral 
nature of their claims to power. Herodian could not be much further removed from Dio in this 
respect. He is not just outside the Senate. He shows no particular regard for senators’ actions, beyond 
their utility as a tool for characterisation. 
All of this comes to a head in Herodian’s portrayal of Maximinus Thrax. From 7.4, and the rebellion 
of the Gordians, to the end of book 8, Herodian covers perhaps six months at a level of chronological 
focus more detailed than any other point in the narrative.14 Detail does not immediately mean 
accuracy. The uprisings against Maximinus, and the scenes of rioting in Rome, are part of a narrative 
of barbaric destruction. As Maximinus’ reign progresses, the empire is increasingly defined by his 
traits of savagery and greed. Such is his threat to the empire that the city of Rome itself moves from 
metaphorical to literal siege by Maximinus and his supporters. The three social groups are prominent 
in the creation of a chaotic atmosphere. The accession of a man described as an uneducated, violent 
Thracian soldier is the subversion of the model set by Marcus Aurelius. After several books containing 
familiar scenes, his reign correspondingly turns all expectations upside down. As the capital is sacked, 
the Senate become first murderers, before inciting the kind of rioting associated with the army; in 
                                                             
14 See Sillar 2016; Peachin 1990: 26-29 for the chronology. The only comparable point is the narrow focus of book 
2, which covers a few months of 193; cf. Hidber 2006: 136-46 for Herodian’s overall temporal scheme. 
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driving out the emperor’s corrupt agents, the people become informers against innocent opponents. 
In a great reversal of familiar tropes, the city is then saved from destruction by Maximinus’ 
assassination at the hands of his troops. The elaboration of the narrative in book 7 does not have to 
be an indication that it is an accurate, first-hand account of unrest in Rome.15 It is a formulation of 
worsening chaos, in which social order is destroyed, and Rome is razed to the metaphorical ground. 
From a more explicitly historical perspective, the use of Herodian’s History to reconstruct the events 
of 238 is fraught with problems. In itself, Herodian’s narrative is extremely simplistic in its 
presentation of unified social groups, competing against each other in a series of shifting alliances. 
The wider role of Herodian’s social structure in characterising emperors reinforces the need for 
caution in following his explanations for the rebellions. When the reassessment of Dio’s “senatorial” 
narrative is taken into account, Herodian’s reliability outright collapses. The conflict he presents 
between the Senate seems to follow Dio’s formulation of senatorial experience. The more Dio is 
viewed as smoothing over competition within the Senate, and externalising individuals who did not 
conform to his idea of consensus, the harder it is to defend Herodian’s more extreme homogenisation 
of collective activity. Without the support of Dio, the inconsistencies in the History are difficult to 
ignore. It becomes increasingly necessary to accept his account for what it is: an exploration of 
imperial character and its effects on Rome, with no evident concern for recording the details of 
political structures. Herodian’s conceptualisation of Roman society is undoubtedly effective in that 
aim, enabling a depiction of Maximinus which is more sophisticated than has largely been noted. It 
does not lend itself to a simple reconstruction of political tensions. 
Literary studies of Dio and Herodian have developed considerably in recent years. If their respective 
political narratives are to be understood, the same methodologies need to be applied here too. As I 
have made clear, it is not simply a case of looking beyond literary excesses to find reliable 
contemporary records of the early third century. Neither historian produced a narrative by building 
rhetorical images around a central, objective account. Their thematic concerns inform the 
                                                             
15 See Börm 2008: 74-75 for an effectively sceptical response to some of the claims about Herodian’s suddenly 





fundamental structure of the Roman worlds they present, just as they shape the character of any 
given emperor. In many ways, Herodian’s account of 238 becomes a confirmation of a different kind 
of historiographical approach. It demonstrates how deeply the interests of ancient writers can affect 
how they shape narrative worlds. And it shows how dangerous it is to accept them uncritically. These 
two narratives are not descriptions of a political division between the Senate and their non-senatorial 
opponents. They are responses to contemporary events, which create that division as part of 
historiographical schemes very different in their interests and intentions from our own. 
Rethinking Political Conflict 
It is one thing to say that current models of reconstructing the early third century are inadequate. It 
is quite another thing to suggest an alternative. It is self-evidently beyond the scope of this 
conclusion to offer even an overview of an alternative explanation for the disruptions to imperial 
authority that plagued Rome over the third century as a whole. Even so, it is possible to put forward 
a few directions for future research which could sharpen our understanding of its early decades, and 
in turn modify interpretations of the unrest which followed. The defining feature of my position is 
the rejection of the assumption that we should be looking for conflict between coherent interest 
groups. This impression is generated from the contemporary narratives of Dio and Herodian. Rather 
than thinking of their accounts as accurate descriptions of events, they can be viewed as simplified 
reactions to them. Two main consequences follow. Firstly, “military” involvement in political life is 
transformed from the unanimous aims of a coherent body, into moments when individuals took 
advantage of their connections with the army. Secondly, and importantly, such a reconsideration of 
military action does not reject the ancient historiography. If the contemporary narratives are treated 
as responses to events, their detail can be explained outside any discussion of their historicity. They 
can be thought of as part of a broader discourse of imperial legitimacy. This may dispel a sense of 
knowing exactly what happened, especially in the 230s. I argue that the acknowledgement of 
uncertainty is more productive than a naive decision to trust what Dio and Herodian said. 
The key figure for this reassessment is Maximinus Thrax. Maximinus continues to be viewed as a 
political outsider. Even as it is now fully accepted that he was not the barbarian described by ancient 
writers, a disinterested or incompetent leader who alienated the Senate in favour of spending time 
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and money on his troops. Ando’s jibe at his ‘gross irresponsibility as ruler’, or Potter’s complaint that 
‘[Maximinus] simply did not understand the whole range of the job’ are merely reassertions of the 
dismissive attitude towards his reign.16 But the reconstruction of an externalised emperor is a 
reflection of the ancient narratives. Outside written accounts, almost nothing is known about 
Maximinus’ career. Reconstructions of his rise through the military ranks are entirely reliant on the 
Historia Augusta.17 And as Michael Speidel has now observed, even the most widely reported part of 
his career – serving as praefectus tironibus, in charge of training Severus Alexander’s army – is based 
on the modern fabrication of an office which is in fact otherwise unattested.18 The assumption that 
Maximinus was a soldier, and nothing more, derives from Herodian’s contemporary account. And as 
I have argued, that exclusive connection to the army is part of the History’s scheme of imperial 
characterisation, just as much as his supposedly barbarian origins. 
In order to escape the influence of Herodian’s rhetoric, a different approach to Maximinus is needed. 
I believe that sociological methodologies can offer a useful point of comparison here. I am not the 
first to argue for such a position; Inge Mennen’s study of the political elite in the third century is 
framed explicitly around sociological definitions of power and status.19 Where I differ is in the 
preliminary assumptions. Mennen preserves the clear division between the Senate and the army, 
                                                             
16 Ando 2012: 104; Potter 204: 170. See above, 160-62. 
17 Herodian says simply that he rose through all the ranks of the army, and was given commands over the army 
and the provinces (6.8.1). Wiegels 2012 provides a comprehensive overview of evidence and earlier discussion, 
as well as attempting to reconstruct a plausible career for Maximinus. The common assortment of names Gaius 
Julius Verus Maximinus makes it very difficult to connect epigraphic evidence which predates his reign 
specifically to Maximinus. 
18 Speidel 2016: 347-48, with bibliography. Speidel compares the closest attested ancient office, the junior 
equestrian rank of praefectus tironum: ‘It is practically inconceivable that a Roman official who had previously 
commanded legions and governed important military provinces would have next taken on such a lowly 
position.’ 





treating equestrians primarily as military officers.20 Through a comparison with one of Maximinus’ 
imperial predecessors, I believe that the assumed division can be broken down, and Maximinus 
himself reframed as someone closer to traditional sources of power.  
Pertinax has not received a great deal of attention from historians. His reign lasted only three 
months,21 and primarily appears as part of a brief interlude between the reigns of Commodus and 
Septimius Severus. In terms of political unrest in Rome, Pertinax is viewed as the opposite of 
Maximinus. In the ancient accounts, Pertinax was chosen because of his senatorial virtue, and 
assassinated through the greed of the Praetorian Guard.22 He stands at the opposite extreme in the 
conflict between senators and soldiers. This continues to be how his reign is viewed. For Ando, so 
scathing about Maximinus’ rejection of the niceties of senatorial politics, ‘Pertinax represented the 
establishment.’23 His failure to win over the troops, according to such arguments, was simply a sign 
of things to come.24 
But this is only part of Pertinax’s career. As far as can be reconstructed, Pertinax held only two offices 
on the senatorial cursus honorum: the suffect consulship, probably in 175; and the ordinary consulship 
in 192, with Commodus as his colleague. For the remainder of his career, including the years between 
his consular appointments, his activities look rather similar to the supposed military career of 
Maximinus. Pertinax’s rise to prominence under Marcus Aurelius is attributed to his successes as a 
                                                             
20 Mennen 2011: esp. 43-46. Within her scheme, ‘Maximinus was a professional soldier’, and ‘the first emperor 
with a pre-imperial career as professional military man’ (Mennen 2011: 23). 
21 Dio 74[73].10.3 records that he reigned for eighty-seven days, which would place his death on the 28 March. 
22 For Dio, Pertinax made the mistake of trying to change things too quickly, and as a result alienated the 
Praetorian Prefect, Laetus. It was Laetus’ underhand machinations which provoked the soldiers into killing 
their emperor (Dio 74[73].6.3; 74[73].9.1). Herodian is more straightforward. The soldiers were angry at losing 
the indulgence of Commodus, and so killed Pertinax because of his excessive discipline (Hdn 2.5.1). 
23 Ando 2012: 19. 
24 Campbell 2005: 1-2; Ando 2012: 19-22; Potter 2014: 95-96; Kulikowski 2016: 77. Note Schöpe 2011 as an 
exception, for the argument that Pertinax was forced into limiting the extent of his personal authority by the 
conspirators who selected him. 
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general in the Marcomannic Wars; adlection to praetorian rank was both a reward, and a means of 
ensuring that he was eligible for more important commands. There are definite problems with this 
reconstruction. Much of the specific detail of his appointments derives from the HA,25 and is only 
confirmed through a single, heavily restored inscription found near Cologne.26 But whatever his 
precise career path, Pertinax appears typical of a number of successful generals who enjoyed 
Antonine patronage.27 
When these two aspects are brought together, they highlight an element of discord in the 
presentation of Pertinax. He has been received simultaneously as an elderly and respected senator, 
and also a man who owed everything to his military abilities. It is something which goes back to Dio 
and Herodian, the former of whom notes his introduction into public office through a tribunate in 
the cavalry, secured through the patronage of the senator Pompeianus.28 A more individualised 
perspective on political change has a striking effect on the model of military/senatorial conflict. 
Much like his patron, Pertinax stood on both sides.29 He could be both a soldier and a hero of the 
Senate. If this is the case for Pertinax, it raises the question of whether it could also be true of 
Maximinus. 
In order to construct a potential scheme of closer engagement with the Senate by Maximinus, it is 
first necessary to explore Pertinax in more detail, to establish a comparatively firm basis for 
comparison. Returning to Dio’s narrative of senatorial life in Rome starts to raise a number of 
possibilities about the kinds of interaction taking place within the political elite. As I have shown, Dio 
excludes men of all backgrounds from his united Senate, including those with a strong senatorial 
                                                             
25 Pert. 1.5-4.3. See Alföldy 1974b; Lippold 1983; Devijver 1988; Kienast et al. 2017: 143-44. 
26 Kolbe 1962, = AE (1963) 52. Only two columns of text survive, each roughly three letters wide. Even the opening 
line is restored, to read [P] HELV[IO PERTIN]AC[I]. 
27 See recently Kemezis 2014: 51-55; Potter 2014: 74-82. 
28 Dio 74[73].3.1-2. Herodian (2.1.4) is typically less precise, mentioning successful but unspecified military and 
civil offices, and listing a number of his victories. 
29 Kulikowski 2016: 51-55 introduces Pompeianus as a ‘remarkable’ demonstration of equestrians gaining very 





pedigree.30 The positive reception of Pertinax might allow that thinking to be inverted, to suggest a 
likelihood of much more collaborative relationships than the ancient writers allow. If a career soldier 
could be praised as respectably senatorial by a member of the Senate, the same could be true of 
figures who are attacked. Was Didius Julianus held in the universal contempt suggested by the Roman 
History? Julianus’ political career is comparable to Dio’s own, climbing the cursus honorum and holding 
several governorships.31 It would be surprising if he had no senatorial allies to celebrate his accession 
in 193. The same could be said about Comazon entering the Senate, or the influence of Praetorian 
Prefects like Plautianus. Dio is especially clear in his presentation of their separation from his view 
of legitimate senatorial authority. It does not follow that all senators would have agreed, especially 
if they disputed the moralising charges which Dio applies to his opponents.32 Such disagreements 
would suggest a much greater level of competition within the Senate than Dio and Herodian suggest, 
but that would not be surprising.33 When the key to political advancement is the emperor’s favour, 
having the support of a newly adlected senator also meant having the support of someone who is in 
close contact with the imperial court. 
That in turn points towards investigations of the court itself. Björn Schöpe’s study of the Severan 
court is extensive in the detail of interaction between emperors themselves and the elite.34 Thinking 
in terms of elite social networks stresses that this is only part of an explanation for the constitution 
                                                             
30 See above, 100-108. 
31 Kienast et al. 2017: 147-48. 
32 Cf. Schöpe 2014: 83-85 for an introduction to imperial amici which follows Dio in seeing some promotions as 
inherently unacceptable to senators. 
33 Dio’s anti-senators are far from the only example; see e.g. Hoffer 1999: 55-91; Ash 2013 on Pliny’s use of the 
senatorial delator Regulus as a means of self-definition in the Epistles; it could be actively useful to claim 
opponents. It would be interesting to make a comparison with delatores more generally in this context, too. 
Though universally despised in all ancient narratives, it is difficult to pin down exactly what made someone an 
informer. Many can be identified as senators. They might therefore be thought of as losers in the game of 
imperial public life; see Rutledge 2001; Rivière 2002; 397-424. 
34 Schöpe 2014.  
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of the court. Pertinax can again demonstrate this. The ancient narratives might suggest that he owed 
his promotion to qualities which attracted the attention of Marcus Aurelius.35 Even if we accept that 
premise, this seems to omit several stages. It does not explain how Marcus became aware of Pertinax 
in the first place. It may not be coincidental that Pertinax could rise to prominence under an emperor 
who spent a large proportion of his reign fighting defensive wars on the frontier.36 Though there is 
almost certainly insufficient data for definitive conclusions, sociological network theories may offer 
interesting points of comparison.37 The ability to access an emperor, potentially during the 
campaigning season itself, could certainly have been a factor in the promotions of Pertinax and men 
like him, enabling them to prove their worth.38  
Or it may be that the military element is already misleading. Reformulating the Senate as a much less 
cohesive body significantly expands the potential social networks in which senators were engaged. 
It is now widely observed that wealthier equestrians enjoyed similar cultural and economic lifestyles 
as the senatorial elite. This can be extended into networks of communication, suggesting an even 
greater degree of integration between the Senate and the wider imperial administration.39 If that is 
the case, Pertinax’s career may owe little to his military abilities. The only evidence for Pertinax’s 
                                                             
35 HA Pert. 2.7-9 is especially explicit; see also Sidebottom 1998: 2807; Hidber 2006: 203-6 on Pertinax embodying 
Marcus’ virtues in Herodian; Kemezis 2012: 397-402 on the comparison in Dio. 
36 For recent overviews of the Marcommanic Wars, see Kovács 2009: 201-64; Birley 2012: 222-30. 
37 e.g. Malkin et al. 2009; Collar 2013; Brughmans et al. 2016. In terms of data, there is a reason why many studies 
concentrate on economic questions, relying on (relatively) abundant archaeological evidence. Ruffini 2008 
addresses issues of social structure using the Oxyrhynchus papyri; the evidence to reconstruct communication 
within the imperial court in this way does not exist. 
38 De Blois 2014: 229-31 argues that imperial absence from Rome from the 230s onwards gave equestrians better 
access to the emperor, increasing their influence; see also Lo Cascio 2005: 164 for Maximinus speaking political 
change through his absence from Rome. The same justification would appear to apply in case of the 
Marcomannic Wars too. 
39 Weisweiler 2016 offers a useful parallel, investigating the ability of local elites to integrate into sources of 





quality as a general is his series of promotions. That may bespeak a political ability to manoeuvre 
through court intrigue as much as actual skill as a general.40 It might be instead that Pertinax owed 
his career entirely to pre-existing senatorial contacts. Pompeianus may have provided a route into 
court circles, and acted as contact who facilitated his advancement beyond the tribunate. In such 
models, direct interaction with the emperor becomes much less important than having someone 
speaking on his behalf.41 It may therefore be coincidental that the emperor was on the frontier. There 
are important questions, which I am not even pretending to answer here. Whatever Pertinax’s quality 
– whether an educated and effective commander, or someone lucky enough to have a senatorial 
patron – it still needs to be explained how it was that he could gain the emperor’s attention. 
The suggestion that Pertinax was really an equestrian who happened to be in the right place, at the 
right time, with the right senatorial patron, invites an obvious reply. How then can his reputation be 
explained? To be clear, there is no particular reason to doubt that Pertinax was far more educated 
than the stereotypical soldier, whether or not he really did start out as a grammaticus.42 Of itself, that 
is not sufficient to account for such a favourable reception. The same could easily be said of the 
supposedly corrupt Didius Julianus, who would have experienced the same rhetorical training in his 
youth. The causal link between an emperor’s actions and the praise or censure they received is far 
from secure. As recent studies of Domitian suggest, even apparently positive traits could easily be 
transformed into charges of tyranny against an assassinated ruler.43 Rather than analysing the 
emperor’s actual qualities, the issue at hand is why later commentators would choose to present 
Pertinax in this way. 
                                                             
40 This would challenge the common perception of Marcus Aurelius as a particularly effective emperor, if his 
regime was open to the same cronyism as those of other emperors. 
41 Thus Sandwell 2009 on Libanius, and his engagement in social networks across the empire, with people he 
likely had never actually met; Schor 2011 on Theodoret’s social and religious networks. 
42 Dio 74[73].3.1; HA Pert. 1.4. 
43 A colourful example is found in the contrast between Mart. Ep. 9.8 praising Domitian’s ban on castration, 
twisted into an attack by Dio. He writes that Domitian wanted to insult the memory of his brother Titus, who 
had a particular fondness for eunuchs (67.2). See Schulz 2016 for Dio’s reception of Domitian. 
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Pertinax had two benefits in this regard. In the immediate aftermath of his death, he was directly 
associated with legitimate rule. Septimius Severus originally appears to have taken power on the 
claim of avenging Pertinax; even without the specific explanations found in the ancient narratives, 
the reforms to the Praetorian Guard and his decision to add the cognomen Pertinax to his own name 
make that link quite clearly.44 Even after Severus had himself adopted into the Antonine dynasty, and 
no longer relied on Pertinax to legitimise his position, it is hard to see any benefit from attacking 
him; it still helped that Julianus was a tyrant.45 Pertinax was also useful to the ancient historians. The 
respective models of Dio and Herodian could both make use of Pertinax. His rise to senatorial status 
occurred under the auspices of Marcus Aurelius, an emperor who in most commentators’ eyes – both 
ancient and modern46 – could do no wrong. The parallels in both ancient narratives are clear, with 
Pertinax standing as a brief reminder of Antonine prosperity.47 Pertinax’s reputation was therefore 
secure without the need for his genuine support of a senatorial tradition.48  
Using Pertinax, two models have been suggested: how it was he might have come to prominence, and 
how his positive reception can be explained. The same two ideas can be applied to Maximinus as well. 
Challenging the simplistic portrayal of conflict between the Senate and the army opens up a series of 
explanations for his appointment. It becomes possible that Maximinus was part of the same network 
                                                             
44 On Severus’ actions in 193, see Campbell 2005: 1-4; Ando 2012: 23-28; Potter 2014: 101-103. 
45 The attempts made by Severus to claim legitimacy have been studied at length. See e.g. Baharal 1996: 20-42 
on the use of the Antonines; Lichtenberger 2011 on religious aspects; Kemezis 2014: 55-74; Hekster 2015: 209-18 
on Severus’ adoption by Marcus Aurelius. See also Imrie 2018: 113-33 on the Constitutio Antoniniana as an attempt 
by Caracalla to justify his sole rule after Geta’s death. 
46 See Hekster 2011 for a discussion of Marcus’ persistent reputation for virtue, even in modern scholarship. 
47 See n. 18. Kemezis 2014: 55: ‘[Pertinax’s] story is similar in many ways to Galba’s, except that he was a more 
personally attractive figure than Galba, and he would come to stand not for the obsolete severity of the 
forgotten republic, but for a kind of good government that many people in the Severan era could still 
remember.’ 
48 Though this does not mean that he lacked it. It is entirely possible that Pertinax respected senatorial tradition, 





which contained the political elite, whether as an active figure in the imperial court himself, or as 
someone with connections to it.49 The processes behind his appointment can then be questioned. 
Rather than Maximinus being the choice of the soldiers, it is possible that he was part of a broader 
conspiracy against Alexander, which included higher ranking supporters.50 Maximinus’ reported 
popularity among the troops could have been a reason for his selection; but like Pertinax, there is the 
chance that all military associations are to some degree misleading. If Maximinus was fully integrated 
into an elite social network, a reputation as a commander might not actually have been necessary. 
Soldiers might have been a means to remove Alexander, guided by conspirators.51 That is not the 
same as the army actively choosing their new ruler.52 
The disconnect between this view of Maximinus as a well-placed equestrian and the tyrannical 
soldier from the ancient narratives can be explained in the same discursive terms of imperial 
legitimacy seen with Pertinax. As Olivier Hekster has recently demonstrated in relation to dynastic 
presentation, claims of legitimate rule could vary considerably, but were constrained by the cultural 
norms of the time. Very crudely, ancestry was a useful method of supporting an emperor’s authority, 
                                                             
49 This would allow a more serious consideration of the links between Maximinus and his colleague as ordinary 
consul in 236, Marcus Pupienus Africanus Maximus, the son of the emperor Pupienus (PIR2 H 74). It has already 
been noted that his wife Caecilia Paulina, may have come from an elite background (e.g. Lippold 1991: 181; Börm 
2008: 79; Haegemans 2010: 86). Beyond her marriage to Maximinus, and her deification after her death, nothing 
else is known about her.  
50 Cf. Haegemans 2010: 254 for a summary of the idea that the rebellion against Maximinus could have been 
spread through elite patronage networks. She excludes Maximinus himself from these. 
51 Similar suggestions have recently been made regarding the role of the Praetorian Guard in the assassinations 
of Pertinax (Appelbaum 2007) and Elagabalus (Kemezis 2014; Arrizabalaga y Prado 2017: 433-41). 
52 Though a commonplace, the suggestion that the army was responsible for choosing leaders is problematic on 
a number of levels. It suggests a detailed awareness of the political situation, and relies entirely on greed as a 
motivation. The individuals who can really gain from a rebellion – the generals themselves – are the ones with 
access to up-to-date knowledge of the possibility of revolution, supporters in positions of power, and the 
military strength to assert their claims. Stripping them of agency in favour of their soldiers seems misguided. 
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but it had to be expressed in terms which its audience could understand.53 The promulgation of 
military power operated in the same terms. Emphasis on the army may not be appealing to a modern 
audience, but it was a standard, recognisable feature of Roman imperial rhetoric. This was an empire 
in which the ruler claimed the title imperator, and emperors were granted honorifics based on the 
foreign peoples they had conquered. Dio might accuse Septimius Severus of needlessly hunting for 
glory in his invasion of Parthia,54 but success as a commander was always a feature of imperial self-
presentation and self-legitimation.  
There are especially good reasons for this kind of self-presentation in 235. Severus Alexander could 
be presented as a youthful and inexperienced leader, whose military campaigns, according to 
Herodian had failed resoundingly. The accuracy of that image is far from certain,55 but to some degree 
that is of only partial importance. Even if it is the result of exaggeration, or indeed outright 
falsification, this description would benefit the successful general who took over after Alexander’s 
death.56 It seems that Maximinus attempted to secure his reputation immediately, with an invasion 
which may have advanced several hundred kilometres east of the Rhine.57 Herodian’s comparison of 
Maximinus’ invasions with those of Marcus Aurelius may be more apposite here than has been 
assumed.58 Three years of campaigning on the Rhine/Danube frontier have been taken as evidence of 
                                                             
53 Summarised in greater detail at Hekster 2015: 317-23. 
54 Dio 75[75].1.1; cf. the criticisms of Caligula’s war against the sea (Suet. Calig. 46), or Domitian’s false victory 
over non-Germans (Tac. Germ. 29.4). 
55 Contemporary imagery and later writers celebrate Alexander’s Persian campaign as a great success. Dignas 
and Winter 2007: 71-77 assembles the contradictory evidence. 
56 See Strobel 2004 for the suggestion that Pertinax was in fact closely connected to Commodus’ regime, making 
his portrayal as a restorer of the empire rather misleading. 
57 Berger et al. 2010 reports the archaeological excavation of a battleground at Harzhorn, around 200 kilometres 
east of Cologne, dated to the 220s or 230s. It is claimed that the direction of battle suggests the army was 
returning to Roman territory, and had therefore advanced further. See also papers in Pöppelmann et al. 2013. 





Maximinus’ lack of political ability or interests.59 Quite to the contrary, they have an effective 
ideological precedent in the shape of Marcus’ Marcomannic Wars.60 The presentation of an old and 
therefore experienced general could both distance Maximinus from the weaknesses of Alexander’s 
reign, and also connect him to positive models of Roman leadership. 
The negative reception of Maximinus follows the same pattern. The “senatorial” presentation of both 
rebellions in 238 would certainly gain from a focus on restoring a traditional social order.61 The 
Senate’s authority was recognisable, and reinforced by its opposition to an emperor portrayed as a 
jumped-up soldier.62 The military aspect of the characterisation may be peculiar to the third century, 
but its wider basis is not. The attacks bear a striking resemblance to the kind of rhetoric directed 
against homines novi for centuries. The charges against ‘soldiers’ may represent a new variety of 
invective in response to a changing political world.63 Maximinus does not have to have been outside 
elite networks in order for such charges to be made against him. When attacking opponents, a 
                                                             
59 Drinkwater 2005: 30; Ando 2012: 103-104; Potter 2014: 167. 
60 Or indeed Trajan’s actions on the same frontier before his return to Rome. See Haegemans 2010: 83-84 for the 
view that Maximinus’ absence from Rome was not a conscious decision, and that its importance has been 
greatly exaggerated. I would suggest that it could still have been a deliberate move, but one with positive 
associations. 
61 Townsend 1955 may be simplistic in its presentation of a senatorial revolution, but social networks could 
allow a more sophisticated support for his suggestion of strong links between the Gordians and Pupienus and 
Balbinus. 
62 Nero’s domus aurea offers a useful comparison. As scholars have now observed, his dominance of Roman space 
was standard Julio-Claudian practice, and an accepted feature of an early image of imperial power; it became a 
symbol of tyrannical excess under the Flavians, who used it to stress their own (equally traditional) generosity. 
See e.g. Rosso 2008; Wood 2010. 
63 It is worth bearing in mind that Dio was the son of a consul. His dismissive accounts of corrupt figures may 
reflect this developing form of conservatism. Thus, Comazon was sent to the galleys as a punishment when in 
the army (80[79].3.5); he was not only a common soldier, but an ill-disciplined one at that. 
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background outside the senatorial elite was an easy target.64 Equestrian generals (whether adlected 
to the Senate or not) certainly had a different career to senators like Cicero, but the same arrogant, 
elitist disregard for men outside the nobility is on show in their criticism.65 
Reframing ancient historiography as reactive, rather than objectively descriptive, sets up a very 
different model of political change in the third century. Pertinax and Maximinus may remain as 
extreme of a spectrum, but only in rhetorical terms. They do not have to be the champions of 
opposing political forces. Herodian would have us believe that they represent the Senate and the 
army, and Dio’s political configuration closely conforms to his suggestions. Outside of this narrative 
world, their careers look rather more similar. Both were older men, with experience as military 
commanders; both were appointed after the assassination of emperors who came to power young, 
and who had reigned for just over a decade. Their very different reputations can be explained in part 
through their contrasting roles under later rulers, heightened by Pertinax’s association with Marcus 
Aurelius. Maximinus may not have been a senator, but that does not remove him from the networks 
of the Roman political elite.   
The struggle between the Senate and the army continues to dominate even the most recent 
reconstructions of the period. The survival of emperors is explained in terms of their ability to 
maintain the loyalty of greedy soldiers, who would replace them as and when they considered it 
opportune. This view of the third century derives from its contemporary historiography. It can be 
put to one side. Just as specific details and individual events have been challenged to increasing effect, 
so too the general political environment is misleading. If Maximinus Thrax, the archetypal soldier-
emperor, was in fact nothing of the sort, it raises significant questions for the remainder of the third 
                                                             
64 Börm 2008: 77-78 adapts Weber’s three archetypes of legitimate rule, arguing that Maximinus represented 
himself as a charismatic ruler, as opposed to the legal legitimacy of Pupienus and Balbinus. There is a danger 
that the differentiation between them is a reflection of their reception, rather than their own claims. That is to 
say, it is not necessarily that Maximinus used only his military successes as a basis for legitimacy, but that his 
opponents chose to emphasise that, in order to demonstrate his illegitimacy. 
65 On such invective in the Republic, Craig 2004; Mehl 2018. See Libanius Or. 42 for the phenomenon still 





century. Unrest can be explained not from competition between antagonistic institutions, but from 
a weakness of imperial authority itself, and a network of integrated political elites who were willing 
to claim power for themselves.  
This reassessment is removed from the contemporary accounts of ancient writers, but it is not a 
complete rejection of them. Herodian’s narrative of emperors and their individual characters can be 
understood in conversation with efforts to legitimise imperial authority. It is clear from the History 
that Herodian saw many of these attempts as either corrupt or ineffective. Dio’s Roman History 
presents one response to a Senate whose composition was changing. Within the same viewpoint, 
adlected senators could be welcomed, as in the case of Pertinax, as well as attacked. In Dio’s narrative, 
senators are judged on their conformity to an ideal of behaviour, whatever their background. Correct 
actions coincide neatly with his own. In both cases, we do not need to accept personal views as 
representative of a wider social attitude. There is greater scope for competition between means of 
legitimisation, and collaboration between different parts of an elite imperial network, than either 
historian allows for. These accounts are not enlightened eyewitness insights which can guide the 
modern reader through the early third century, but simplifications of a more complex situation. 
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